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ABSTRACT
This thesis aims to examine the role of collective social and political agency in international 
relations through an elaboration of the category ‘international civil society’. It does so by 
adopting a distinctly modem understanding of collective agency associated to the concept of 
civil society, then to argue that the social movements operating within this domain have 
displayed international characteristics from their inception. Specifically, the study considers 
the way in which modem social and political movements (trade unions, socialist and 
nationalist parties) emerged and developed in Tunisia from the turn of the century through to 
independence in 1956, as a result of this country’s interaction with the international system. 
Hence, the thesis is primarily concerned with the mechanisms responsible for the extension of 
modes of social and political organisation across national, ethnic and religious boundaries. In 
doing so, however, it also seeks to uncover practices of transnational solidarity among social 
movements and to evaluate the relevance of such practices for our understanding of 
international society. In short, the central purpose of the thesis is to illustrate how the concept 
of ‘international civil society’ can serve on the one hand as an analytical tool for the study of 
international political agency and its impact upon international relations; and on the other 
hand, as a normatively charged category, capable of recovering the past history of 
internationalist political activity and illuminating its future potential.
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Chapter One 
Introduction
This aim of this thesis is to argue for the relevance of collective social and political 
agency in international relations. The term ‘civil society’ is initially adopted to 
describe that social domain where modern collective political agency takes shape. 
From this premise, I go on to argue that the social movements operating within civil 
society have displayed international characteristics from their inception, thus 
warranting the introduction of the term ‘international civil society’ as a category 
capable of explaining the dynamics and consequences of collective social and political 
agency at an international level. The historical and sociological implications of 
deploying this concept will be considered with specific reference to the case of 
Tunisia. I shall examine the way in which modern social movements emerged and 
developed in Tunisia between the turn of the century and independence in 1956, due 
fundamentally to the country’s interaction with the international system. One of the 
central concerns of this thesis, therefore, is the examination of the mechanisms 
responsible for the reproduction of modes of social and political organisation across 
national, ethnic and religious boundaries. The aim of such an exercise is to uncover 
and recover for the study of international relations, the practices of transnational 
solidarity among social movements and to evaluate the relevance of these practices for 
our understanding of international society. In short, the central purpose of the 
chapters that follow is to illustrate how the concept of ‘international civil society’ can 
serve on the one hand as an analytical tool for the study of international political 
agency and its impact upon international relations; and on the other hand, as a 
normatively charged category, capable of recovering the past history of 
internationalist political activity and illuminating its future potential.
These broad objectives raise two immediate questions to be addressed in this 
introductory chapter. The first set of considerations relate to the choice of Tunisia as 
case study: what is relevance of this country for the expansion of international civil 
society?; and can the conceptual tools derived from the European experience be 
applied to the study of a north African society? A second, and perhaps more
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important question concerns the novelty of the idea of international civil society: in 
what ways does this category contribute to or depart from existing approaches to 
International Relations (IR) with similar concerns? This introductory chapter seeks to 
answer these questions explicitly, but the responses provided here will hopefully also 
be implicit throughout the rest of the thesis.
The chapter is organised in the following way: a first section will briefly 
defend the universal currency of categories derived from modern social science and 
highlight the reasons for considering the expansion of international civil society to 
Tunisia as an instance of this validity. The remaining sections aim to distinguish my 
own treatment of questions such as agency, transnationalism and civil society from 
those prevailing within the discipline, thereby placing the concept of international 
civil society within the wider debates in IR. One important reason for these 
differences, I maintain, lies in the broadly-defined historical-sociological method 
adopted in this study. The concluding section of the chapter is therefore dedicated to 
the definition and justification of such an approach.
1.1 The Universal and the Particular: Tunisia as a Case-Study
One of the central aims of this thesis is to highlight the universality of modem forms 
of social and political agency under capitalist modernity. The claim here is that the 
distinctly modern forms of political engagement that developed in Europe from the 
seventeenth century onward were eventually replicated across many parts of the 
world, essentially as a result of the global reproduction of capitalism. Such modes of 
social and political agency were plainly not homogenous: positing a universality of 
form does not preclude accepting a diversity of content. In other words, the broad 
range of modern social movements that have operated internationally over the past 
three centuries are by no means uniform; the historical and geographical context of 
their development has given many such movements a very specific cultural, political
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and sociological imprint. Acknowledging this specificity, however, is perfectly 
compatible with the recognition of certain universal traits in the language, 
organisation and activity of modern social movements. Thus, for example, though 
national liberation movements such as the Nicaraguan FSLN and the Mozambican 
FRELIMO clearly display features particular to their concrete socio-historical setting, 
their organisational structures, ideological orientation and methods of mobilisation can 
be said to be analogous.
This seemingly straightforward contention (that modern forms of political 
agency have a universal purchase) is nonetheless far from uncontroversial. Indeed, 
much of recent scholarship on the international dimensions of social movements is 
concerned with highlighting the sharp differences in the modes of political 
engagement across the world, often associating the ‘modernity’ of any given social 
movement to foreign impositions. It is with these arguments in mind that Tunisia has 
been chosen as a case study which illustrates the process of universalisation of modern 
political agency. As a non-European country with a strong Arab and Islamic heritage, 
Tunisia qualifies as one of those proverbial ‘Other’ societies which, some social 
theorists suggest, cannot be understood with the analytical tools derived from the 
western historical experience.1 The idea of civil society, for example, is deemed to 
be inapplicable to an eastern society like that of Tunisia because it is a concept that 
emerged and developed in the west.
A rebuttal of such an approach to the study of Tunisia (or for that matter, any 
other country of the Middle East and North Africa) can take several avenues. 
Numerous scholars from inside and outside the region have demonstrated that 
geographical categories such as ‘western’ or ‘eastern’ are highly fluid when not 
outright unsustainable historically; that the so-called ‘Muslim world’ is thoroughly 
heterogenous and that there is nothing specifically ‘Islamic’ about the economic
1 Recent examples include B. Sayyid, A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of 
Islamism (London and New York: Zed Books, 1997) andP. Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the 
Colonial World: a Derivative Discourse? (London: Zed, 1986).
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backwardness, social conservatism or political authoritarianism so often connected to 
these societies.2 They have moreover shown how many of the socio-economic and 
political phenomena such as revolutions, populism, military conflict or religious 
fundamentalism commonly associated to this part of the world can be quite readily 
compared to similar phenomena in other parts of the world. The arguments invoking 
the particularity of the Middle East and North Africa can therefore be disposed with 
simply by probing the historical accuracy of geographically-determined concepts and 
by carrying out comparative research. In the Sami Zubaida’s words:
[t]here are many Muslim societies, and the range of their variation is 
comprehensible in terms of the normal practice of social and political analysis 
like any other range of societies. Of course, there are certain cultural themes 
common to the Muslim lands and epochs, arising from religion and common 
historical reference, much like the common culture arising from Christian 
religion and history. It would be a mistake, however, to think that these 
cultural items and the entities they specify are sociological or political 
constants; they are assigned different meanings and roles by different socio­
political contexts.3
In the last instance, the most convincing test of whether the categories of modern 
social theory are applicable outside the west lies in the plausibility of the explanations 
they generate. Thus, the choice of Tunisia as a case study derives both from the need
2 I am thinking inter alia of the work of Ervand Abrahamian, Talal Asad, Aziz Al-Azmeh, Simon 
Bromely, Rene Gallissot, Fred Halliday, Nikki Keddie, Val Moghadam, Roger Owen and Maxime 
Rodinson. In the anglophone world, the now-defunct Review of Middle East Studies embodied this 
historical and sociological approach to the region during the 1970s . TheMiddle East Research and 
Information Project (MERIP) reports and the journal Comparative Studies on South Asia, Africa the 
Middle East now carry the mantle of this tradition.
3 Sami Zubaida, “Is There a Muslim Society? Ernest Gellner’s sociology of Islam”, Economy and 
Society (Vol. 24, No. 2, May 1995), pp. 151-181.
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to focus on a ‘hard case’ of a seemingly unique society, and from the conviction that 
it is historical explanation, and not abstract epistemological and ontological debates 
that determine the validity of given concepts.
This said, there are plainly numerous specific features to Tunisian history and 
society which will hopefully emerge in the course of the historical narrative developed 
below. Of the three major Maghrebi countries (the other two being Morocco and 
Algeria), Tunisia is the smallest both in terms of territory and population. The legacy 
of Ottoman rule was more enduring than in Algeria (where it technically ended in 
1848 as the country officially became an administrative part o f the French hexagone) 
and Morocco (which was never subjugated by the Ottomans). Conversely, the colonial 
penetration was in many respects comparable to that of Algeria, though without the 
same levels of violence nor the equivalent number of settlers than its neighbour. 
Moreover, as the chapters in narrative section of this thesis will indicate, Tunisian 
society was generally at the forefront in the development of modern forms of social 
and political agency in the Maghreb, if not always responsible for its most radical 
expressions.
Overall, therefore, the experience of twentieth-century Tunisia is broadly 
representative of the Maghreb at large. Indeed, at various stages during the course of 
this thesis, I shall consider events in Tunisia within the context of the Maghreb as a 
whole, due to the pronounced impact of regional dynamics on the country’s historical 
development. Moreover, in so far as significant commonalities can be found between 
this historical experience of the Maghreb and that of other colonised societies in Asia, 
Africa and the Middle East this very specific case study of the expansion of 
international civil society to Tunisia aims to produce more general insights into the 
international dimensions of modem social and political agency in countries as diverse 
as Vietnam, Angola or Argentina. In other words, students of similar processes across 
the world will hopefully find some use in the concepts and conclusions emerging out 
of this study. Having presented a basic justification for the use of a case study, it is
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now time to consider the essential premises of my understanding of international civil 
society, and how they contrast and overlap with the existing approaches within IR to 
similar themes.
1.2 Non-State Actors in International Relations
For over three decades, IR scholars have been contesting the predominance of ‘the 
state’ as the central explanatory category within the discipline. In their seminal 
collection of essays on Transnational Relations and World Politics, Robert Keohane 
and Joseph Nye captured the beginnings of this reaction to state-centric IR theory - 
represented in the work John Burton, Mansbach et al. , James Rosenau and Edward 
Morse, among others4- when they insisted that, “A good deal of intersocietal 
intercourse with significant political importance, takes place without governmental 
control [...] This volume ... focuses on these ‘transnational relations’ - contacts, 
coalitions, and interactions across state boundaries that are not controlled by the 
central foreign policy organs of governments.”5 The relevance of such interactions 
had, it can be argued, already been identified by classical thinkers of international 
relations from Kant and Burke through to Marx and Mill. Certainly the notion of 
transnationalism has been present in twentieth century IR theory, whether implicitly 
-as in the writings of Leonard Woolf or David Mitrany- or more explicitly in
4 J. Burton, World Society (London: Macmillan, 1972); J. Rosenau, Linkage Politics: Essays on the 
Convergence o f National and International Systems (New York; Free Press, 1969); E.L. Morse, 
Modernisation and the Transformation o f International Relations(New York: Free Press, 1976); R.W. 
Mansbach, Y. H. Ferguson, D. E. Lampert, The Web of World Politics: Non-state Actors in the Globed 
System (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1976); E-O. Czempiel (ed.) Die anachronistische 
Souveranitat (Koln-Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1969) . For a good overview of the literature 
falling under the category of ‘transnationalism’ see Michael Clarke, “Transnationalism” in Steve Smih 
(ed.) International Relations: British and American Perspectives (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), pp. 
146-170.
5 R. Keohane and J. Nye (eds.), Transnational Relations and World Politics (Cambridge, MA and 
London: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. x.
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Raymond Aron’s or Arnold Wolfers’ discussion of the subject.6 Yet the 
transnationalist literature that emerged in the 1970s marked a substantive departure 
from these previous explorations in at least two respects. First, rather than being a 
tangential consideration within a broader analytical framework, transnational 
phenomena represented the central theoretical concern for scholars such as Burton, 
Rosenau or Keohane and Nye. This, of course, did not entail an outright rejection of 
the study of interstate relations, but it did assume that transnational relations were 
worthy of analysis both in their own right, and in so far as they significantly affected 
interstate relations. As Keohane and Nye summarised it: “[w]e believe that the 
simplifications of the state-centric approach divert the attention of scholars and 
statesmen away from many important current problems and distort the analyses of 
others. We have suggested a ‘world politics paradigm’ that includes transnational, 
transgovernmental and interstate interactions in the hope of stimulating new types of 
theory, research, and approaches to policy.”7
Second, and following on from this, despite some important differences in 
their arguments, the transnationalist literature adopted a similar methodological 
stance: one thoroughly permeated by the prevalent behaviouralist trend in the social 
sciences. Briefly stated, such an approach placed great faith in the explanatory 
potential of data accumulation. The proliferation of transnational interactions, so the 
argument ran, had increased the complexity of world politics such, that only the 
systematic collation of data relating to these interactions could bring some semblance 
of order to our understanding of international relations. This enthusiasm for the 
possibilities of quantification was, to be sure, tempered by an emphasis on the 
identification of appropriate ‘variables’. As one notable exponent of the
6 See respectively, R. Aron, Peace and War: A Theory o f International Relations (Weidenfeld& 
Nicolson, 1966) and A. Wolfers (ed.), Discord and Collaboration (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1962).
7 Keohane and Nye, Transnational Relations, p. 398.
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transnationalist approach put it: “Accurate and reliable measurements are of little 
value unless they measure the proper variable; and, unfortunately, our speculations 
about changing global structures involve variables that are not readily observed.”8 
Once the ‘puzzlement’ over variables was solved, however, the ground was cleared 
for empirical investigation:
[w]e should recall that the conceptual task of disaggregating the relevant 
global structures so that their component parts are exposed -and thus 
measurable- is far more difficult than performing the empirical task of 
recording observations. Indeed, once these component parts are conceptually 
identified, it ought not to take much creativity to formulate operational 
measures for them that can be applied to their interaction across time and in 
the context of comparable cases.9
Transnationalism was subjected to a range of forceful criticisms in the aftermath of 
its rise to theoretical prominence in the 1970s. Some of these will be addressed in 
greater detail below. At this point, however, its is necessary to pause briefly on the 
role of collective social and political activity within the transnationalist framework. 
For one of the seemingly novel phenomena that spurred on the transnationalist agenda 
was the organisation of social and political movements across national boundaries. 
Again, the way in which the different authors associated to this approach dealt with 
such phenomena varied considerably. Nonetheless it is possible to identify four basic 
assumptions which undergirded the transnationalist treatment of social movements.
The first of these concerned the relatively recent arrival of non-governmental 
organisations to the international political arena. With a few notable exceptions, the
8 James N. Rosenau, “International Studies in a Transnational World” Millennium: Journal of 
International Studies (Vol. 5, N o.l, Spring 1976), pp. 1-20, p.8.
9Ibid., p. 9.
13
Chapter One: Introduction
classical transnationalist authors rarely extended their investigation of non-state actors 
beyond the twentieth century, claiming that it was the quantitative explosion of non­
governmental organisations during this century that most merited the attention of IR 
students. The transnationalist discussions of social movements tended to link the rise 
of such actors with the extension of international organisations and the intensification 
of global economic relations after World War II. Furthermore, transnational social 
and political activity was explicitly portrayed as a ‘pluralisation’ of actors in world 
politics encouraged by US ascendancy in the international system. As Keohane and 
Nye candidly admitted: “from a transnational perspective the United States is by far 
the preponderant society in the world ...[this] has its origins in American patterns of 
social organisation and the American ‘style’ as well as in the size and modernity of 
its economy.”10
Second, although most advocates of transnationalism were at pains to 
emphasise that they were not heralding the demise of the state, they did claim that 
non-state actors could under specific circumstances be as important, if not more, than 
the nation-state when explaining international relations. Hence, transnationalists 
granted different forms of collective social and political agency distinct ontological 
status in international relations. This in turn led to a third assumption closely 
associated to Keohane and Nye’s understanding of interdependence, namely that there 
existed no necessary hierarchy among the plethora of actors in world politics. State 
and non-state actors vied for influence in the international system, sometimes in 
unison, other times in competition. The upshot of such activity, however, was 
indeterminate in so far as no one expression of power -military, economic, 
ideological, political- associated to these different agents could be said to predominate 
over the other. From this perspective the traditional, state-centric approach to 
international relations, with its emphasis on geopolitics and military might, was being 
superseded by a much more complex web of powers and interests including
10 Keohane and Nye, Transnational Relations, p. 389.
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transnational organisations such as revolutionary groups, labour movements, or 
indeed the Ford Foundation and the Catholic Church. The latter deployed mechanisms 
of international influence and organisation the impact of which simply could not be 
ascertained through the deployment of old analytical categories such as ‘national 
interest’ or ‘foreign intervention’. Instead IR scholars had to accept that the plurality 
of forces in world politics had created an interdependent world where structures of 
international interaction were constantly being re-arranged:
We find ourselves in a world that reminds us more of the extensive and 
curious chess board in Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass than the 
more conventional versions of that ancient game. The players are not always 
what they seem, and the terrain of the chessboards may suddenly change from 
garden to shop to castle. Thus in contemporary world politics not all players 
on important chessboards are states, and the varying terrains of the 
chessboards constrain behaviour. Some are more suited to the sue of force, 
others almost unsuited for it. Different chessboards favor different states.11
Last, and by no means least important, all theorists of transnationalism acknowledged, 
with different degrees of qualification, that theirs was a normative project imbued 
with the liberal-pluralist values prevalent in the US academe at the time. The 
transnationalist emphasis on competition among a multiplicity of actors in world 
politics, their belief that the outcome of such contests was not predetermined and that 
therefore global interdependence was creating a world where the centres of power 
were increasingly diffuse, all echoed the pluralist theories of democracy applied to the 
domestic setting by writers such as Robert Dahl or David Easton. From this 
perspective, the existence of multiple transnational actors was in itself a positive 
feature of world politics insofar as it ostensibly made the monopoly of power less
11 Ibid., p. 379
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likely. More interestingly perhaps, in a language reminiscent of their ‘utopian’ and 
functionalist forebears in IR, many of the transnationalist theorists attached a 
privileged role to transnational social and political movements in the promotion of 
international cooperation, inter-cultural understanding and the peaceful resolution of 
conflict.
This brief overview of the early transnationalist literature will have hopefully 
provided some sense of how non-state actors, and social and political movements in 
particular, were originally incorporated into mainstream IR theory during the 1970s. 
Much of the later investigation into social movements within IR owes a great deal to 
this pioneering work. Yet at the same time, the transnationalist literature displayed 
a number of analytical and normative shortcomings that require closer critical 
scrutiny.
The first of these relates to the overall descriptive nature of the transnationalist 
agenda. For all their boldness in announcing a shift from a state-centric toward a 
‘world politics’ paradigm, students of transnationalism remained surprisingly coy 
about the explanatory power of this new category. As Michael Clarke has astutely 
observed, “In itself [transnationalism] certainly does not constitute a theory; it is 
rather a term which recognizes a phenomenon, or perhaps a trend in world politics, 
a phenomenon from which other concepts flow.”12 With very few exceptions, the 
authors investigating transnationalism seemed content with identifying non-state 
agents and describing their intercourse with other actors in world politics. The task 
at hand was not so much to consider how these interactions might help to explain 
world politics, but simply to recognise their existence and register their impact upon 
interstate relations. The closest transnationalism came to acquiring explanatory status 
was in the conclusions to the volume edited by Keohane and Nye. Here, the two 
editors surveyed the uses which their colleagues’ ‘findings’ could be put to when 
studying international relations, US foreign policy and international organisations,
12 Michael Clarke, “Transnationalism”, p. 146.
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respectively. Yet, again, the prospect of a paradigm shift giving rise to an improved 
explanation of international relations failed to go beyond a hesitant and promissory 
declaration of good intent premised on the descriptive paucity of state-centrism:
Transnational actors sometimes prevail over governments. These ‘losses’ by 
governments can often be attributed to the rising costs of unilateral 
governmental action in the face of transnational relations. For a state-centric 
theory this is represented as the ‘environment’. But it is theoretically 
inadequate to use exogenous variables of the environment to account for 
outcomes in the interaction of various actors in the world politics. State- 
centric theories are not very good at explaining such outcomes because they 
do not describe the patterns of coalitions between different types of actors 
described in the essays [of this volume]. We hope that our ‘world politics 
paradigm’ will help to redirect attention toward the substances of international 
politics...13
One important reason for the limited explanatory power of transnationalism is that it 
lacks any theory of agency. For transnationalists, the ‘actors’ in world politics 
become so simply by virtue of their pursuit of self-professed goals. There is no 
attempt in the transnationalist literature to distinguish between different types of 
agency, nor to situate the latter in an adequate historical and sociological context. 
Thus, any form of organisation that operates on a non-governmental basis across 
interstate borders automatically qualifies as a transnational actor. Why such an 
organisation emerged in the first place, or what motives may lie behind its activities, 
are not relevant issues for the fundamentally descriptive approach endorsed by 
transnationalists. However, if our aim is to explain international relations, it seems 
imperative to identify and distinguish between different modes of transnational
13 Keohane and Nye, Transnational Relations, p. 386.
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collective agency. This is essential not only for the purposes of creating some 
hierarchy of agencies, where actions adopted by some organisations become more 
relevant than others, but also so as to provide a sense of direction to these actions. A s 
I shall try to indicate below, these questions have been the mainstay of sociological 
theory for almost two centuries. In recent years, they have finally found their way 
into IR theory, thus providing a long overdue corrective to the explanatory paucity 
of transnationalism.
The transnationalist failure in adequately explaining collective agency uncovers 
a third important limitation of this approach, namely the absence of any clear notion 
of society. Characteristically, the bulk of transnationalist literature assumes that the 
actors in ‘world politics’ operate within a neutral and pre-existing international space 
they interchangeably term the ‘international system’, ‘world society’ or ‘international 
society’. Yet, clearly, the historical and structural characteristics of the existing 
international system are in many important respects unique. Specifically, once modern 
international society is understood to be a by product of the advent and development 
of capitalism, the structural features of this society and the nature of the agents that 
act within it become associated to particular interests and specific hierarchies. For 
example, in the transnationalist account, multinational corporations (MNCs) are 
simply identified as another private actor in world politics, this time confined to the 
private sphere of ‘economics’. But the kind of agency that informs the workings of 
an MNC is plainly different to that which motivates, say, an international trade union 
organisation. Furthermore, in so far as both these forms of collective agency are part 
of ‘world politics’, they tend to represent opposing interests and generally interact 
along a hierarchical axis. All this does not mean that both MNCs and international 
labour organisations are not equally relevant for our understanding of international 
relations. On the contrary, it is to suggest that in order fully to appreciate the nature 
and import of their role in international relations, it is necessary to investigate their 
historical provenance and the interests that motivate their actions. One way of
18
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achieving this is by reference to the structures and agencies engendered by capitalism. 
But this, unfortunately, is something that eludes transnationalist theories. Because 
most of the transnationalist literature is oblivious to the broad concerns of sociological 
theory, it has been unable to develop any analysis of social relations -be these 
capitalist or otherwise- beyond that of describing the selective interaction among 
specific transnational actors.
There is a last facet of transnationalism worth criticising in this context; this 
time relating to the state. One facile objection often levied against transnationalist 
theories is that they overemphasise the relevance of non-state actors in detriment to 
that of the state. Indeed, one notorious critic of transnationalism ascribed its failings 
to a particular ‘American illusion’: “The curious delusion about the imminent demise 
of the nation-state has affected Americans throughout their history ... No matter that 
the assumption of American politicians and ‘analysts’ about the demise of the nation­
state has been proved wrong time and again. ” 14 Aside from misrepresenting the 
transnationalist agenda, criticisms of this nature impoverish the debates over 
transnationalism by reducing the disputes to an either/or outcome ie. either states are 
the most important actors in international the international system or transnational 
actors are. Yet, as I shall argue in the rest of this thesis, a more fruitful, and arguably 
more accurate approach to the question involves concentrating on the interaction, as 
opposed to the contrast between state and non-state actors, or more precisely between 
state and civil society. Theorists of transnationalism rarely announced ‘the demise of 
the nation-state’ but rather sought to highlight the role of social forces outside the 
immediate control of the state. In their more sophisticated expressions (eg. the work 
of Keohane and Nye) the transnationalist literature aimed to gauge the impact of 
transnational activity upon the interstate system, and not to set one class of actors 
against the other. Unfortunately, such investigations into the dialectic between state
14 Fred Northedge, “ Transnationalism: The American Illusion”, Millennium (Vol. 5, No. 1, Spring 
1976), pp. 21-27, p. 25.
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and civil society were pitched at the ahistorical, positivist level geared toward 
calculating the ‘sensitivity’ or ‘vulnerability’ of states vis-a-vis the activities of non­
state actors. The approach adopted below, however, seeks to probe the interaction 
among state and non-state actors from a historical-sociological perspective, 
emphasising the mutual construction of these entities through time. Such a focus upon 
the historical relations among the agents of state and civil society, I argue, manages 
to transcend the crude dichotomy between state and non-state actors without thereby 
obscuring their distinct existence and internal dynamic.
Classical transnationalism then, is flawed on five major counts: it is essentially 
descriptive; it has no clear notion of agency; it has no comprehensive theory of 
society; it fails to consider the interrelationship between state and society; and 
consequently, it cannot account for the hierarchies and structures in world politics. 
The sections below will try to illustrate how these shortcomings can be corrected 
without thereby foregoing some of the important insights into international relations 
provided by the transnationalist literature. Indeed, the rest of this thesis can be read 
as a contribution toward an historical and sociological understanding of transnational 
relations. In so doing, subsequent chapters will place considerable emphasis on two 
concepts which in the past decade have been widely discussed among IR theorists: 
civil society and agency. While the discussion of these two broad categories allows 
us to go some way in redressing the sociological paucity of classical transnationalism, 
significant problems still remain with the prevailing understanding of agency and civil 
society in IR. It is to these questions, and how my own usage of the categories differs 
from the existing ones, that I now turn.
1.3 Civil Society and International Relations Theory
The idea of ‘civil society’ has been all-pervasive in the social sciences over the past 
two decades. Partly a response to the role of collective agency in toppling dictatorial
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regimes, partly a reflection of the retreat from the language of class or revolution 
among the left, the portmanteau concept of civil society has been invoked in a wide 
range of contexts, generally with reference to that arena of our social and political 
lives that stands outside the control of the state. The limitations of such an approach 
to civil society will be dealt with at greater length in chapter two. Here the aim is to 
outline the ways in which IR theorists have incorporated this category into our 
discipline, and to identify the analytical and normative shortcomings of such usages.
In essence, ‘civil society’ has been deployed within IR in three basic ways. 
First, there are those authors such as Ronnie Lipschutz15, Matin Shaw16 or M. J. 
Peterson17 that resort to the concept in order to retrieve much of the classical 
transnationalist concerns with non-state actors and what they perceive as a new stage 
in global interdependence, usually presented under the rubric of ‘globalisation’. These 
authors generally consider this renewed activity among transnational actors in world 
politics as a possible source of progressive politics, and in this sense, they represent 
a continuity in the tradition of liberal internationalism under a different guise. For 
both these reasons, I have labelled them the ‘new transnationalists’.
A second cluster of authors shares much of the empirical diagnosis of the new 
transnationalists, acknowledging a qualitative shift in the nature of world politics, but 
displaying considerable scepticism as to whether such changes bear the promise of 
new transnational social and political coalitions. Scholars like R.B.J Walker18 and,
15 Ronnie D. Lipschutz, “Reconstructing World Politics: The Emergence of Global Civil Society”, 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, (Vol. 21, No.3, Winter 1992), pp. 389-420.
16 Martin Shaw, “Global Society and Global Responsibility: The Theoretical, Historical and Political 
Limits of ‘International Society’” Millennium: Journal of International Studies, (Vol. 21, No.3, Wmter 
1992), pp. 421-434.
17 M.J. Peterson, “Transnational Activity, International Society and World Politics”, Millennium: 
Journal o f International Studies, (Vol. 21, No.3, Winter 1992), pp.371-388.
18 R.B.J. Walker, "Social Movements/World Politics", Millennium: Journal o f International Studies 
Vol. 23, No. 3, 1994, pp. 669-700, p. 699.
21
Chapter One: Introduction
outside our own discipline, Michael Hardt19, can be seen to represent this view of the 
overlap between civil society and international relations. Because most of their critical 
energies are directed against the ‘modernist’ readings of international civil society, 
these scholars can be said to defend a post-modernist approach to the issue.
Last, there are those IR theorist that fall under the category of ‘Neo- 
Gramscians’ or the ‘Italian School’ who have applied Antonio Gramsci’s conception 
of civil society to the domain of international relations. According to this school, civil 
society is associated to the capitalist market and the contest between hegemonic and 
counter-hegemonic forces that arise from this ‘private’ sphere of social relations. In 
so far as the neo-Gramscians apply a Marxian understanding of civil society, their 
analysis is of global or international civil society closest to that deployed in this 
thesis.
All three contributions to the question of civil society and international 
relations have enriched our understanding of the phenomena arising out of this 
juxtaposition. Each approach emphasises different aspects of civil society (social 
movements, market relations, its relation with the state) which lend support to the 
arguments in favour of taking this concept seriously within IR. Yet despite these 
significant advances in bringing civil society into the domain of the international, 
reservations must still be raised as to the way this manoeuver has been effected. In 
other words, while being entirely sympathetic to the ends pursued when 
incorporating civil society into our discipline, I would like to raise some objections 
as to the means employed to do so.
The main targets of critique are what I have termed the new transnationalists. 
The work of Martin Shaw and Ronnie Lipschutz has been at the forefront of the 
debates on civil society and world politics. Through their contributions to the 1992 
special issue of the journal Millennium -dedicated to exploring the terrain ‘Beyond
19 Michael Hardt, "The Withering of Civil Society", Social Text (Vol. 14, N o.4, Winter 1995) ,pp. 
27-44.
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International Society’- these authors provided the first sustained discussions of civil 
society and international relations (or their derivations, global civil society and 
international civil society). These themes have been followed up with monographs that 
apply such concepts to specific issues of world politics like the environment or the 
impact of media on humanitarian crises.20
The first major fault of these approaches lies in their adoption of an 
ahistorical and socially disembedded understanding of civil society. Much like their 
transnationalist forerunners, international or global civil society on this account is 
identified as a space populated by transnational forces such as international non­
governmental organisations and pressure groups that float autonomously within this 
sphere. Thus for example, Lipschutz considers global civil society to be represented 
by “ [pjolitical spaces other than those bounded by the parameters of the nation-state 
system”21, while Shaw suggests that a global civil society, “[c]an be seen at work in 
a variety of developments: the attempts by global ecological movements to make the 
state system respond to demands for global environmental management, the attempts 
by pressure groups to ensure that human rights and democracy are judged by a global 
standard and the demands, fuelled by media coverage, to make respect for human 
needs and human rights effective principles in international conflicts.”22 There is, 
again, little attempt in these writings to situate the purported agents of civil society 
within an historical and sociological context capable of identifying the origins of such 
organisations and the interests they seek to further. The currency of the term ‘civil 
society’ is therefore devalued by referring rather blandly to any transnational 
phenomena beyond the strict domain of interstate politics. Global or international civil
20 See respectively, R. D. Lipschutz (with J. Mayer) Global Civil Society and Global Environmental 
Governance: the Politics of Nature From Place to Planet (Albany, NY: State University of New York 
Press, 1996) and M. Shaw Civil Society and Media in Global Crises: Representing Distant Violence 
(London: Pinter, 1996).
21 Lipschutz, “Reconstructing”, p. 392.
22 Shaw, “Global Society”, p. 431.
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society simply replaces the old-fashioned term ‘transnational activity’ in its descriptive 
account of world politics.
It should be noted that Martin Shaw somewhat modified his usage of global 
civil society in a later contribution to Millennium. In the 1994 special issue of this 
journal dedicated to ‘Social Movements and World Politics’, Shaw recognised that 
the crucial interaction between states and civil society yielded a dynamic process 
where non-state actors simultaneously undermine and reinforce the international 
system: “The emergence of global civil society can be seen both as a response to the 
globalisation of state power and a source of pressure for i t ... [it] in fact corresponds 
to the contradictory process of the globalisation of state power, and the messy 
aggregation of global and national state power which comprises the contemporary 
interstate system.”23 Similarly M. J. Peterson’s contribution to the debates on 
international civil society emphasised the need states and civil societies have for their 
mutual survival.24 Such qualifications went some way toward charging the prevalent 
interpretation of global or international civil society with some explanatory power. 
Yet they still remained silent on the origins and development of the forms of 
collective agency which operated within this space, and more importantly, continued 
to ignore the hierarchies and interests which conditioned their interactions, both 
among the non-state actors themselves and in the latter’s interactions with the states- 
system. In short, the new transnationalists failed to draw out the full theoretical and 
historical implications of using the term ‘civil society’, preferring instead to employ 
it as a generic category useful in updating the catalogue of transnational activity in 
world politics for the 1990s.
A second set of commentators on civil society and international relations have 
proved to be more mindful of the concept’s lineage and the historical and political
23 Martin Shaw, “Civil Society and Global Politics: Beyond a Social Movements Approach” 
Millennium: Journal o f International Studies (Vol. 23, No.3, Winter 1994), pp. 647-67, p. 651.
24 Peterson, "Transnational Activity", p. 387.
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baggage it has accumulated. Arguing that the term ‘civil society’ is inextricably tied 
to modern conceptions of the social and the political, such approaches focus on the 
limitations inherent in using modernist discourses under the post-modern condition. 
R.B.J Walker has defended this view most ardently within our own discipline. In a 
recent assessment of the different invocations of civil society within IR, Walker 
recognises the value of bringing this concept into the discipline, if only because it 
unearths the aporias buried within modernist ‘meta-narratives’:
The current popularity of claims about a global civil society can thus be read 
as a partial response to the dearth of ways of speaking coherently about forms 
of politics that transgress the bounds of the sovereign state. As such, it is 
sometimes quite illuminating. Nevertheless, as an attempt to extend to the 
global context a concept that is so historically rooted in the historical 
experiences of states ... it is a concept that also expresses distinct limits to our 
ability to reimagine the political under contemporary conditions.25
In a similar vein, although coming from a different perspective, Michael Hardt 
suggests that we replace ‘civil society’ with ‘postcivil society’ as a more adequate tool 
of analysis for societies which have ”[r]ecently experienced a passage from a 
disciplinary society to a society of control."26 Here again, the sources of this shift in 
modes of dominance are explicitly associated to global transformations: "Mobility, 
speed and flexibility are the qualities that characterize this separate plane of rule."
What emerges from these ‘post-modern* explorations of global civil society 
therefore is an uneasy recognition of the relevance for world politics of those social 
movements operating within civil society, qualified by a strong scepticism toward the 
modernist foundations of their outlook and action. In other words, scholars like
25 Walker, "Social Movements/World Politics", p. 695.
26 Hardt, "The Withering of Civil Society", p.36.
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Walker appear to concur with the new trans nationalists on the relevance of non-state 
actors in international relations, but argue simultaneously that labelling this 
phenomenon global or international civil society simply reinforces the historic 
association of civil society to the bounded politics of the sovereign state.
The post-modern musings on the overlap between civil society and 
international relations have the merit of clearly identifying the historical roots of this 
conjunction. Walker’s commentary on the global civil society literature corrects the 
latter’s historical myopia not only by hinting at the predecessors to contemporary 
transnational social movements but more importantly, by associating the advent of 
civil society to a distinct historical epoch, namely capitalist modernity. This in turn 
opens up the possibility of anchoring our analysis of collective social and political 
agency at the international level upon a specific understanding of society ie. that 
characterised by the structures of the capitalist market. Somewhat paradoxically 
perhaps, the post-modern approaches to global civil society are allied on this point 
with the neo-Gramscian writings we shall be exploring in a moment, and indeed with 
the definition of international civil society adopted in the rest of this thesis (to be 
expounded further in chapter two). The real difference between the post-modernist 
and the modernist treatment of international civil society lies in the contemporary 
validity accorded to this category. While for the post-modernists, international civil 
society and its cognates are at best a relic of the past and at worst, modernist 
constructs which in Walker’s words “[s]imply affirm the limits of their ambition”, the 
view defended in this thesis (and therefore falling squarely into the modernist camp) 
is that international civil society is the term that best captures the dynamics of 
collective agency obtaining internationally today. Far from experiencing a shift 
toward modes of domination and contestation that transcend capitalist modernity, the 
present international conjuncture is characterised precisely by the affirmation of 
modern claims to state sovereignty, democracy, citizenship rights, civil liberties and 
by the deployment of modem forms of agency through political parties, trade unions
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and other comparable organisations. As long as these modes of social and political 
engagement remain the predominant sources of resistance across the world, reference 
to civil society and its international ramifications would appear to be the most 
adequate way of exploring the role of collective agency in international relations.
It is this general appreciation of the contemporary international system that has 
informed the usage of civil society among several Marxist scholars in IR. More 
specifically, it is those IR theorists who, inspired by Robert W. Cox’s pioneering 
work, that have incorporated Gramscian categories such as ‘civil society’, ‘hegemony’ 
and ‘historical bloc’ into the discipline. In essence, the neo-Gramscian references to 
civil society extrapolate the Italian communist’s usage of the term in the domestic 
setting onto the international stage. In a variation on the ‘domestic analogy’ the neo- 
Gramscians suggest that the associations, institutions and collectivities that Gramsci 
identified as forming a civil society distinct from the state within bourgeois 
democracies can also be seen to operate at the international level, thus warranting 
reference to a global or international civil society. Following Gramsci and Marx, the 
authors associated to the ‘Italian school’ identify civil society with the ‘private’ sphere 
of the capitalist market, to be distinguished from the ‘public’ domain of the state. 
Thus, global civil society is on this account synonymous with the global capitalist 
market. Such a conceptualisation represents a significant improvement on the 
transnationalist understanding of global civil society in that it roots discussions of the 
subject on the concrete socio-economic relations that govern our social lives. 
Moreover, the neo-Gramscian approach highlights the contestation that takes place 
within civil society by making reference to the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic 
interests that play themselves out within this sphere. In these two respects, the neo- 
Gramscian discussions on global civil society address the key criticisms levelled above 
at the new transnationalists: the lack of a notion of hierarchy and interests within civil 
society, and the consequent absence of a sociological and historical grounding of the 
concept.
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These strengths however, are overshadowed by a number of weaknesses in 
the neo-Gramscian conception of international civil society, not least in its imprecise 
usage. As we have seen , all the authors associated to this school equate civil society 
with the capitalist market. Yet on some accounts global or international civil society 
additionally refers to a set of “private, informal transnational apparatuses, such as the 
private international relations councils”27 that sustain the international ruling class 
consensus and foster the ideological consent among subordinate classes necessary for 
the maintenance of world hegemony. On this reading, global civil society also 
encompasses the activity of transnational class coalitions identified in Kees van der 
Pijl’s classic study on The Making o f an Atlantic Ruling Class,28 Although these shifts 
in the meaning of global civil society are not necessarily contradictory, they do beg 
the question of what is specifically useful about this category: if global civil society 
simply represents the global capitalist market, why not stick to the latter term?; if the 
concept aims to describe the forging of a transnational ruling class, how does 
reference to civil society clarify the object of study?
A more substantive problem in the neo-Gramscian discussion of global civil 
society relates to the place of the state in this domain of world politics. Although one 
of the major contributions of this school to IR is their insistence on the centrality of 
the historical interaction between states and civil societies when explaining 
international relations, it is not altogether clear how these two spheres inter-relate 
once they are projected onto the international realm. In a recent critical appraisal of 
the new Gramscians, Randall D. Germain and Michael Kenny put the point thus:
In the end, the concept of a ’global’ civil society cannot claim a Gramscian
27 Stephen Gill, “Structural Change and Global Political Economy: Globalizing Elitesand the Emerging 
World Order” in Y. Sakamoto (ed.) Global transformation: Challenges to the State System (Tokyo: 
United Nations University Press, 1994), p. 173.
23 K. van der Pijl’s The Making of an Atlantic Ruling Class (London: Verso, 1983)
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lineage except in relation to some kind of ‘international’ state ... [a]ny 
specifically Gramscian reading of civil society requires a corresponding 
structure of concrete political authority in order to become genuinely 
hegemonic in the sense used by Gramsci. It thus requires an account of a 
global ’political society’ along the lines questioned here. Put in another way, 
we challenge the new Gramscians to show just how far Gramsci’s justly 
famous equation can be refashioned to read: ‘international state= global 
political society+ global civil society’.29
The challenge presented by Germain and Kelly is posed in rather stark terms: it is 
possible to conceive of a global civil society that operates at the transnational level but 
comes short of producing a countervailing international state. Indeed, one of the 
major arguments of this thesis is that the social movements that form international 
civil society simultaneously undermine and affirm the legitimacy of the modern states- 
system. This notwithstanding, Germain and Kelly are right to point out the difficulties 
inherent in a self-professed ‘Gramscian’ view of global civil society that fails to 
adequately define the latter’s relationship to the international society of states. For all 
their suggestive references to the way in which the reproduction of global capitalism 
and the transnational class alliances that it generates slowly forge a global civil 
society, the neo-Gramscians remain elusive about the place of the state and the system 
of states in the unfolding of this sphere of world politics.
This section has sought to offer a brief overview of the different uses the term 
‘civil society’ has been put to within IR. As we have seen, our discipline has not been 
immune from the frustrating practice of attaching various, often incompatible 
meanings to the concept and its derivatives, global or international civil society. All 
three of the approaches outlined above agree on the usefulness of the term ‘global
29 Randall. D. Germain and Michael Kenny, “Engaging Gramsci: International Relations Theory and 
the New Gramscians”, Review of International Studies (Vol. 24, N o.l, January 1998), pp. 2-21, p. 17.
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civil society’ when describing the transnational interactions in world politics and, 
furthermore, appear to include the world capitalist market within this domain. While 
the new transnationalists remain at this descriptive level, the post-modernist and neo- 
Gramscian theorists probe the explanatory potential of the concept. The former 
emphasise the inherent ontological limitations in explaining an ostensibly post-modern 
world with reference to modernist categories like civil society. They are primarily 
interested in discussing global civil society as part of a broader campaign against the 
disciplining schemas of modernist discourse. The neo-Gramscians, on the other hand, 
seek to demonstrate the continuing validity of the term civil society, applying the 
analytical and strategic insights of Antonio Gramsci’s writings on the subject to the 
contemporary international system. From this perspective, global civil society is seen 
as a domain of transnational class agency capable of engendering hegemonic blocs that 
sustain successive historical world orders. Occasionally, this sphere also appears as 
a an arena of counter-hegemonic contestation, although the neo-Gramscians tend to 
pay lip-service to this aspect of global civil society more than exploring its full 
implications for the study of international relations.
The conception of international civil society to be developed in the rest of this 
thesis plainly overlaps with many of the perspectives outlined above. There are, 
however, two important departures from the existing theories of international society 
worth flagging here. First, in contrast to the new transnationalists and following the 
neo-Gramscians, I seek to ground the idea of international civil society historically 
and sociologically by associating its origins and development to the reproduction of 
global capitalism. International civil society is therefore treated in this thesis as a 
domain of social and political activity subsumed under the broader dynamics of 
capitalist social relations. Unlike the neo-Gramscians, however, I understand the
modern state, and by extension, the international system to be a necessary component
{
of any definition of international civil society. As we have seen, one of the defects of 
the neo-Gramscian understanding of global civil society is that it fails to grant the
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sovereign state and inter-state relations any clear role in the development of this 
sphere of international relations. The chapters that follow, on the other hand, aim to 
emphasise the centrality of the international system of states in the formation of 
international civil society. Secondly, my own understanding of international civil 
society focuses very specifically on modem forms of political and social agency as the 
constitutive element of this international domain. Contrary to both the new 
transnationalist and neo-Gramscian approaches to the subject, the question of agency 
-and particularly the collective agency of subaltern classes- figures very prominently 
in the considerations on international civil society that follow. The last section of this 
introduction will therefore address the issue of agency and how it relates to the 
perspective on international relations offered in this study.
1.4 Agents and Structures in International Relations
One of the major arguments arising out of the preceding discussion is that using the 
term international civil society necessarily assumes an historical and sociological 
understanding of international relations. In recent years, this basic premise has gained 
increasing weight in the theoretical debates within IR. Specifically, the sociological 
problematic of agency and structure has acquired its own currency within the 
discipline. As was stated at the outset, this thesis can in some ways be read as a 
contribution to an historical-sociological investigation of transnational social and 
political agency. In this respect, it also represents an engagement with the agency- 
structure literature in IR. The aim of this section therefore, is to clarify status of the 
term ‘agency’ as it is employed in the rest of this study. In essence, the standpoint 
adopted here is that collective social and political agency is the expression of class 
antagonisms arising out of capitalist social relations. I understand class as a 
phenomenon that emerges out of definitive historical relations of production which 
engender a self-conscious antagonism of interests and values between different social
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groups. This clash of interests explains the rise and development of most modern 
forms of social and political agency, although, naturally, the existence of class 
struggle does not in itself guarantee the emergence of such agency. As I hope to 
indicate below, adopting a Marxist perspective on collective agency offers two 
advantages over other approaches to the subject: it provides an historical and 
sociological account of agency, and it manages to reconcile the artificial division 
between structure and agency. Before contrasting this view of agency with those 
prevailing in recent IR theory, it is necessary to consider briefly the assumptions 
behind an historical-sociological approach to international relations.
Any sociological understanding of human life must start by explaining the 
relationship between human agency and social structures. As Philip Abrams put it: 
"All varieties of sociology stress the so-called 'two-sidedness' of the social world, 
presenting it as a world of which we are both the creators and the creatures, both 
makers and prisoners; a world which our actions construct and a world that 
powerfully constrains us."30 What is distinctive about a historical sociology is that 
it seeks to explain this relationship between agency and structure as one forged 
through time: "The two-sidedness of society, the fact that social action is both 
something we choose to do and something we have to do, is inseparably bound up 
with the further fact that whatever reality society has is an historical reality, a reality 
in time. "31 The key insight here is that social structures like, for example, civil society 
are the product of historical processes. Likewise, the possibility of recognising social 
structures arises ffom our capacity to identify a specific logic to these processes. The 
task which a historical-sociological approach sets itself, therefore, is to explain our 
social world by identifying the historical interaction between structures and processes. 
Ernest Gellner once used the analogy of a chess game to elucidate what might be 
distinctive about this method. Suggesting that our social life be seen as a sequence of
30 P. Abrams, Historical Sociology (Shepton Mallet: Open Books, 1982), p. 2.
31 Ibid., p.2.
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moves on a chess board, Gellner argued that a sociological history would seek to 
"elicit and specify [...] the shared set of rules which connect one move with the 
next."32 Thus, for Gellner, "A sociological account ... is analogous to explaining the 
story to someone, say a child, who is unfamiliar with the rules of chess: the rules 
must be specified, and it must be explained why some moves are mandatory, others 
preferable, some forbidden, some allowed but disastrous".33 The way of establishing 
what these "rules" of social interaction are is through reference to history; we can 
only understand our social world by identifying the changes and continuities in the 
structures and processes of social life through time.
From a Marxist perspective, the principal agency behind historical processes 
is class struggle. On this account, in order to explain structural transformations in the 
course of human history it is necessary to make reference to the conscious and 
unconscious antagonism of interests and values between, and sometimes among, social 
classes. This is, of course, an oversimplified statement of the Marxist view of 
historical change. For one, it obviates the important Marxist debates on the relative 
weight of the forces and relations of production, respectively, in effecting social 
change. Gerry Cohen, to take but one example, famously argued that the level of 
development of the productive forces in any given society takes precedence over class 
struggle in the explanation of social change. Furthermore, as a summary statement it 
cannot delve into the complex philosophical considerations regarding the nature and 
classification of epochal shifts, nor the historical difficulties involved in the 
identification of class antagonisms. At this stage, however, it seems unnecessary to 
elaborate on these points. Instead, while acknowledging the contested character of the 
position, I would like to press on with an illustration of how a class-based 
understanding of historical change challenges the prevalent notions of agency and
32 E. Gellner (edited with a preface by I.C Jarvie and Joseph Agassi), Contemporary Thought and 
Politics (London and Boston: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1974), p. 116.
33 Ibid., p. 122.
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structure in international relations.
For almost six decades since its emergence as an academic discipline, IR has 
been oblivious to the sociological problematic of agents and structures. IR theorists 
have certainly employed these terms in the past, for instance in the transnationalist 
appraisal of non-state ‘actors’ examined above, or in Kenneth Waltz’s notorious 
defence of the need to develop the ‘systemic’ level of analysis in international 
relations. Yet none of these usages engage with the “two-sidedness of the social 
world” mentioned earlier: at best, agents and structures are treated in isolation from 
one another (as in the neo-realist celebration of ‘structure’); at worst, they are 
stripped of any explanatory power (as in the transnationalist notion of ‘actor’ 
discussed above). It was in response to this sociological naivety that several IR 
scholars turned to meta-theoretical considerations on structure and agency from the 
mid-1980s onwards. Although many of the insights associated to what later became 
known as the agency-structure debate in IR had arguably been articulated earlier in 
the work of Robert W. Cox, Ekkehart Krippendorff, John Maclean or Ralph Pettman, 
it was Alexander Wendt’s 1987 International Organization article that set the 
parameters of later discussions.34 In this piece, Wendt set off from a critique of neo­
realist and world-system theory, arguing that both these approaches “[r]eify system 
structures in a way which leads to static and even functional explanations of state 
action. ”35 For Wendt, reducing international relations to either the agency of states 
(as the neo-realists do) or the structures engendered by the world-capitalist system (as 
in the case of world-systems theory) impoverishes our understanding of both the 
character of these entities and their dynamic interaction. A more fruitful approach, 
according to the author, involves focusing upon the interdependence between agents 
and structures in international relations and probing the interconnected nature of their
34 Alexander Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory”, International 
Organization, (Vol. 41, No.3, Summer 1987), pp. 335-370.
35 Ibid., p. 348.
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identity. Taking his cue from Anthony Giddens’ work on ‘structuration’, Wendt 
argued that
The structurationist approach ... tries to avoid what I shall argue are the 
negative consequences of individualism and structuralism by giving agents and 
structures equal ontological status [...] This conceptualisation allows us to 
rethink fundamental properties of (state) agents and system structures. In turn, 
it permits us to use agents and structures to explain some of the key properties 
of each as effects of the other, to see agents and structures as ‘co-determined’ 
or ‘mutually constituted’ entities.36
The consequences of this methodological shift for IR were twofold. One the one hand, 
state agents and international structures were presented as dynamic, historical entities 
that are shaped through time as a result of their mutual interaction. Secondly, and 
following on from this, neither agents nor structures were given ontological priority 
when analysing international relations. The research agenda arising out of these 
premises was summarised as follows: “The core of this agenda is the use of structural 
analysis to theorize the conditions of existence of state agents, and the use of 
historical analysis to explain the genesis and reproduction of social structures.”37 
Wendt’s contribution had the virtue of laying down rigorous terms of debate 
on an issue that plainly struck a chord among theorists of IR at the time. By 
challenging the meta-theoretical assumptions of both the neo-realists and their world- 
system contenders, Wendt opened up a space for a critical sociology of agency and 
structure ie. a sociology that problematises the very categories employed in the 
debate. Yet though Wendt should be praised for his sense of opportunity, the novelty 
of his argument must be questioned. Indeed, the accusation of ‘reinventing the wheel’
16 Ibid., p. 339.
37 Ibid., p. 365
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levelled at his theoretical mentor, Anthony Giddens, can also be applied to Wendt’s 
work.38 Although Wendt’s points on the ‘mutually constitutive’ nature of agency and 
structure are well taken (particularly in the context of theoretically stunted discipline 
like IR), it is not necessary to take on board Giddens’ own theory of structuration in 
order to arrive at this conclusion.39 On the contrary, as was suggested above, the 
basic insights of structuration theory have been the mainstay of much of this 
century’s historical sociology, and were arguably encapsulated in the first place within 
Marx’s conception of praxis.*0 In the words of one Marxist theorist not known for his 
sympathies to Giddens’ work: “[a]t the level of their most general presuppositions, 
there is no necessary antagonism between Giddens’ structuration theory and historical 
materialism. ”41
A Marxist understanding of agency, then, concurs with the more sophisticated 
discussions on agency and structure in IR, both on the need to emphasise the 
necessary interaction between agents and structures (or subject and object), and on the 
requirement to do so historically ie. to consider this interaction through time and 
place. This said, there are plainly a number of significant differences between 
Wendt’s structurationism and the Marxist approach adopted in this study.
First, whereas Wendt appears to focus almost exclusively on the agencies and 
structures generated by states -only making cursory references to other social forces 
toward the end of his paper- the arguments to be developed below identify classes as
38 Derek Sayer, “Reinventing the Wheel: Anthony Giddens, Karl Marx and Social Change” in J. Clark 
C. Modgil and S. Modgil (eds), Anthony Giddens: Consensus and Controversy (London, New York 
and Philadelphia: Falmer Press, 1990), pp. 235-250.
39 Wendt himself concedes as much when making reference to Thrift’s classfication of Philip Abrams, 
Roy Bhaskar, Pierre Bourdieu and Derek Layder as ‘structurationists’ (albeit often despite themselve^.
40 See R. Bernstein, Praxis and Action (London: Duckworth, 1972). For a discussion within the contet 
of IR see Christian Heine and Benno Teschke, “Sleeping Beauty and the Dialectical Awakening: On 
the Potential of Dialectic for International Relations” Millennium: Journal of International Studies (Vol. 
25, No.2, Summer 1996), pp. 399-423.
41 Sayer, “Reinventing the Wheel”, p. 236.
36
Chapter One: Introduction
the major force behind the production and reproduction of structures and agents in 
international relations. Second, for all his criticism of the static and instrumentalist 
character of existing treatments of agency and structure in IR, Wendt failed to provide 
any theory of socio-historical change. State-formation and the reproduction of the 
international system are, for Wendt, explained as dynamic historical processes, yet 
nowhere in his contribution was there a consideration of how we might identify 
structural transformation on a world scale, nor which agents might be responsible for 
such change. A Marxist approach, on the other hand identifies the rise and expansion 
of capitalist social relations as the defining feature of the historical epoch we have 
come to know as modernity. The structures engendered by the global reproduction o f 
capitalism in turn generate modern forms of collective agency organised around 
antagonistic class interests. Thus, put very crudely, on this account capitalism is seen 
as the ordering structure of collective class agency responsible for change in the 
international system. Without foregoing the dialectic relationship between structure 
and agency, such an approach is at least able to chart the transformations in 
successive world orders and explain the sources of their dynamic.
In the chapters that follow, the expansion of international civil society is 
explained as an historical process characterised precisely by this interaction between 
the agents and structures produced by global capitalism. The historical analysis of the 
origins and development of Tunisian civil society to be carried out below focuses 
upon forms of collective agency such as trade unions and political parties which 
emerged out of the class relations imposed by imperialist penetration. French 
colonialism certainly introduced new socio-economic and political structures into 
North Africa; yet not only were these in themselves the product of specific forms of 
class agency (eg. those articulated by capitalist entrepreneurs and state officials) but, 
furthermore, they generated novel forms of social and political resistance. Tunisian 
interwar history can therefore be interpreted as the outcome of this complex 
interaction between structures (such as colonial capitalism) and agents (such as
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modern social movements). Once we accept that such a history was itself a part of a 
wider international context, a category like international civil society allows us to 
identify the concrete dynamics which - underpinned by the reproduction of class 
conflict in the Maghreb- defined the international relations of the region.
1.5 Conclusions: Toward a Historical Sociology of International Political Agency
The aim of this introductory chapter has been to set out the differences between the 
uses of ‘agency’, ‘transnationalism’ and ‘civil society’ as they are employed in this 
thesis from those developed in other theoretical frameworks within IR. It has been 
argued that the existing discussions within our discipline on issues pertaining to 
international political agency are unsatisfactory on a number of counts. The early 
literature on transnational relations in world politics had the virtue of identifying and 
exploring the relevance in international relations of actors other than the state. Thus, 
transnational political agency was ascribed to entities such as multinational 
corporations, religious institutions, pressure groups, trade unions and so forth. Yet, 
as we saw above, such a literature failed to move beyond the merely descriptive, 
presenting a canvass of international relations that was broader in its incorporation of 
previously marginalised non-state actors but that ultimately lacked explanatory depth. 
Almost a generation later, several IR scholars sought to retrieve the transnationalist 
concern for non-state actors, this time cloaking the theoretical poverty of their 
predecessors through references to the concept of ‘civil society’. Though generally 
alert to the conceptual richness of the term ‘civil society’, those authors employing the 
category within our field have inexplicably shied away from exploiting its full 
historical and sociological potential. The same conceptual pitfalls that bedevilled the 
original transnationalists emerge in the work of theorists of global civil society like 
Martin Shaw or Ronnie Lipschutz: the absence of a notion of agency; the refusal to
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consider hierarchical aspects of civil society; the lack of a clear examination of how 
global civil society might interact with the international system of states. In order to 
address these issues, an altogether separate debate on agency and structure in 
international relations has to be resorted to: that dealing with the more meta- 
theoretical concerns of structuration theory. As mentioned above, though helpful in 
exploring questions of agency and structure in a more rigorous fashion, Wendt’s 
structurationist approach to agency in international relations paradoxically returns the 
discipline full circle to an almost exclusive discussion of agency and structure in 
relation to the behaviour of states. Thus, social and political agency mediated through, 
for example, social movements escapes the purview of Wendt’s analysis.
The combined effect of these developments has been that, while questions of 
collective social and political agency in international relations have arisen in different 
guises within our discipline, no overall theoretical category capable of explaining 
international political agency and its impact upon the international relations has 
emerged to date. It is the aim of the rest of this thesis to develop a notion of 
‘international civil society’ that is capable of meeting such a challenge. Although a full 
discussion of the meaning of international civil society is the subject of the following 
chapter, I will now briefly outline the main features of this concept with reference to 
the preceding discussion.
International civil society refers to a domain of international relations 
generated by the global reproduction of capitalism where modern social movements 
pursue their political goals. Modem social movements are characterised by a 
historically specific form of agency with four basic components: a universalist 
ideology; an open membership; a secular or ‘disenchanted’ vision of social and 
political action; and a reliance of printed media and novel forms of mobilization such 
as strikes, demonstrations or electoral rallies. Chapter two will elaborate on this 
definition of modern social and political agency. For the moment, however, it may 
be sufficient to simply point out that such an understanding of collective agency
39
Chapter One: Introduction
differs from the existing approaches outlined above in two respects. First, contrary 
to the ahistorical conceptions of collective action in world politics, the idea of 
international civil society emphasises the historical specificity of modern political 
subjectivity. This not only involves tracing the origins of international social 
movements back to the eighteenth century, but more importantly, suggests that we 
‘modems’ engage in collective social and political activity in radically different ways 
to our ‘pre-modern’ forebears. Secondly, in contrast to most contemporary 
understandings of agency and civil society, I consider the latter as an equivalent, in 
the Marxian sense, of ‘bourgeois society’. In other words, international civil society 
is treated in this thesis as an arena plagued by the social and political antagonisms 
inherent to capitalist social relations. On this account, civil society is by no means a 
necessarily benign sphere of social and political action, but rather a hierarchical space 
where clashing interests play themselves out through analogous but unequal modes of 
collective agency.
Aside from a distinct understanding of collective agency, the idea of 
international civil society presented in the following chapters also offers a novel 
interpretation of the impact of such agency upon international relations. International 
civil society is certainly viewed as a domain inhabited by international social 
movements that organise and act across national, ethnic or religious boundaries. Thus, 
much of the historical narrative on the expansion of international civil society to 
Tunisia will focus on internationalism as a principle and a practice of transnational 
solidarity (whether it be premised on class, religion or ethnicity). As already 
mentioned above, in this respect the thesis forms part of a broadly-defined 
transnationalist agenda. Recognising forms of international politics that fall outside 
the domain of inter-sate relations does not, however, mean rejecting the existence of 
an international society of states. Indeed, this study will continually emphasise the 
need for an analysis of the historical interaction between states and civil societies in 
the construction of the international system. In short, from this perspective
40
Chapter One: Introduction
international civil society represents a domain of international political activity which, 
though distinct from the system of states, is in constant interaction with the latter.
These, then, are the basic characteristics of international civil society as it will 
be developed in the rest of the thesis. The category aims to offer a novel 
understanding of social and political agency in international relations by reformulating 
the use of the term ’civil society’ within IR. Furthermore, it seeks to demonstrate the 
explanatory value of such a concept when interpreting the nature of contemporary 
international relations, both past and present. Last, underlying this conceptual 
reworking of the term international civil society is the aspiration of retrieving past 
experiences of international social and political agency among ordinary activists, and 
illuminating future possibilities for a progressive world politics premised on 
transnational political solidarity. The next two chapters will consider in greater detail 
how these aspirations can be realised with reference to the notion of civil society and 
international society, respectively. Chapter two offers an extended account of the 
ideological and historical development of the concept ‘civil society’, and argues 
further that the numerous international dimensions to the category merit a leap toward 
the analysis of an international civil society. Chapter three considers the manner in 
which this new category -international civil society- fits into the broader and more 
orthodox concerns of IR theory such as sovereignty, nationalism or the norms and 
values of international society. It will be argued there that the traditional notion of 
international society is inherently incapable of accounting for social forces other than 
state elites in the explanation of international relations, and that the idea of 
international civil society can remedy this flaw while simultaneously retaining some 
of the relevant insights on the nature and workings of international society provided 
by the authors associated to the ‘English school’ of IR. In conjunction, these two 
chapters should prepare the ground analytically for the remaining narrative chapters 
of the thesis, where the historical unfolding of the expansion of international civil 
society will be illustrated with reference to Tunisia.
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Civil Society: The Challenge of the International
2.1 Three Components of Civil Society
Among the concepts of classical political theory used in contemporary political and 
social discourse, civil society is probably the term which has staged the most dramatic 
come-back. Since its medieval retrieval via William von Moerbeke's translation of 
Aristotle's Politics, the term passed through the hands of virtually every significant 
western political philosopher, culminating in Hegel's magisterial re-working of the 
idea of civil society and its subsequent critique by Marx. After a long absence 
initiated at the turn of the century (briefly interrupted by Gramsci's work), the 
concept of civil society has returned with a vengeance, claiming a newly found 
legitimacy through its association with the overthrow of dictatorial regimes in Latin 
America, southern Europe, east Asia and most recently in eastern and central Europe. 
The power of collective action in the struggle against the all-encroaching state was 
reflected in a number of novel formulations of civil society either sociologically as a 
‘public sphere’, anthropologically as a ‘condition of liberty’ or as the political space 
where new social movements operate.1
Paradoxically, this close relationship between the restitution of civil society 
as a concrete historical phenomenon and its employment as a political and sociological 
category has occasioned the loss of some of the concept's analytical sharpness. The 
prevailing definition of civil society refers to that sphere of public life beyond the 
state's control. This is the sense which politicians, journalists, activists and no few 
academics ascribe to the term when they speak of ‘civil society’ standing as a bulwark
11 refer to three contemporary approaches the idea of ‘civil society’ which have proved especially 
influential: J. Habermas, The Structural Transformation o f the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a 
Category o f Bourgeois Society (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992); E. Gellner, The Conditions of Liberty: 
Civil Society and its Rivals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994); A. Arato and J. Cohen, Civil 
Society and Political Theory (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992). Two excellent collections of essays 
on the subject are J. Keane (ed.), The State and Civil Society: New European Perspectives (London: 
Verso, 1988) and J. Hall (ed.), Civil Society: Theory, History, Comparison (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1995).
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against ‘the state’, or when they defend it as the realm of freedom. It is also the way 
in which IR scholars have adopted the term when examining transnational and 
international nonstate actors.
Clearly, this understanding of civil society has some analytical purchase, 
demonstrated amongst other things in the way that it has captured the imagination of 
such a broad public. Yet if it is placed under closer historical and sociological 
scrutiny, the simple identification of civil society with all social activity which escapes 
the control of the state gives rise to a rather crude dichotomy which impoverishes the 
concept in at least two respects.
In the first place, when viewed historically either as a concrete sociological 
phenomenon or as a theoretical category, civil society appears inextricably linked to 
the modern state. The analytical distinction between two spheres need not imply their 
separation as two historical entities. The conceptual power of the term civil society 
lies precisely in its capacity to make this distinction while simultaneously revealing 
the complex interaction between its two parts. Second, by delving into the historical 
roots of the sociological and ideological distinction between civil society and the state, 
the door is opened to an explanation of how and why this distinction was effected in 
the first place. This avoids the static and ahistorical definition of civil society as a 
constant; everywhere and always defined as a counterpart to the state. One of the 
basic claims of this thesis is that civil society needs to be understood as a historically 
variable social space. Civil society is not a given, but a concrete sociological sphere 
which is made and unmade by collective human agency, and which is susceptible to 
the same historical and social forces which operate upon other parts of our social life.
This double manoeuvre -giving civil society a historical and sociological 
content- recovers the complexity of the category, thereby reinstating its analytical and 
explanatory power. In what follows, I will attempt to reconstruct the conceptual 
richness of the term by addressing three general phenomena which help to define it: 
the imagination of society; the emergence of capitalist social relations; and the birth
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of modern collective agency. Once the general parameters of this redefinition of civil 
society are made clear, I shall turn to the basic claim of this chapter, namely that an 
historical and sociological evaluation of civil society reveals a number of international 
factors in its genesis and development. This challenge of ‘the international’ warrants, 
I suggest, a further conceptual leap toward the realm of ‘international civil society’.
The Idea o f Society
In Europe, the word ‘society’ was associated with vernacular notions of 
‘companionship’ or ‘fellowship’ until well into the second half of the seventeenth 
century.2 During the course of that century thinkers like Hobbes and Locke began to 
use the term scientifically, but it was generally deemed to be a word devoid of any 
theoretical or analytical pretensions. By the eighteenth century, however, the concept 
had taken on a new dimension as leading theorists of the time such as Ferguson, 
Montesquieu, Hume, Rousseau or Smith made the origins and nature of ‘civil society ’ 
the mainstay of their philosophical inquiries. For all the diversity of their positions 
and methods, one general preoccupation could be said to be common to all these 
philosophers: to examine the conditions under which men could escape the state of 
nature and enter into a contractual form of government based on the rule of law ie. 
a civil society. Thus, an essential component of this novel deployment of ‘society’ 
was its contrast to a real or imagined ‘state of nature’; the term ‘civil society’ denoted 
a new stage in the evolution of government among the human species.
Initially, civil society was synonymous with the state. As was noted above, the 
Latin translation of koinonia politike as societas civilis meant that the term retained 
much of its Aristotelian inflection. It was defined as a political community -usually
2 See R. Williams, Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society (London: Fontana Press, 1976), 
p.293 and D. Frisby and D. Sayer, Society (New York: Ellis Horwood, 1986), p. 17.
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the polis- rooted in the principles of citizenship. In this respect, civil society was seen 
as a model of government. Yet underlying this predominantly political understanding 
of civil society was a deeper sociological claim about the nature of human relations. 
Although couched in a language still distant from that of modern sociology, what 
thinkers like Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau or Ferguson were initiating in their 
ruminations on the origins and development of civil society was the actual imagination 
of a systematic set of relationships between human beings which gradually became to 
be known as ‘society’. As Keith Tester has emphasised, "[c]ivil society is perhaps 
best identified as a specifically, and also fundamentally, sociological problem [...] as 
an idea by which the seventeenth, eighteenth and early nineteenth-century 
philosophers tried to explain how society was possible."3
Thomas Hobbes was probably the first among the modern political 
philosophers to have posed the question of the origins of society in a systematic 
fashion. Although his earlier works, Elements o f Law and Philosophical Rudiments 
Concerning Government and Society (the English translation of De Cive) already 
addressed the idea of society, it is in Leviathan that Hobbes presents most starkly his 
theory on the origins and characteristics of this concept. Hobbes did this by 
introducing two seemingly innocent and commonsensical assumptions about human 
nature which laid the foundations for future definitions of civil society.
The first of these assumptions was that human beings constitute individual and 
comparable entities whose actions are governed by laws of motion similar to those of 
other physical bodies. Hobbes opened Leviathan with a discussion of the physiological 
and psychological traits common to all human beings, suggesting that ”[w]hosoever 
looketh into himself, and considered! what he doth, when he does think, opine,
3 K. Tester, Civil Society (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 6. This point is also made 
by Marvin B. Becker who suggests that during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, "[F]or the firs 
time in the history of the West the word society defined an entity both distant and abstract." The 
Emergence of Civil Society in the Eighteenth Century: A PrivilegedMoment in the History o f England, 
Scotland and France (Bloomington and Indianapolis, IN: Indiana University Press, 1994), p.2.
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reason, hope, fear, &c, and upon what grounds; he shall thereby read and know what 
are the thoughts, and Passions of all other men [...] "4. Under the consecutive headings 
of ‘Sense’, ‘Imagination’, ‘Speech’, ‘Reason and Science’, and ‘Passions’, Hobbes 
discovered the motivations which he considered to lie behind all human action, thus 
underscoring his methodological empiricism and individualism.
From these initial premises, Hobbes went on to present his famous account of 
"the Naturall Condition of Mankind" where the human disposition toward 
competition, diffidence and glory gives rise to a "time of warre, where every man is 
Enemy to every man [...] and the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and 
short."5 As C.B. Macpherson has underlined, Hobbes' conception of the ‘state of 
nature’ was derived from the experience of his own contemporary ‘civilised society’: 
"'Natural' for Hobbes is not the opposite of social or civil."6 Nonetheless, it was 
clearly essential for Hobbes’ argument to posit a distinction if not an opposition 
between the state of nature and civil society in order to justify his defence of the 
Leviathan or Commonwealth as the expression of a free covenant between rational 
men. Hobbes made this explicit in chapter 17 of Leviathan when, in response to the 
hypothetical claim that like bees and ants, humans could "live sociably one with the 
other ... and yet have no direction" he retorts that, 'r... the agreement of these 
creatures is Naturall; that of men, is by Covenant only, which is Artificiall."7
Although perhaps not immediately obvious, the two aspects of Leviathan 
highlighted above -its methodological individualism and the distinction between civil 
society and the state of nature- provide the rudimentary basis of a theory of society.
4 T. Hobbes (edited with and introduction by C.B Macpherson),Leviathan (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin Books, 1968), p.82.
5 Ibid., p. 186.
6 C.B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: From Hobbes to Locke
(Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 25.
7 Hobbes, Leviathan, p.226
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By envisaging an abstract individual endowed with a set of universal physiological and 
psychological motivations, Hobbes prepared the ground for the future imagination of 
society as the sum of interactions between individual human beings. In fact, in 
Leviathan, Hobbes puts this imagination to work by describing how civil society or 
the Commonwealth is born, "[w]hen men agree amongst themselves, to submit to 
some Man, or assembly of Men, voluntarily, on confidence to be protected by him 
against all others."8
A second and more controversial implication of Hobbes1 discussion of civil 
society is its normative identification with a higher stage of human development. 
Despite the ambiguities in his exposition, Hobbes effected a distinction in Leviathan 
between civil society and the state of nature which has since represented a central 
tenet of most theories of civil society. This distinction rests on the familiar but 
nonetheless conclusive argument that our human capacity to reason allows us to 
escape the natural predicament of other animals and enter into the higher realm of 
civil society. As we shall see below, this has important consequences for the two 
other relationships which I claim define civil society: that between nature and 
production and that between human agency and history. For the moment, however, 
it may suffice to simply register that without this rational component it is impossible 
to imagine society, let alone realise the ethical life of which it holds promise.
In his impressive conceptual history of civil society, Manfred Riedel suggests 
that Hobbes was instrumental in the shift from a natural to an historical conception of 
civil society; from civil society understood as a natural community to civil society as 
the artificial product of separate individuals joining together in a commonwealth :
In den Systemen des 17. Jahrhunderts kommt das einzelne, das Individuum,
vor dem gesellschafltichen Ganzen. Die biirgerliche Gesellschaft hat hier kein
8 Ibid., p. 228.
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urspriingliches ("natiirliches") existenz sondem ein abgeleitetes Dasein; sie ist 
ein posterius und nicht ein prius, das Resultatt eines Prozesses, der beim 
einzelnen Individuum beginnt. [In De Cive] formuliert Hobbes den 
entscheidenden Grundsatz, der Gattungsbegriff der klassischen Politik aus der 
ihm Geshichlosigkeit herausholdt; dafi die Natur der Dinge und des Menschen 
kein Mogliches Prinzip der Vereinigung zur societas civilis ist. Natur und 
Geschichte des Menschen, die in der klassischen Tradition der Politik eine 
Einheit bilden, treten jetz.9
The pervasive influence of Hobbes' formulation of civil society as outlined above is 
exemplified by the work of Locke and Rousseau on the subject-matter. To be sure, 
these three thinkers derived political conclusions from their examination of civil 
society which were very different, when not plainly at odds with each other. Yet the 
retention of the abstract individual and the imaginary state of nature as the two 
building-blocks in the definition of civil society betrayed a continuity in the basic 
theoretical parameters laid out by Hobbes. In this respect, the work of Locke and 
Rousseau can be interpreted as a further elaboration on a version of civil society 
which contained deeper sociological claims about the nature of modern society.
Locke opens his Second Treatise on Government with a discussion of the state 
of nature. Unlike Hobbes' bleak vision of man's natural condition, Locke suggests 
that "the State o f Nature has a Law of Nature to govern it, which obliges every one: 
And Reason, which is that Law, teaches Mankind, who will consult it, that being all 
equal and independent, no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty or
9 Manfred Riedel, "Gesellschaft, biirgerliche" in O. Brunner, W. Conze and R. Koselleck (eds), 
Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland 
(Stuttgart: Ernst Klett Verlag, 1975), p. 736-737. Italics added.
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Possessions."10 But this benevolent picture is transformed in the subsequent chapter 
into a state of war. Contradicting his own advice against confusing the state of nature 
with the state of war, Locke goes on to insist that "To avoid the State of War ... is 
one great reason o f Mens putting themselves into Society, and quitting the State of 
Nature."11 Thus, the origin of civil society is boldly situated in the contract made by 
free and rational men seeking to preserve their life, health, liberty and property:
Wherever therefore any number of men are so united into one Society, as to 
quit every one his Executive Power of the Law of Nature, and to resign it to 
the publick, there and there only is a Political or Civil Society ... And this 
puts Men out of a State of Nature into that of a Commonwealth.12
About half a century later, Jean-Jacques Rousseau echoed this contrast between the 
state of nature and civil society in order to come to terms with the new form of soci al 
relationships which he observed around him. In the Discourse on the Origin and 
Foundation o f Inequality o f Mankind Rousseau emphasised from the outset that his 
depiction of the state of nature was not based on historical evidence but was premised 
rather on "mere conditional and hypothetical reasoning."13 In fact, Rousseau happily 
admitted that his invocation of the state of nature follows in the tradition of other 
theorists who have derived this category from their own contemporary experiences: 
"The philosophers who have inquired into the foundations of society, have all felt the 
necessity of going back to the state of nature [...] Every one of them ... has
10 J. Locke (edited with introduction and notes by P. Laslett), Two Treatises on Government 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 271.
11 Ibid., p.282.
12 Ibid., p. 325.
13 J-J. Rousseau (translation and introduction by G.D.H Cole), The Social Contract and the 
Discourses (London, Melbourne and Toronto: Everyman's Library, 1979), p.44.
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transferred to the state of nature ideas which were acquired in society; so that, in 
speaking of the savage, they described the social man".14
According to Rousseau, man's natural condition is so blissful and benign that 
"he can have departed from it only through some fatal accident."15 Such misfortune, 
Rousseau contended, was brought about by the institution of private property. I shall 
explore the significance of this explanation of the fall of natural man for the idea of 
civil society in a moment. At this stage, however, it is more important to note that the 
introduction of private property gives "rise to a horrible state of war" which leads 
property-owning men to
conceive[d] at length the profoundest plan that ever entered the mind of man: 
[...] 'Let us, in a word, instead of turning our forces against ourselves, collect 
them in a supreme power which may govern us by wise laws, protect and 
defend all members of the association ... and maintain eternal harmony among 
u s '.16
The attributes of this "supreme power" were of course expounded in The Social 
Contract. Here, Rousseau deployed the contrast between natural and civil society most 
forcefully by suggesting that "The passage from the state of nature to the civil state 
produces a very remarkable change in man, by substituting justice for instinct in his 
conduct, and giving his actions the morality he had formerly lacked.” 17 Thus, just like 
his English predecessors, Rousseau came to identify civil society with the moral 
advancement of the human species; civil society becomes the realm of justice arrived
"Ibid., p. 45.
15 Ibid., p. 83.
16 Ibid., p. 89.
11 Ibid., p. 177.
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at through the rational contract among free men.
In exploring the usage of civil society by these three prominent political 
thinkers, I have attempted to stress the sociological insights offered by what are 
generally deemed to be political theories. I have suggested that the positing of the 
abstract, rational individual as the foundation of civil society and its contrast with the 
state of nature opened the way for the modern understanding of society as the 
systematic interaction between individuals. The observation which Keith Tester 
reserves for John Locke is, in this context also valid for Hobbes and Rousseau:
At the very threshold of modernity, Locke used the imagination of civil 
society to explain how society was possible [...] Locke understands civil 
society to be the association of individuals beyond the family which are ... 
based on the symmetric reciprocity of strangers. [Civil society] involves the 
reciprocity of strangers who equally and individually give up the state of 
nature in order to enter into a society.18
While the methodological tools applied by Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau to their 
studies of civil society were broadly similar, there is one crucial variable, already 
alluded to above, which differentiates Hobbes' account from the other two thinkers, 
namely the role of private property in the forging of a civil society. As was briefly 
pointed out above, Rousseau was unequivocal about this; the second part of the 
Discourse on the Origin o f Inequality opens with the thundering affirmation: "The 
first man who, having enclosed a piece of ground, bethought himself of saying 'This
4
is mine' and found people simple enough to believe him, was the real founder of civil 
society."19
18 Tester, Civil Society, p. 40.
19 Rousseau, The Social Contract and the Discourses, p. 76.
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Locke, on the other hand, presented a vision of civil society plagued with 
ambiguities regarding the place of private property in the genesis and later 
development of civil society. These contradictions were at the root of C.B. 
Macpherson's celebrated thesis of Locke (among others) as a political theorist of 
‘possessive individualism’. Essentially, Macpherson identifies two discrepancies in 
Locke’s account: one pertaining to the difference between the state of nature and the 
state of war; the other referring to the property requirements for membership of civil 
society. The first of these, briefly mentioned above, involves Locke's inconsistency 
in separating the state of nature from the state of war in one chapter of the Second 
Treatise, only to conflate them in the following one. In the second instance, Locke 
is guilty of shifting his definition of property from the more restricted one of "life, 
liberty and estate" to that including goods and land. In both cases, Macpherson 
argues, the contradictions can be explained by situating Locke within the context of 
a ‘possessive market society’:
[Locke] had in his mind at the same time two conceptions of society, which 
although logically conflicting, were derived from the same ultimate source. 
One was a notion of society as composed of equal undifferentiated beings. The 
other was the notion of society as composed of two classes differentiated by 
their level of rationality -those who were ’industrious and rational' and had 
property, and those who were not [...] Locke would not be conscious of the 
contradiction between these two conceptions of society, because both of them 
... were carried over into his postulates from his comprehension of his own 
society.20
The connection Macpherson makes between theories of civil society and the
20 Macpherson, The Political Philosophy o f Possessive Individualism, p. 243.
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emergence of a capitalist market society can be buttressed by a wealth of historical 
evidence. In his study John Locke and Agrarian Capitalism, for example, Neal Wood 
identifies the exact intersection between Locke's language of ‘improvement’, 
‘commonwealth’ or ‘labour’ and the incipient agrarian capitalism characterised by the 
process of enclosure, the establishment of wage relationships and the extension of the 
legal mechanisms necessary for its operation. This, according to Wood, indicates how 
Locke "[w]as indisputably a theorist of landed men and property but also of a society 
beginning to be transformed by agrarian capitalism, bringing with it changes 
expressed in his thought".21
It was precisely this transformation which encouraged the growing 
identification of civil society with the distinct analytical and practical category of the 
‘economic’ during the following decades. By the mid-seventeenth century, the 
association of civil society with a capitalist market society was accomplished through 
the emergence of the new science of ‘political economy’. In the writings of Adam 
Ferguson, Adam Smith and a century later, in those of Karl Marx, civil society 
became inextricably linked to the division of labour, the mass production of 
commodities and the extension of market relations characteristic of modern 
capitalism.22 In this respect, it is necessary to explore the origins and development of 
this new productive system and the attendant rise of the distinct sphere of the 
‘economic’ as a second constitutive element of civil society.
21 N. Wood, John Locke and Agrarian Capitalism^ Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University 
of California Press, 1984), p. 113.
22 This is what Charles Taylor denominates the ‘L-stream’ within civil society. He uses this short­
hand term with reference to a picture of civil society first represented in John Locke: " [a] picture of 
society as an 'economy1, that is, as a whole of interrelated acts of production, exchange and 
consumption which has its own internal dynamic, its own autonomous laws." Charts Taylor, "Modes 
of Civil Society", Public Culture (Vol. 3, No. 1, Fall 1990), pp. 95-118, p. 107.
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Civil Society as Capitalist Market Society
The debates over the origins and consequent periodisation of capitalism mirror similar 
disputes among the historians of economic ideas regarding the genesis of political 
economy. Most commentators situate the beginnings of political economy in 
seventeenth century England with William Petty's 1662 Treatise o f Taxes and 
Contributions as its founding text.23 Others cite the economic tracts produced in Tudor 
England and Renaissance Italy as evidence of the earlier origins of modern 
‘economics’.24 Despite the important differences which separate the economic thought 
of these three periods, a number of conceptual and practical innovations introduced 
at the turn of the fifteenth century marked the beginning of a new approach to wealth 
and its relationship to society at large.
The first of these features was the intense preoccupation with the accumulation 
of data relating to all aspects of commercial and productive life. While not an entirely 
new phenomenon, the scale and scope of these empirical investigations into rents, 
prices, money flows and in the case of England, the amount of land enclosed or the 
number of poor in each municipality signalled the emergence of a particular domain 
of the ‘economic’. Price, value and interest had previously been explained with 
reference to a wider moral philosophy like scholasticism or natural law theory. By the 
seventeenth century, however, these phenomena were increasingly associated with an 
independent economic system, the logic of which could be expressed in abstract 
quantities. The systematic collection of statistics was therefore seen as the key in
23 See for example, T. Hutchison, Before Adam Smith: The Emergence of Political Econany, 1662- 
1776 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988) and J. O. Appleby, Economic Thought and Ideology in 
Seventeenth-Century England (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1978).
24 N. Wood, Foundations of Political Economy: Some Early Tudor Views on State and Society 
(Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: University ofCalifomia Press, 1994). See also N. Wood and E. 
Meiksins Wood, A Trumpet o f Sedition: Political Theory and the Rise of Capitalism, 1509-1688 
(London: Pluto Press, 1997).
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understanding the fluctuations in prices, population, wealth and so forth.
It is important to highlight nevertheless, that this wealth of empirical data was 
used to sustain political arguments about the state of the nation. In his survey of what 
he describes as ‘Tudor reformers’, Neal Wood emphasises that "[they] did not collect 
such data for its own sake but for the purpose of discovering the causes of the 
depressing scene they witnessed and as the basis for recommending changes in 
governmental policy.,?25 The ongoing public debates about what to do with the nation's 
poor or how to increase the Kingdom's wealth -expressed in countless tracts and 
pamphlets- were clearly part of the wider political struggles among the ruling classes. 
Nonetheless, it is significant that the language employed in these debates already 
betrayed a distinction between technical matters pertaining to the domain of the 
‘economic’ and the more subjective ‘political’ questions. Joyce Oldham Appleby 
makes this point particularly forcefully in her discussion of the early seventeenth 
century economic thinker Thomas Mun. According to Appleby, Mun's pamphlets 
indicate how, "For the first time economic factors were clearly differentiated ffom 
their social and political entanglements ... In differentiating essential economic 
relations from contingent ones, Mun gave expression at the same time to the idea that 
the system of exchange was autonomous."26
Thus, well over a century before Ferguson and Smith began to make the 
connection between capitalist market society and civil society, English intellectuals 
were preparing the way for this marriage by separating out the ‘political’ from the 
‘economic’ spheres of public life. This differentiation, however was not merely the 
child of a scientific revolution occasioned by a paradigmatic shift in the way wealth
25 Ibid., p. 36.
26 Appleby, Economic Thought and Ideology, p. 41.
55
Chapter Two: Civil Society : The Challenge o f the International
was conceived and quantified.27 The pre-classical economists were describing, and in 
some cases endorsing the gradual replacement of old social relations with those 
characteristic of capitalism: wage labour, separation from the direct means of 
subsistence, production geared toward the generation of exchange-value. Much of the 
new economic language of ‘profit’, ‘improvement’ or the ‘advancement of private 
persons’, for example, was derived from the ongoing process of land enclosure. 
Similarly, changing attitudes toward usury reflected the growing importance of credit 
in commerce and industrial or agricultural investment.28
In sum, the new discourse of political economy which developed in parts of 
Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth century was the product of three inter­
related transformations. First, a scientific revolution which lent authority to the idea 
that the systematic collection of empirical data could explain the logic behind 
fluctuations in prices, wages, population or interest rates. Second, an intense political 
debate -mainly fought out in England- surrounding the question of poverty and wealth 
which for the first time linked the fate of a particular state to the operation of an 
autonomous social sphere known today as ‘the economy’. Third, and perhaps most 
important, the emergence of capitalist relations of production which underpinned these 
two developments by gradually separating whole populations from their immediate 
means of subsistence in order to create a society of individual wage-eamers dedicated 
to the mass production of commodities. These were the transformations which 
engendered the type of society which Ferguson, Smith and a century later, Marx 
encountered when analysing civil society. It is now time therefore to examine the 
relationship between capitalist market society and civil society in the work of these 
thinkers.
27 This is an interpretation favoured by Jose Manud Naredo in his otherwise excellent introduction 
to economic thought La economia en evolucion: Historia y perspectivas de las categorias basicas del 
pensamiento economico (Madrid: Siglo XXI, 1987).
28 Ibid., chapter 3.
56
Chapter Two: Civil Society : The Challenge o f the International
The approach of the Scottish Enlightenment to the idea of civil society is best 
summarised in the title of Adam Ferguson’s An Essay on the History o f Civil Society 
(1767). History, Civility and Society took on very particular meanings in the work of 
Ferguson, Smith and their contemporaries. In the first place, the idea of man's 
inherent sociability was firmly entrenched in the world-view of the Scottish 
Enlightenment. Far from intuiting or implicitly recognising the notion of society as 
Locke of Hobbes had done, Ferguson and Smith openly endorsed Montesquieu's 
dictum that "Man is born in society, and there he remains". The question therefore 
lay in explaining how and why societies differed historically and geographically.
This entailed the adoption of a distinctive philosophy of history. The 
understanding of history as a progression of humanity through various stages became 
central to the differentiation between modern civil society and previous forms of 
society.29 This modern idea of history -derived from Vico and again, Montesquieu- 
suggested that in order to explain the present type of society it was necessary to 
examine its evolution, thus imputing a particular logic or dynamic to history. 
Ferguson, for example, opens his History by drawing a parallel between man's 
development and that of other living matter:
Natural productions are generally formed by degrees. Vegetables grow from 
a tender shoot, and animals from an infant state. The latter being destined to 
act, extend their operations as their powers increase; they exhibit a progress 
in what they perform ... This progress in the case of man is continued to a 
greater extent than in that of any other animal. Not only does the individual 
advance from infancy to manhood, but the species itself from rudeness to
29 Ronald L. Meek examines what he labels as the ‘four-stages theory’ in Social Science and the 
Ignoble Savage (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976). He deals with Ferguson and Smith 
in chapter 4.
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civilization.30
Although Ferguson is careful to point out the contingencies attached to historical 
development, his account of how certain societies progress from a "rude" to a 
"polished" state is ultimately rooted in an evolutionary view of history. In line with 
other theorists of civil society, Ferguson situates the motor of historical change in 
property: "It must appear very evident that progress is a matter of property [...] it is 
in reality the principal distinction of nations in the advanced state of mechanic arts."31 
Different modes of subsistence -heavily conditioned in Ferguson's view by climatic 
factors- yield stages of social evolution which are represented in varying notions of 
property: "Of the nations who dwell in ... the less cultivated parts of the world some 
intrust their subsistence chiefly to hunting, fishing, or the natural produce of the soil. 
They have little attention to property, and scarcely any beginnings of subordination 
to government."32 It is only in that mode of subsistence characterised by private 
property, the division of labour and the exchange of commodities that men come to 
inhabit a civil society: "[t]he prospect of being able to exchange one commodity for 
another, turns, by degrees, the hunter and the warrior into a tradesman and a 
merchant".33 Furthermore, "By the separation of arts and professions, the sources of 
wealth are laid open; every species of material is wrought up to the greatest 
perfection, and every commodity is produced in the greatest abundance".34
There is hopefully no further need to elaborate the point that Ferguson, like
30 A. Ferguson (edited by F. Oz-Salzberger),/4n Essay on the History cf Civil Society (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 7.
31 Ibid., p.81
32 Ibid., p .81
33 Ibid., p. 172
34 Ibid., p. 173
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his other contemporaries (most notably Adam Smith), came to identify civil society 
with capitalist market society. Central to this view was the idea that only the division 
of labour and the extension of commerce could bring about the prosperity and stability 
which characterised the ‘polished’ manners, art and polity of civil society. To be sure, 
Ferguson had some misgivings about the negative social and political consequences 
of the division of labour. The point remains, however, that the Scottish Enlightenment 
represented a culmination in the gradual shift from a ‘political’ to an ‘economic’ 
understanding of civil society.
It is therefore unsurprising to find Marx citing Ferguson in Capital Volume I  
in support of his claims about the alienation wrought by the modern division of 
labour. Although Marx's contribution to the idea of civil society was for the most part 
written in response to Hegel, his interpretation of the concept was undoubtedly 
coloured by the eighteenth-century theorists examined above.35 After all, Marx's 
central enterprise was to mount a ‘critique of political economy’ and this involved 
accepting the analytical parameters and much of the language of the subject of 
critique. This becomes readily apparent when considering two basic elements of 
Marx's understanding of civil society: its association with the sphere of private market 
relations among individuals, and its historical character as the defining threshold of 
modernity.
For Marx, civil society is defined above all as the arena of class conflict. 
Contrary to Hegel's formulation of civil society as a ‘system of needs’ which finds 
sociological expression in the formal estate-system, Marx argues that "The estate of 
civil society .. consists of separate masses which form fleetingly and whose very
35 The debt owed by Hegel and Marx to Ferguson and othereighteenth century theorists is stressed 
by John Keane in his excellent survey, "Despotism and Democracy: The Origins and Development of 
the Distinction Between Civil Society and the State 1750-1850" in Keane Civil Society and the State, 
pp. 35-71.
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formation is fortuitous and does not amount to an organisation."36 These "separate 
masses" are defined in relation to the productive sphere: " [l\ack o f property and the 
estate o f direct labour, of concrete labour, form not so much an estate of civil society 
as the ground upon which its circles rest and move".37 Hence, Marx is intent on 
highlighting that the stratification of civil society is defined by the emergence of two 
antagonistic classes -the bourgeoisie and the proletariat- whose existence hinges not 
on the political organisation of the estates-system but on a particular organisation of 
production. As Jean Cohen has suggested:
By demonstrating that political estates and corporations contradict precisely the 
unique features of civil society that Hegel himself recognised -abstract right, 
private property, reciprocity, and exchange relations of the system of need- 
Marx shows that socioeconomic distinctions constitute the differentia specifica 
of stratification of modern civil society.38
What is interesting for our purposes, however, is that the "differentia specifica" of 
modern civil society which Marx identified bore close resemblance to that investigated 
by the classical political economists. For Marx, as for Ferguson and Smith, the crucial 
precondition for the emergence of civil society lay in the separation of a private 
sphere of production and exchange from the public arena of the political state. 
Furthermore, this private domain of production was to be characterised by a division 
of labour which facilitated the exchange of commodities among free and equal 
individuals. It is perhaps worth quoting Marx in full on this point:
36 K. Marx, extract of Critique of Hegel's Rechtsphilosophie in D. Sayer, Readings From Karl Marx 
(London and New York: Routledge, 1989), p. 121.
37 Ibid., p. 121. Italics in the original.
38 J. L. Cohen, Class and Civil Society: The Limits of Marxian Critical Theory (Amherst, MA: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 1982), p.57.
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Individuals have always proceeded from themselves, but of course, from 
themselves within their given historical conditions and relations ... But in the 
course of historical development, and precisely through the fact that within the 
division of labour social relations inevitably take on an independent existence, 
there appears a cleavage in the life of each individual, insofar as it is personal 
and insofar as it is determined by some branch of labour and the conditions 
pertaining to it [...] Thus, on the one hand, we have a totality of productive 
forces ... which are for the individuals themselves no longer the forces of the 
individuals but of private property [...] On the other hand, standing against 
these productive forces, we have the majority of individuals from whom these 
forces have been wrested away and who ... have become abstract individuals, 
who are, by this very fact put into a position to enter into relation with one 
another as individuals.39
Civil society is therefore associated with the private realm of relations among 
individuals; a social space which was slowly etched away from the state through the 
triumph in Europe of capitalist relations of production: "Civil society comprises the 
entire material interaction among individuals at a particular evolutionary stage of the 
productive forces ... Civil society as such only develops with the bourgeoisie."40
The emphasis on the historical nature of this transformation is another instance 
of the overlap between Marx's understanding of civil society and that of the Scottish 
Enlightenment. For Marx, civil society represents "[a]n historical advance which has 
transformed the political estates into social estates ..."41. The distinction between the
39 From The German Ideology, cited in Sayer, Readings from Karl Marx, pp. 114-115.
40 Ibid., p.
41 From/I Critique o f Hegel's Philosophy of Right, cited in Sayer, Readings From Karl Marx, p.
120
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state and civil society which is hereby effected marks the beginning of the modern 
epoch. As Marx boldly put it: "The abstraction of the state as such belongs only to 
modern times, because the abstraction of private life belongs only to modern times. 
The abstraction of the political state is a modern product."42 This identification of 
modernity with the separation between civil society and the state, therefore, mirrors 
Ferguson and Smith's association of civil society with the latest stage in human 
evolution. The historical force behind this transformation was in both cases, the 
expansion of capitalist market relations and the class stratification it engenders.
We have therefore seen how from the mid-eighteenth century onwards, civil 
society became virtually synonymous with a particular sphere of production and 
exchange. The modern state was gradually seen, and in some respects actually evolved 
as an institution separated from the ‘economic’ and ostensibly only concerned with the 
domain of the ‘political’. Far from negating the actual inter-relationship between these 
two spheres, what the distinction between civil society and the state permitted was a 
clearer understanding of the dynamics of modern society. A vital component of this 
new arrangement was the birth of modern social movements within the ambit of civil 
society, a development to which I now turn.
Civil Society and the birth o f modem political agency
The preceding sections have focussed mainly on the sociological and ideological 
dimensions of civil society. Yet the idea of civil society has always borne a great deal 
of normative significance. Part of this relates, as we saw above, to its association with 
a rational and peaceful form of government, and to its central role within an 
evolutionary view of history. Most of the normative content of the idea of civil 
society, however, has been developed during the past two centuries in relation to the
42 Ibid. , p. 116. Italics in the original.
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political possibilities which arise within this new social sphere, particularly for 
modern social movements. This section will therefore examine the key role of modern 
political movements in forging the space of civil society. By looking at the way in 
which thinkers such as Hegel, Gramsci, Habermas or Cohen and Arato identify civil 
society as the appropriate locus of modern political agency, I shall attempt to draw 
attention to the fact that civil society is also a social space marked by collective 
struggles for political domination and resistance.
Hegel is in many ways an inappropriate starting point for an analysis of the 
intersection between social movements and civil society. His own theory of civil 
society is an extremely original amalgam of previous ruminations on the theme, 
drawing on sources as diverse as ancient republicanism and Enlightenment political 
economy. As Cohen and Arato note: "It is by now a commonplace that Hegel 
attempted to unite, in a scheme that was to be both prescriptive and descriptive, a 
conception of ancient ethos with one of the modem freedom of the individual. "43 The 
modem, rational state, represented by a universal class of bureaucrats was to embody 
this ideal; a prospect which as John Keane has highlighted, ”[c]onstitue[s] a very 
broad licence indeed for state regulation and dominance of social life."44 It is this 
contradiction between Hegel's positing a realm of civil society lying between the 
family and the state, and his endorsement of the need for the state to intervene in civil 
society in order to uphold the universal interest, that has occasioned a scepticism 
about his relevance to a democratic theory concerned with social movements. While 
it is true, as Marx's critique pointed out, that Hegel had not registered the emergence 
of distinct socioeconomic classes as bearers of particular political interests, he did 
incorporate, as we saw above, the idea of estates (Stande) as representatives of a 
particularly modem ‘system of needs’. The constituents of civil society -associations,
43 Cohen and Arato, Civil Society and Political Theory, p. 91.
44 Keane, “Despotism and Democracy”, p. 54.
63
Chapter Two: Civil Society : The Challenge o f the International
communities, corporations- were given by Hegel a pivotal sociological and normative 
role in linking the individual to the wider community realised in the state. In this 
respect, the independent sphere of civil society, though cancelled out by the universal 
interest of the rational state, is recognised by Hegel as having an important function 
within the project of an Ethical Life (Sittlichkeit). Perhaps a closer examination of the 
sociological and normative elements of Hegel's theory of civil society will illuminate 
its relevance for an understanding of civil society as the original site of modern 
political agency.
Civil Society was identified by Hegel as an historically concrete space of social 
interaction among individuals. This interaction was conditioned by three elements: a 
"system of needs" (broadly speaking, ‘the economy’); an "administration of justice" 
which protects property as the source of individual freedom; and "the police and the 
corporation" as regulators of these two preceding spheres. Hegel explained the 
functioning of these elements in the following way:
In the system o f needs, the livelihood and welfare of each individual \jedes 
Einzelnen] are a possibility whose actualization is conditioned by the 
individual's own arbitrary will and particular nature, as well as by the 
objective system of needs. Through the administration of justice, 
infringements of property or personality are annulled. But the right which is 
actually present in particularity means not only that contingencies which 
interfere with this or that end should be cancelled [aufgehoben] and that the 
undisturbed security of persons and property should be guaranteed, but also 
that the livelihood and welfare of individuals should be secured - i.e. that 
particular welfare should be treated as a right and duly actualized [in the form 
of the police and the corporation].45
45 G. W. F. Hegel (edited by A. W. Wood and translated by H. B.Nisbet), Elements of the 
Philosophy o f Right (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1995), §230, p. 259-260. Italics in the
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Thus, there is a great deal of overlap between Hegel's vision of civil society and that 
of his predecessors. The concept of a ‘system of needs’ is taken directly from the 
Scottish political economists, while Hegel's emphasis on the idea that civil society is 
inhabited by right-bearing individuals echoes Locke's formulation. Furthermore, 
Hegel shares with the Enlightenment commentators the notion that civil society is a 
product of that distinct historical epoch known as modernity. What is singular in 
Hegel, is his recognition of the role played by social organisations in mediating the 
political relationship between the individual and the state. Hegel ascribes this role to 
Estates which, representing the corporations, associations and communities of civil 
society, integrate the public and private spheres of social life:
Viewed as a mediating organ, the Estates stand between the government at 
large on the one hand and the people in their division into particular spheres 
and individuals [Individuen] on the other [...] this position means that they 
share the mediating function of the organized power of the executive, ensuring 
on the one hand that the power of the sovereign does not appear as an isolated 
extreme -and hence simply as an arbitrary power of domination- and on the 
other that the particular interests of communities, corporations and individuals 
[Individuen] do not become isolated either.46
Hegel's invocation of intermediate associations and organisations of civil society must 
also be seen within the context of his wider normative project. In a sense, the chief 
purpose of Elements o f the Philosophy o f Right is to present an ethical and political 
alternative to the growing individual alienation imposed by modern society. Hegel 
recognises the achievements of modern morality: its grounding on universal rationality
original.
46Ibid., §302, p.342.
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and its respect for individual conscience. Yet, for Hegel, morality can only become 
meaningful if it operates within a community, if it is given content through the 
individual's involvement in public life. As Charles Taylor put it: "Morality shows 
human moral life ... as a purification of the will. But it cannot reach its goal of 
deriving the fullness of human moral duties from reason, nor realize these unless it 
is completed by a community, in which morality is not simply an 'ought', but is 
realized in public life. "47 It is at this juncture that the associative elements of civil 
society take on not only a representative, but an ethical role by integrating individuals 
into the wider community, recognising the value of their work and educating them in 
the virtues of civic life. The corporation, for Hegel, "[h]as the right to assume the role 
of second family for its members ... "48
It should hopefully be clear by now that the originality of Hegel's formulation 
of civil society rests on his skilful combination of a sociological and political 
understanding of the concept. For Hegel, civil society represented both an 
independent sphere of ethical life and a mediating element within the wider 
community governed by the rational state. Hegel was unequivocal about the state's 
primacy over other spheres of society, yet he also insisted on the importance of 
allowing civil society to retain certain autonomy from the state. For John Keane, 
"Ultimately, from his perspective, the relationship between state and society can be 
determined only by weighing up, from the standpoint of political reason, the 
advantages and disadvantages of restricting the independence, abstract freedom and 
competitive pluralism of civil society in favour of universal state prerogatives."49
The antinomies of Hegel's political philosophy and their wider implications 
need not detain us here. What I hope to have pointed out is that Hegel's theory of civil
47 C. Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p.431.
48 Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, §253, p. 271.
49 Keane, "Despotism and Democracy” p. 53.
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society contained two important innovations. First, it made independent associations 
and public opinion a core component of civil society, granting them a role as political 
and ethical mediators between individuals and the state. Second, for all its invocation 
of the communal dimensions of human existence, Hegel's concept of civil society 
acknowledged the centrality of conscious, reflexive individuals in the construction of 
modern civil society.
These innovations have been taken up by a number of twentieth-century 
theorists of civil society. Antonio Gramsci for example adopted the Hegelian 
understanding of civil society in his interpretation of the failures of proletarian 
revolutions in Europe during the aftermath of World War I. He clearly explained the 
difficulties of revolutionary strategy in western societies with reference to the 
hegemonic role played by the independent institutions of civil society which 
complement the coercive rule of the state with sophisticated cultural mechanisms of 
consent. In order to challenge this hegemony, Gramsci contended, revolutionary 
forces embodied in a myriad of social movements and cultural associations- must 
occupy the space of civil society created by western capitalist societies. In a different 
but related fashion, contemporary thinkers such as Jurgen Habermas or Jean Cohen 
and Andrew Arato place considerable emphasis on the role of social movements in the 
construction of a democratic public sphere. In short, broadly coinciding with the rise 
of modern forms of political agency, civil society has increasingly been associated to 
the political activism displayed by different social movements. To be sure, this 
conception of civil society situates the rise of social movements within the context of 
capitalist modernity, and often in opposition to the encroachments of the expanding 
state machinery. Yet the primary impulse behind civil society according to most 
contemporary theorists is a particularly modern form of political subjectivity. As 
Cohen and Arato indicate “Modern civil society is created through forms of self­
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constitution and self-mobilization.”50 Since this study shares the view that civil society 
is ultimately made and unmade by the collective action of conscious individuals 
organised around social movements, it may be worth pausing briefly on the nature and 
characteristics of these movements before proceeding to analyse their international 
dimensions.
Sidney Tarrow has neatly defined social movements as "Collective challenges 
by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with elites, 
opponents and authorities".51 Although social movements have, defined in this way, 
existed in different historical epochs, the argument of this paper is that civil society 
is premised on specifically modem forms of political agency, the nature of which can 
be summarised with reference to four of its general components:
1. Secularism: Secularism should not be confused here with atheism or even anti­
clericalism. Rather, it is used in a broader sense to refer to a way of engaging in 
political action which emphasises human subjectivity and moral agency as opposed to 
Divine intervention or other-wordly determinations. In a way, it involves applying 
Weber's notion of "disenchantment" to the realm of collective agency52, thus 
contrasting, for example, messianic forms of political protest to those built around 
specific programmatic demands. The organisational consequence of this is that the 
hierarchy of modern political movements is determined by the members themselves 
and not ordained by God or His representatives on earth. Moreover, modern 
movements secularise their epistemology by replacing theology with ideology, or in 
Koselleck's formulation, favouring prognosis over prophecy; philosophy of history
50Arato and Cohen, Civil Society and Political Theory, p. ix.
51 S. Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 3-4.
52 As presented in his essay "Science as Vocation". Reproduced in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mils 
(eds.) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (London: Routledge, 1991).
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over the conjectures of cosmology.53
2. Democracy: Modern political movements tend to have an open membership, the 
sole requirement being the sharing of political world-view.54 The notable exception 
to this rule were women55, and in many cases, peoples of colour. These are, of 
course, no minor nor accidental exceptions and they reflect the contradictory nature 
of some modern social movements. Yet, in so far as the general rule of open 
membership for adult men marked an obvious contrast to the previously restricted 
forms of association, it must be maintained as an elementary component of modern 
agency.
3. Universalism: Virtually all modern social movements have a universal message, 
i.e. they are aware of the wider validity of their claims for other people elsewhere in 
the world. As opposed to pre-modern forms of agency, modern political movements 
rarely base their objectives exclusively on the very particular and concrete issues of 
their immediate surrounding. They are certainly premised on a specific source of 
political identity (eg ‘working-class’, ‘women’, ‘black people’) but the general 
assumption is that anybody is entitled to support the particular cause.
53 R. Koselleck, Futures Past: on the Semantics o f Historical Time (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1985).
54 This point is made in the opening lines of E.P. Thompson's77i£ Making of the English Working- 
Class (London: Victor Gollancz. 1963). Refering to the first of the ‘leading rules’ of the London 
Corresponding Society which claims, "That the numbers of our Members be unlimited" Thompson 
says: "Today we might pass over such a rule as commonplace: and yet it is one of the hinges upon 
which history turns. It signified the end to any notion of exclusiveness, of politics as thepreserve of 
any hereditary elite or property rule ... To throw open the doors to propaganda and agitation in this 
"unlimited" way implied a new notion of democracy, which cast aside ancient inhibitions and trusted 
to self-activating and self-organising processes among the common people", (p. 22).
55 Civil society is, like most other classical keywords of political theory, a gendered concept. Yet 
the fact that it has been invoked by some contemporary feminists, and more importantly, that feminist 
critiques emerged precisely from social movements which operate within civil society suggests that the 
category can be useful to those engaged in feminist politics.
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4. Use of printed media and new modes of protest: Modern political agency is 
strongly dependent on the use of new printed media: newspapers, journals, 
manifestos, programmes, pamphlets, declarations. Habermas and others have rightly 
underlined the importance of these media in the rise of a bourgeois ‘public sphere’ 
while print-capitalism is of course a crucial element in Benedict Anderson's account 
of the rise of nationalism.56 It should also be noted that modern social movements 
introduced new modes of protest. As Louise and Charles Tilly have pointed out: 
"[t]he food riot, the tax rebellion, the invasion of fields, and the other standard ways 
of voicing eighteenth-century demands give way to the strike, the demonstration, the 
public meeting, the electoral rally ..."57
These distinguishing features neither exhaust the definition of modem political 
agency nor do they encompass all the forms of agency that come under this category. 
In fact, they represent an ideal-type, which always needs to be contrasted with the 
historical practice of social movements. This said, they do broadly capture what is 
distinctive about the social movements which have operated within civil society. It is 
now time therefore, to explore the ways in which this type of agency may be deemed 
to be international.
2.2 The International Dimensions of Civil Society
The foregoing brief and necessarily selective survey of the way civil society has 
operated as a political, historical and sociological category identifies three basic 
elements of its constitution. In the first place, civil society assumes the possibility of 
analysing the systematic interaction between individuals in a scientific fashion. In
56 B. Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread o f Nationalism 
(London: Verso, 1983).
57 L. A. Tilly and C. Tilly (eds.) Class Conflict and Collective Action (London and Beverly Hills, 
CA: Sage Publications, 1981), p.21.
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other words, it marks the beginning of a distinctly modem  view of society. The 
emergence of this new imagination of society, however, corresponds to the historical 
development of capitalist social relations. In this respect, civil society is rooted in 
bourgeois society. Third, the sociological understanding of civil society is given 
political and ethical content by modern social movements. Ultimately, the continued 
existence of civil society hinges upon the capacity of social and political movements 
to channel collective human agency toward specific political goals.
The claim I want to develop now is that civil society has from its inception 
been moulded by a number of international factors which warrant the adoption of the 
term international civil society as a more accurate category of social, political and 
historical analysis. Viewing civil society from a wider international perspective, I 
suggest, poses a challenge to the prevailing assumption that civil society can be 
restricted to a particular national setting. It allows us to examine the same phenomena 
that have traditionally preoccupied theorists of civil society, while at the same time 
encompassing the international aspects of its genesis.
Essentially, the international dimensions of civil society are three-fold. In the 
first place, civil society must be seen as a constituent o f the modern system of states. 
Whether understood as an autonomous sphere of economic activity or as the 
embodiment of a distinct type of political community, civil society emerged in 
conjunction with the modern sovereign state -the key component of the international 
system. Second, defined as the expression of capitalist market relations, civil society 
should be seen as an international phenomenon by virtue of its global expansion. In 
other words, it is fruitful, as the neo-Gramscians discussed in the introductory chapter 
have done, to conceive of the global capitalist economy as the domain of international 
civil society. Last, when civil society is viewed as a political and ethical space 
occupied by modern social movements, the international dimensions of its operation 
become even more evident. The combination of these three elements produces the 
following definition of international civil society: International civil society is the
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social and political space created internationally and within states by the expansion 
o f capitalist relations o f production, where modem social movements operate in 
pursuit o f stated political goals.
In what follows, I shall elaborate on this definition with reference to the three 
elements of international civil society. I shall pay most attention to the last 
component, the functioning of international social movements, for it brings into focus 
the role of internationalism in reproducing international civil society. This is a concept 
that will figure prominently in the historical narrative that follows, and it is also of 
considerable relevance to the normative implications of thinking about international 
civil society. For these two reasons, I shall spend some time identifying the basic 
features of internationalism as a political principle and practice. The concluding 
section of the chapter will signpost the analytical and normative promises of 
employing the term international civil society, thereby anticipating some of the themes 
to be developed in the closing chapter of this study.
Civil Society and the Construction o f the System o f States
One of the few obvious aspects of any definition of civil society is that it necessarily 
assumes reference to the modern state. Although, as we saw above, the nature of the 
interaction between these two categories has varied through time, they have always 
been presented within the context of a relationship between two distinctive, if not 
always separable entities. The modern state being the traditional starting-point for the 
analysis of the international system, one would expect IR theorists to have paid more 
attention to the interplay between civil society and the state in the genesis of the 
modern states-system.
Yet it is only recently that IR theory has come to interrogate the nature of this 
relationship and its relevance for an understanding of the international system. In 
addressing the historical origins of the sovereign state, Justin Rosenberg has laid
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special emphasis on the place of civil society in this process. For Rosenberg, "[t]he 
structural specificity of state sovereignty lies in its 'abstraction' from civil society - 
an abstraction which is constitutive of the private sphere of the m arket..."58 Hence, 
the very possibility of thinking about state sovereignty -and consequently, the modern 
international system- only arises when the separation between the ‘political’ and the 
‘economic’ (state and civil society) is effected under capitalism.
This thesis is of course far from uncontroversial. As Rosenberg freely admits, 
the historical evidence lends greater weight to the more conventional view that it was 
the rise of Absolutism which -by centralising the state apparatus, creating standing 
armies and marking a separation between the state's internal supremacy and external 
independence- paved the way for the emergence of a system of independent sovereign 
states. According to this view, civil society understood either as a market or as 
political community was inconsequential to the constitution of the modern 
international system. The emergence of the latter was principally the result of the 
landed nobility responding to the crisis of feudalism in Europe by concentrating 
political and economic power in a territorially defined Absolutist state. In the words 
of Perry Anderson: "The class power of the feudal lords was thus directly at stake 
with the gradual disappearance of serfdom. The result was a displacement of politico- 
legal coercion upwards towards a centralized, militarized summit-the Absolutist 
state"59.
Clearly, the historical origins of the modem international system remains the 
subject of a complex and unresolved debate which cannot be further addressed here. 
For the purposes of our argument however, it may be worth pointing out that neither 
of the two accounts presented above, ascribes a role to the social movements within 
civil society in the configuration of this new international system. Anderson refers to
58 J. Rosenberg, The Empire of Civil Society: A Critique of the Realist Theory o f International 
Relations (London: Verso, 1994), p. 123.
59 P. Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State (London: Verso, 1974), p. 19.
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the centrifugal resistance to the Absolutist state displayed at different times by local 
nobles, tradesmen or lawyers, often in combination with a rural or urban mob. Yet 
surely the period also witnessed the gradual emergence of social movements 
employing a distinctly modern language of rights, constitutionalism and even 
democratic governance which reinforced the legitimacy of the territorial state as a 
political community. In other words, whether seen as a product of capitalism or 
Absolutism, the modern state was given actual historical content not only by the ruling 
classes and their attendant systems of property and law, but also by a populace which 
increasingly identified this particular territorial entity as the locus of modern politics. 
One of the most noteworthy paradoxes of modern social and political movements, 
therefore, is that they operate at an international level while at the same time 
recognising the political salience of the sovereign state. It is in this respect that 
international civil society becomes simultaneously an arena of domestic and 
international politics. The chapter that follows will aim to illustrate in greater 
historical detail how looking at the emergence and reproduction of civil society can 
help us to understand key concepts in IR theory such as ‘sovereignty’, ‘self- 
determination’ or ‘the standard of civilization’. It will be argued there that the notion 
of ‘popular sovereignty’ as a purveyor of self-conscious agency of collectivities has 
been instrumental in forging the modern states-system. At this stage, however, my 
aim is merely to highlight the part played by the incipient modern social movements 
in defining the political limits of the modern state, and hence their contribution to the 
construction of a modern system of states.
The Expansion o f International Civil Society
When civil society is identified as an arena dominated by capitalist relations of 
production, the international ramifications of the concept become even more apparent. 
This claim can be elaborated on from two vantage points. On the one hand, seen from
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an orthodox Marxian perspective, international civil society becomes synonymous 
with the global capitalist market; the organisations and corporations of capitalist 
production and exchange come to embody the ‘economic’ space of a borderless civil 
society which underscores the ‘political’ system of sovereign states. Thus, the 
relationship between the two spheres turns into a domestic analogy whereby 
international civil society stands in the same relation to the international system as 
civil society does for the state in a national setting. The position adopted here 
however, eschews the domestic analogy and seeks to incorporate the dynamics of the 
international system into a broader definition of international civil society. While 
maintaining the notion that international civil society is a social and historical space 
created by the expansion of capitalism, the claim is also that this expansion altered the 
very nature of capitalism as a social formation. Thus, talking of international civil 
society does not just involve recognising the obvious fact that capitalism expanded 
globally, but furthermore, that it did so in a distorted fashion. The features which had 
originally defined capitalism in its European birthplace became refracted through the 
lens of international phenomena such as sovereignty, war, imperialism or revolution. 
The usage of international civil society employed here attempts to convey the intricate 
set of social and political relations which were thrown up by this process. Perhaps the 
best way of illustrating this point is by way some examples.
Any analysis of international capitalism should involve an examination of 
European (and to a lesser degree Japanese and American) imperialism, for it was 
through this process that capitalist social relations were extended across the globe. 
The controversies over the exact nature of imperialism are of course manifold. 
Nonetheless, at least three key elements are common to all historical forms of 
capitalist imperialism. First, the imperial state is at some stage involved in the 
imposition of capitalist social relations, either through war and conquest, or by means 
of indirect coercion such as unequal trade treaties and credit arrangements. Second, 
imperialism involves a mode of political subjugation which, far from laying the
75
Chapter Two: Civil Society : The Challenge o f the International
foundations of civil society via the establishment of a market of free labour, actually 
employs all its coercive powers to extract surplus value through mechanisms ranging 
from outright slavery to bonded labour or forced migration. Third, and not least 
important, this form of capitalist expansion finds legitimacy in notions of racial 
supremacy, so that the modes of surplus extraction are heavily conditioned by a racial, 
ethnic or religious hierarchies which justify unequal market relations.
If we take the case of North Africa, for example, the nature of French 
capitalist penetration bore all the hallmarks of imperialism just mentioned above. 
Algeria and later, Tunisia and Morocco were invaded under the pretext of 
safeguarding French financial and strategic interests. In all three cases, but 
particularly in Algeria, invasion was followed by violent ‘pacification’ and forced 
expropriation of land which was subsequently occupied by European settlers. The 
legal administrative structures erected by the invading power effectively divided the 
population along two categories: that of the indigene and that of the white colon. Thus 
the upshot of this whole process was certainly the introduction of capitalist relations 
of production in North Africa, ie. the expansion of international civil society. Yet 
because imperialism was the primary agent of this development, the form of capitalist 
social relations which emerged in North Africa were significantly different from those 
existing in Europe. The interaction between French and North African civil societies 
must be seen within its appropriate international context: one of imperialist 
domination articulated upon various racial and national hierarchies and enforced 
through direct state intervention.
Of course, the extension of capitalist social relations has also taken non- 
imperialist routes. The Meiji Restoration in Japan is typically cited as an example of 
state-led capitalist transformation, while in many parts of the world, most notably in 
Latin America, capitalism made inroads either directly through the mechanisms of the 
global market or through local middle-men, dubbed by some theorists as the 
‘comprador bourgeoisie’. There is hopefully no need to labour the point further that
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world capitalism is what Eric Wolf terms a "differentiated" mode of production.60 The 
relevant conclusion in terms of our argument is that the category ‘international civil 
society’ should suggest much more than an alternative formulation of the global 
capitalist market. It should represent an approach to the expansion of capitalism which 
incorporates a host of international dimensions (such as nationalism, ethnic and 
religious stratification, revolutions or imperialism itself), into the Marxian 
understanding of civil society as a private sphere of capitalist production and 
exchange.
International Civil Society as the Arena o f International Political Agency
The foregoing discussion on the nature of world capitalism bears direct relevance to 
the subject-matter of this last section in two important respects. First, it is the 
extension of capitalist social relations which best explains the emergence across the 
world of the modem social movements that have been the protagonists of international 
civil society over the past two centuries. Most political expressions of modern civil 
society -be they liberal pressure groups, women's movements, nationalist parties or 
socialist organisations- arise out of class relations present only under capitalism. This 
does not mean that capitalism necessarily produces these forms of organisation, nor 
that it is the only force responsible for their emergence. It does mean, however, that 
historically the forms of modern political agency typical of civil society spring from 
the socioeconomic transformations brought about by capitalism.
Second, and not least important, the uneven expansion of world capitalism 
examined above engenders a variety of social and political forces which, although 
broadly comparable, exhibit a number of particularities. As was briefly discussed in 
the introductory chapter to this thesis, positing universal forms of social and political
60 E. R. Wolf, Europe and the People without History (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 1982), Chapter 10.
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agency does not preclude recognising their diversity. Indeed, the historical analysis 
of Tunisian civil society in the chapters that follow aims precisely to demonstrate how 
the reproduction of capitalist social relations in the Maghreb generated modern social 
movements with myriad political programmes: reformist liberals; populist nationalists; 
socialist and communist parties and trade unions; Islamic revivalist. These movements 
were in one way or another the product of the expansion of international civil society; 
yet they simultaneously contested the social and political implications of this process, 
sometimes in unison and most often in competition with each other. In other words, 
far from generating homogenous replicas of an archetypal modern social movement, 
the expansion of international civil society produced very specific manifestations of 
universal forms of social and political agency.
Taken together, these two considerations provide the backdrop against which 
we can examine the normative dimension to the idea international civil society. The 
expansion of capitalism only opens up the sociological space of international civil 
society; in the last instance, however, this space is given content through the 
international activity of social movements. I shall now turn to the nature of these 
movements, how they are defined internationally and how they represent the political 
space of international civil society.
Taking the earlier definition of modern social movements as a starting-point, 
the claim defended here is that such movements have been international from their 
inception in at least three important respects. First, as the third of the characteristics 
presented above suggests, virtually all social movements are premised on some form 
of universal political agency. For the socialist, it is the working-class which plays this 
role; for the feminist, it is women which are the political agents of their own 
emancipation; for the nationalist, it is the imagined community of the nation which 
carries this burden. In all three cases, there is an explicit assumption that ‘women’, 
‘nations’ or the ‘working-class’ exist as potential political agents in all parts of the 
world. To take a random but illustrative example, the People's International League,
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a cross-European association established in 1847 by the Italian nationalist Guisseppe 
Mazzini, defined its objectives thus:
to disseminate the principles of national freedom and progress; to embody and 
manifest an efficient public opinion in favour of the right of every people to 
self-government and the maintenance of their own nationality; to promote a 
good understanding between the peoples of every country.61
Even a cursory glance at the history of social and political movements of the past two 
centuries would reveal a vast number of similar tracts where the potential audience of 
the message is consciously deemed to be international. In short, the very consideration 
that a particular political discourse might be relevant outside the original national or 
regional context of its genesis suggests that at an ideological level, all modern social 
movements have been international from the start.
The most solid evidence in favour of the idea that modern social movements 
constitute an international phenomenon, however, lies in a study of their forms of 
organisation. Clearly, modern movements which espouse universal ideologies also 
attempt to realise those aspirations in practice. Thus again, an historical survey of the 
organisational forms of the relevant modern social movements indicates a clear 
international, when not overtly internationalist disposition. Consider the women's 
movement for example. Since the mid-nineteenth century, women have organised 
internationally with the intention of furthering their common interests across the 
globe. Emerging out of existing international associations like the Anti-Slavery 
League or the Socialist International, feminist internationalism took shape in the form 
of organisations such as the International Congress of Women (established in 1888), 
the International Women's Suffrage Alliance (1904) or the Socialist Women's
61 Cited in D. Mack Smith, Mazzini (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994), p 52.
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International (1907).62 Although the general objectives of the various organisations 
which formed the international women's movement differed considerably, the single 
common denominator remained the explicit attempt at transgressing the existing 
national political boundaries. This aspiration was realised by a number of 
organisations which, although predominantly European and North American in 
membership, still managed to attract sympathisers in Turkey, Iran, South Africa or 
Argentina. Thus, by the time the women's movement re-emerged as ‘new’ social 
movement in the late 1960s, the international women's movement had a rich 
experience as a representative of international civil society. Similar stories could be 
told of the liberal, pacifist, socialist and even environmentalist movements which have 
been the mainstay of civil society across the world.
These various experiences fall under what in the rest of this thesis will be 
described as the principle and practice of ‘internationalism’. The notion of 
internationalism arose during the latter part of the nineteenth century in response to 
the momentous socioeconomic and political changes that were transforming the lives 
of millions across the world. The emerging ‘universal interdependence of nations’ 
captured so vividly by Marx and Engels in their 1848 Communist Manifesto was 
simultaneously generating attempts at forging a corresponding ‘universal 
interdependence of peoples’. This aspiration to create bonds of solidarity among 
groups of different national, religious and ethnic backgrounds was expressed first as 
a principle which celebrated the internationalisation of the world as a positive process 
which could facilitate the pursuit of universal political goals such as peace, 
democracy, equality or freedom.63 Additionally, internationalism came to reflect a 
particular practice of social and political organisation of people across national, ethnic
62 See the useful summary provided by D. Stienstra, Women's Movements and International 
Organization (London: Macmillan Press, 1994), chapters 3 and 4.
63 This summary is drawn from Fred Halliday's essay on internationalism, "Three concepts of 
Internationalism", International Affairs (Vol. 64, No.2, 1988), pp. 187-197.
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or religious boundaries. In the specific case of working-class internationalism, this 
was realised in the form of the International Working Men’s Association (IWMA) or 
First International formed in 1864, and later in the Second and Third Internationals, 
founded in 1889 and 1919, respectively. Understood in this way, internationalism 
becomes both cause and consequence of the expansion of international civil society: 
internationalist solidarities were certainly encouraged by the increasing 
interpenetration of societies across the world; yet at the same time, a heightened 
consciousness of this process among for example, the European working-class, led to 
pre-emptive initiatives in internationalist activism geared toward undermining the 
greater mobility and power of capital. The upshot of all this is that the emergence in 
a particular society of modern social movements typical of civil society cannot be 
explained with reference to ‘domestic’ factors alone. Historically, the principle and 
practice of internationalism have played a crucial role in extending modern modes of 
social and political action across the world. In this respect, although the expansion of 
international civil society should not be directly equated with internationalism, the 
latter has certainly been instrumental in encouraging the international reproduction of 
modern forms of social and political agency .
A last element in the international constitution of modern social movements is 
what, for want of a less overbearing phrase, can only be described as the impact of 
world-historical conjunctures. Even when there is no direct organisational affiliation, 
or a deliberate attempt at ideological propagation, social movements can emerge in a 
given location in response to events occurring elsewhere in the world. Revolutions 
provide the classic instance of this type of phenomenon. Whether one considers the 
Democratic Revolutions of the late eighteenth century, the socialist and radical 
nationalist revolutions of the twentieth, or even the Iranian revolution of 1978-79, 
there is plenty of evidence to suggest that the demonstrative example of these events 
inspired the creation of social movements typical of civil society in parts of the globe 
where they had previously been absent. Less dramatic perhaps, but still very much
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relevant, the political success of a given social movement -the civil rights movement 
in the US or the Latin American self-help barrio associations- clearly impact upon the 
formation of movements elsewhere without there being any formal links between 
groups. One interesting instance of this was the adoption by Catholics in Northern 
Ireland of the language and methods of their black counterparts in the southern United 
States during their own struggle for civil rights in the 1960s.
In each of these three respects, then, the international emerges as a key 
component of modem social movements which inhabit civil society. Seen in this light, 
international civil society represents a political space which has been constructed over 
the past three-hundred years by the international activity of modern social movements. 
By espousing and propagating universal ideologies; by providing examples of how 
collective action can be politically meaningful across the world; and most importantly, 
by organising internationally, modern social movements have for decades been 
extending the boundaries of political action beyond the territorial state. It is in this 
sense that international civil society becomes the relevant site of international politics. 
Taken in conjunction with the preceding arguments on the relevance of civil society 
when explaining the construction of the modern state and the global reproduction of 
capitalism, a strong case can be made for considering civil society and the phenomena 
it gives rise to, as being inherently international. Thinking of civil society as a social 
and political space that simultaneously transcends and reinforces territorial boundaries 
opens new normative and analytical horizons which I shall briefly outline in the 
concluding section of this chapter.
2.3 Conclusions: The Promises of International Civil Society
The notion of an international or global civil society gradually emerging in the 
aftermath of the Cold War and out of the process of ‘globalisation’ has over the past 
few years captured the imagination of numerous scholars, commentators and activists
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the world over. The phenomenal growth in the number of International Non- 
Governmental Organisations (INGOs) and their often spectacular interventions in the 
different parts of the globe have prompted further talk of ” [c]ivil society and its 
transnational networks [embodying] the universum which competing nations have 
never succeeded in creating" .M While the arguments outlined in this thesis are broadly 
sympathetic to this point of view, there are, nonetheless a number of important 
differences between the approach adopted here and that offered by the existing 
theories of international civil society. Considering these differences more closely may 
help to elucidate the analytical and normative value which I have ascribed to the 
notion of international civil society.
The first significant contrast refers to the historical origins of international 
civil society. The underlying assumption to most discussions of civil society is that 
it developed within a national context. Consequently, the existing literature on 
international or global civil society concurs on the idea that this is a space of political 
action which has only recently shown signs of "becoming global"65 or which, less 
optimistically "is still more potential than actual"66. The evidence offered in this 
chapter has attempted to suggest otherwise. As I have tried to indicate, even when the 
term civil society is deployed in a more traditional sense to refer to the capitalist 
market or to a particularly modern form of political community, there appear a 
number of international dimensions to its genesis and later development. These would 
imply that the category ‘international civil society’ is applicable to the dual process 
of capitalist development and state formation of early modern Europe - a long shot
64 Paul Ghils, "International Civil Society: International Non-Governmental Organisations in the 
International System", International Social Science Journal Vol. 44, No. 133, August, pp. 417-429, 
p. 429.
65 Ronnie D. Lipschutz, "Reconstructing World Politics: the Emergence of Global Civil Society" 
in Millennium: Journal of International Studies (Vol. 21, No. 3, 1992) pp. 389-420, p. 391.
66 Martin Shaw, "Civil Society and Global Politics: Beyond a Social Movements Approach" 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies (Vol. 23, No. 3, 1994) pp. 647-67, p. 655.
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from post-modern world of ‘globalisation’. When civil society is defined as a space 
occupied by modern social movements, however, the case for dating the emergence 
of an international civil society in the late eighteenth century becomes even stronger. 
An analysis of the expansion of eighteenth-century public culture or the various types 
of nineteenth-century internationalism should persuade any student of international 
civil society that the forms of political agency associated with this realm long predated 
contemporary transnationalism or ‘postinternational’ politics. All this does not mean 
that the new expressions of international political agency -be they INGOs, 
humanitarian organisations, ‘critical’ social movements or whatever- should not be 
considered part of international civil society. Rather, the point is to situate them in 
their appropriate historical setting; that is, as part of a sphere which has been 
developing since at least the eighteenth century.
This reappraisal of the historical origins of international civil society, however, 
has deeper implications than simply setting back the dates of its emergence. It 
retrieves two key analytical advantages in employing the term which have been 
overlooked by most commentators. The first of these relates to the question of 
modernity and the international system. With the exception of Marxists like Justin 
Rosenberg or Mark Rupert, no IR scholar using the term has developed the 
implications of civil society being associated with a distinct historical epoch (i.e 
‘modernity’). As Rosenberg has so eloquently argued, this is crucial in both de­
naturalising the states-system and providing a richer explanation of its emergence. Yet 
even as nuanced a usage as Rosenberg's fails to identify civil society with the modern 
forms of political agency discussed above. Furthermore, there is no recognition of the 
international features of these new modes of political protest and organisation. If the 
argument outlined in this chapter carries any weight, then surely the concept of 
international civil society can serve as a framework for an understanding of the 
distinctly modern forms of political agency which have forged the present 
international system.
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Derived from this identification of international civil society with modernity 
is a second theoretical advantage of the concept, namely its emphasis on the necessary 
interaction between the state and the social forces of civil society during this epoch. 
As was pointed out in the last chapter, too much of the literature on global or 
international civil society focuses exclusively on the transnational non-state actors in 
world politics without paying sufficient attention to their relationship with the state. 
The notion of international civil society on the other hand allows us to consider this 
interface without thereby losing sight of societal forces. The aim here is not be to play 
off a societal reading of international relations against a statist one, but rather to 
investigate the grey areas where these two interpretations meet. In other words, to 
probe the historical interaction between state and civil society within an international 
setting. In order to accomplish this, we could do worse than employ the concept of 
‘international civil society’ which takes the language provided by the classical thinkers 
of civil society and places it within an appropriate international context.
A last discrepancy between the prevalent understanding of international civil 
society and the one adopted here revolves around the type of political promise which 
the concept holds. Few scholars interested in international civil society would disagree 
with Ronnie Lipschutz's remarks to the effect th a t" [g]lobal civil society represents 
an ongoing project of civil society to reconstruct, re-imagine, or re-map world 
politics.”67 One ambition of this thesis after all, is precisely to identify the ways in 
which the agents of international civil society have extended the boundaries of the 
political. The key question, therefore, remains what kind of shape will this world 
politics take?
One type of answer to this question insists on the impossibility of employing 
the political idiom of modernity under post-modern conditions. As we saw in the 
introductory chapter, authors such as R.B.J Walker -one of the few IR scholars who
67 Lipschutz,"Reconstructing World Politics”, p. 391.
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has seriously engaged with the role of social movements in world politics- recently 
argued that "An empirical analysis of social movements, and an interpretation of their 
significance for what world politics might become, does not have to be bound by the 
prejudices of modernity. On the contrary, these prejudices can only ensure that the 
fine lines separating us from them can never be transgressed."68
As a philosophical critique of the excesses of modernity, this kind of stance 
provides ready solace for those ‘anti-systemic’ academics disenchanted with the failure 
of modernist political projects. As a recipe for political action, however, it offers little 
more than vague invocations about the creation of loose ‘networks’ and spontaneous 
‘connections’ which might bring together the ‘silenced’ and the ‘subaltern’ in world 
politics. When asked to produce empirical evidence of the kind of movement which 
might inform this alternative world politics, reference is made to the obscurantist 
Hindu revivalism of the Swadhyaya movement in western India.69 Ultimately, the 
relevance of this type of political agency for world politics can only be assessed with 
the passing of time. The contemporary experience, however, suggests that it has been 
modem social movements which, through strike action, mass demonstrations, party- 
political activism and international solidarity campaigns have managed to effect 
meaningful political change in places as diverse as Southern Europe, Latin America, 
South Africa or East Asia.70 Surely it is the example of these kinds of struggle -and 
not mystical Vedic cosmologies- that a progressive world politics should build on.
A second kind of response to the role of international civil society in world 
politics focuses more exclusively on the actions of INGOs and international pressure
68 R. B. J. Walker, "Social Movements/World Politics", Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies (Vol. 23, No. 3, 1994) pp. 669-700, p. 699.
69 Ibid., p. 685.
70 For a recent survey of struggles for liberal democracy that incorporates a notion of international 
civil society, see D. Held (ed.) Prospects for Democracy: North, South, East, West (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1993).
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groups. From this perspective -mainly connected with the field of Development 
Studies- international civil society represents that space occupied by associations 
which, although working in collaboration with the different tiers of the state and 
international organisations, are officially independent and ultimately only accountable 
to their international membership. Furthermore, since they pursue specific political 
goals across boundaries, they hold the promise of a new type of world politics. As 
Mark Hoffman has pointed out, INGOs informed by notions of ‘International 
Citizenry’ may "[pjrovide a basis for forms of intervention which seek to extend the 
boundaries of political community while undermining systems of exclusion" .71 In these 
two respects, the increasingly complex web of INGO activity often receives the label 
‘international civil society’.
This understanding of international civil society is plainly at odds with some 
of the theoretical issues raised here -chiefly concerning questions of epochal change 
and the relationship to the state. Yet there are two important differences regrading the 
political vistas opened up by INGO activities. The first, and most obvious point is that 
INGOs are fundamentally pressure groups which do not contest the overall legitimacy 
of a specific regime but merely seek to alter a particular policy -on human rights, 
environmental law, women's rights and so forth. They therefore eschew campaigning 
for grand-scale social and political change. The conception of international civil 
society adopted here, however, has maintained that the modern social movements have 
been precisely concerned with effecting such grand-scale transformations at an 
interstate level. Thus, international civil society is identified as a political space of the 
‘grand-narratives’ which can still envisage the possibility of global changes in the 
socioeconomic and political structure of a given society. Secondly, and following on 
from this point, there remains a degree of ambiguity about the accountability of
71 Mark Hoffman, "Agency, Identity and Intervention" in I. Forbes and M. Hoffman,Political 
Theory, International Relationsand the Ethics of Intervention (London: Macmillan Press, 1993), pp. 
194-211, p.203.
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INGOs. For the fact that INGOs are ‘non-governmental’ does not mean that they are 
‘non-political’; indeed, their activity necessarily impinges upon existing political 
formations. Yet few INGOs are willing to recognise the full implications of 
participating in a given political community - one of which involves defining the 
sources and limits of a group's political accountability. Modern social movements on 
the other hand, have accepted the political nature of their activity from the outset, thus 
making it very clear to whom they are accountable and in whose interests they 
participate within a given political community. If international civil society is to be 
considered as a possible site of progressive world politics, it would seem more 
appropriate to fix such hopes on the agency of social movements which at least enjoy 
some democratic legitimacy, rather than on organisations that fail to identify the 
sources of their political accountability.
Taken in conjunction with the foregoing theoretical discussion, these two 
general observations on the politics of international civil society suggest that this is 
still an arena dominated by modern forms of political agency. The argument of this 
chapter has been that understanding international civil society in this light might 
provide a clearer and more historically-informed picture of the way emancipatory 
social movements can organise internationally in the future. It has also been my 
intention, however, to indicate how the idea of international civil society can serve as 
a tool for analysing the contribution of collective political agency to the emergence 
and development of an international society of states. It is with issue that the next 
chapter is concerned.
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International Society From Below: The Role of Civil Society in
International Relations
For the past two decades IR theory has undergone an intense process of critical self- 
reflection. As the theoretical insights and preoccupations of other branches of the 
social sciences and the humanities have entered the discipline, the meta-theoretical 
presuppositions inherent to mainstream IR have been placed under close scrutiny by 
approaches such as feminism, historical materialism or postmodernism. Consequently, 
the received wisdom as to how one should go about analysing ‘the international’ has 
been contested, and in its stead, a variety of perspectives on the study of international 
relations now compete for theoretical dominance. This methodological explosion in 
IR theory has certainly affected the parameters of what should be included within the 
domain of the international so that questions relating to culture, gender, the 
environment, or capitalism are now deemed to be central to our discipline. Yet 
paradoxically, it has also given new lease to many of the key concepts and concerns 
of orthodox IR theory such as sovereignty, international society, nationalism, and the 
system of states. Rather than entirely replacing these categories, much of 
contemporary IR theory has sought to investigate their origin and changing nature, 
thus subjecting the conventional use of these concepts to an immanent critique.
It is the aim of this chapter to engage in precisely this kind of critique by 
investigating the notion of international society and its attendant categories - 
sovereignty, nationalism, the system of states and the ‘standard of civilisation’- from 
the vantage point of the North African experience. The objective is to outline some 
of the theoretical parameters of the historical investigation that follows in next 
chapters by arguing that many of the features associated with the idea of international 
society emerged from the interaction with international civil society. The point, 
therefore, is not to reject the concept of international society tout court, but to 
uncover the social and historical content accumulated from its interaction with an 
expanding international civil society.
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In order to develop my argument, I have chosen to focus upon the writings of 
the so-called ‘English School’ of international relations. This is for two reasons. First, 
and most obviously, because it is the authors associated to this school that developed 
the notion of ‘international society’ most thoroughly, and who investigated with 
greatest historical sensitivity concepts such as sovereignty, nationalism, or the 
expansion of the western ‘standard of civilisation’ - all of which are closely linked 
to the arguments of this thesis. Second, because the normative value attached to the 
concept of international society is crucial in understanding its interaction with 
international civil society. Throughout the thesis, I shall emphasise that the 
construction of the modern international system owes just as much to international 
civil society underpinning the institutions of international society, as to international 
society legitimizing the social movements associated to the expansion of international 
civil society. As I hope to elucidate below, the choice of international society in 
opposition to international system as the preferred term for a discussion of the 
theoretical purchase of international civil society, reflects the acceptance that the 
international is a domain permeated by a set of identifiable norms and values. That 
these norms and values were imposed across the world by the expanding capitalist 
powers does not cancel out their continued relevance in the explanation of 
contemporary world politics. In the same way that Marx accepted the categories of 
classical political economy when unpacking the fetishism of the commodity, critical 
IR theory has to engage with the concepts of classical international theory like 
‘international society’ when demystifying the workings of the contemporary 
international system .
Given the controversial nature in IR theory of the term ‘international society’, 
the first section of this chapter investigates the meaning of the concept, thereby 
bringing into the discussion three issues relevant to the interface between international 
society and international civil society: sovereign statehood, the western ‘standard of 
civilisation’ and the ‘revolt against the west’. These three areas of concern for the 
English School will then serve as headings for a sustained criticism of this approach
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to international relations. It will be argued that the International Society perspective 
fails to account for the forces of international civil society in each of the domains j ust 
mentioned, and is consequently unable to consider the relevance of collective social 
and political activity in the expansion, consolidation and transformation of 
international society. The chapter will close with a general and promissory discussion 
of the way in which the study of the expansion of international civil society can 
further our understanding of international relations.
3.1 International Society: A Malleable Concept
The term ‘international society’ was given its contemporary meaning in the essays 
produced by the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics from the 
late 1950s onward. Since then, the concept has been the focus of much scholarly 
attention in IR, spawning an important literature which is often presented in the guis e 
of the English School of IR. There has been considerable debate regarding the 
existence of an ‘English School’ and indeed, whether the term ‘international society’ 
should be exclusively associated with the authors connected to this ‘school’. 1 The 
position taken here will be the conventional one, namely that the members of the 
British Committee did share a common set of assumptions about the nature of 
international society and its centrality in world politics, and that these assumptions 
have been carried through into a number of contemporary studies investigating the 
relationship between international society and aspects of world politics such as
1 For the disputes over the existence or otherwise of the English School see Roy E. Jones, “The 
English School of International Relations: A Case for Closure” Review of International Studies (Vol. 
7, No. 1, 1981) pp. 185-206; Sheila Grader, “The English School of Intemationl Relations: Evidence 
and Evaluation” Review of International Studies (Vol. 14, No. 1, 1988) pp. 29-44; and Peter Wilson 
“The English School of International Relations: A Reply to Sheila Grader” Review of International 
Studies (Vol. 15, No. 1, 1989), pp. 101-129. Two recent helpful overviews of the English School and 
international society are: Ole Waever “International Society” Cooperation and Conflict (Vol. 27, No.l, 
1992), pp. 97-128; and Timothy Dunne “International Society: Theoretical Promises Unfulfilled” 
Cooperation and Conflict (Vol. 30, No. 1, 1995), pp. 125-154. See also R. Fawn and J. Larkins, 
International Society After the Cold War (London: Macmillan Press in association with Millennium, 
1996) for further elaborations and re-workings of the concept.
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nationalism, revolutions, decolonisation, or human rights. Furthermore, the authors 
registered with the English School are distinguished by their historicist understanding 
of the present international system and the importance they attach to normative values 
in explaining the emergence and consolidation of this system. In this respect, the 
International Society approach to IR has, through different generations, displayed both 
an internal consistency in terms of methodology, problematic and guiding assumptions 
and an external identity, built around the emphasis on the idea of international society, 
which distinguishes it from other theoretical perspectives in IR. At the risk of some 
simplification, the broad outlines of the this approach to IR can be summarised in four 
components of international society.
The first, and arguably the constitutive element of international society is state 
sovereignty. Put most succinctly by Hedley Bull, “An international society ... 
presupposes an international system.”2 Virtually all the writers following the 
International Society approach set out from the basic premise that international 
society is above all a society of sovereign states. This is certainly explicit in the 
recent contributions to the study of international society from Alan James3, Robert 
H. Jackson4, James Mayall5 and David Armstrong6, but it was also evident from the 
outset in the proceedings of the British Committee. The collection of essays on 
international theory published under the title of Diplomatic Investigations, for 
example, all endorsed the Realist assumption that what was under investigation in 
international relations was a system of states with no overarching authority, and the
2 H. Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics 2nd ed. (London and Basingstoke 
Macmillan, 1995), p. 13.
3 A. James, Sovereign Statehood: the Basis o f International Society (London: Allen & Unwin, 1986).
4 R. H. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990).
5 J. Mayall, Nationalism and International Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).
6 D. Armstrong, Revolution and World Order: the Revolutionary State in International Society (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1993).
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practices and institutions such as diplomacy or international law which accompanied 
this anarchical system. In contrast to American Realism, however, the International 
Society approach has always emphasised the distinctly modern nature of the present 
international system. Martin Wight’s historical comparison of systems of states was 
perhaps the clearest expression of this. In his essays on ‘The Origins of Our States- 
System’, Wight is unequivocal: “The simplest speculation about the origins of the 
Western states-system .... is bound up with the question as to when modern history 
began.”7 The answer, for Wight, was 1648: it was the Peace of Westphalia which 
consolidated the norms of intercourse among European states that prevailed in the 
next three centuries:
In retrospect, Westphalia was believed to mark the transition from religious 
to secular politics, from ‘Christendom’ to ‘Europe’, the exclusion from 
international politics of the Holy See, the effective end of the Holy Roman 
Empire by the virtual recognition of the sovereignty of its members ...8
Later investigations into international society, most notably Adam Watson’s The 
Evolution o f International Society9, follow Wight in accepting that what distinguishes 
contemporary international society from other systems of states is the secularised 
interaction among sovereign political communities confirmed at the Peace of 
Westphalia. In short, one of the basic features of international society, according to 
the authors which have developed this term in IR, is the emergence during the long 
sixteenth century of the specifically modern entity which forms this society: the 
sovereign state. An investigation of how contemporary international society operates,
7 M. Wight, Systems o f States (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977), p. 110.
8 Ibid., p. 113
9 A. Watson, The Evolution o f International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis (London: 
Routledge, 1992).
93
Chapter Three: International Society From Below
the English School maintained, requires an historical understanding of the rise and 
evolution of this kind of political entity.
The broad consensus over the basic unit in the study of international relations 
allowed the proponents of the International Society approach to open up a second 
research agenda, namely the world-wide expansion of this society of states. Presented 
in the seminal volume on The Expansion o f International Society, the basic concern 
here was to provide an historical account of how the norms, values and institutions 
of European international society were extended across the globe, eventually to 
produce what Bull termed a ‘Universal International Society’. In line with the English 
School’s acceptance of European international society as a novel historical 
phenomenon, the contributors to this volume sought to explain how regional 
international systems outside Europe were incorporated into a wider global 
international society: “We are concerned to see how, by the flood-tide of European 
dominance over the world and its subsequent ebb, the one [regional systems] became 
transformed into the other [a universal international society]”10 The criteria employed 
to determine the nature and pace of this transformation were highly legalistic: non- 
European powers joined the club of international society by signing up to 
international treaties, by engaging in diplomatic relations with other states, and by 
attending international conferences.11 In a more sophisticated treatment of the process, 
Bull’s student Gerrit W. Gong defined this combination of benchmarks as a 
“European standard of ‘civilisation’.”12 When enumerating the features of such a 
standard, Gong included not only the external requirements regarding sovereignty, 
international law or diplomacy, but also referred to domestic arrangements such as 
a ‘civilized’ state guaranteeing basic rights to life, liberty and property, or it 
abolishing internationally unacceptable practices such as polygamy, slavery or
10 H. Bull and A. Watson, The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1984).
11 Ibid, pp 120-122.
12 G. W. Gong, The Standard of ‘Civilisation’ and International Society (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984).
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suttee.13 As the author himself stresses,
[b]y definition, it was expected that members of the same society of ‘civilized ’ 
states would share sufficiently in fundamental, underlying assumptions about 
the world; in customary, historically proven institutions; and in ordinary, 
everyday life-styles, so as to feel part of a common society and a shared 
civilisation.14
This linkage between domestic and international standards of ‘civilisation’ when 
defining membership of international society resonates, as we shall shortly see, with 
Robert H. Jackson’s discussion of positive and negative sovereignty in contemporary 
international society. For the moment, however, it is important to note that, as Fred 
Halliday has recently suggested, the expansion of international society was a process 
buttressed by the increasing homogenisation of the internal socioeconomic and 
political make-up of states.15 Insofar as the nineteenth century diplomatic practices, 
legal documents and international conferences reflect the universalisation of 
international society, they do so as one dimension of a wider process of economic, 
social and political unification across the globe, governed by the logic of capitalist 
accumulation. Despite eschewing a materialist explanation of how the ‘standard of 
civilisation’ might have become the expression of an international society of states, 
Gong at least points to the interaction between state and society in the extension of 
this phenomenon, thereby making explicit what in the contributions to The Expansion 
o f International Society is only implied. In this respect, he enriches our understanding 
of international society by recognising, if not explaining, the vital societal forces 
underscoring the diffusion of the norms, values and institutions which compose this
13 Ibid., p. 14
14 Ibid., p. 21
15 Fred Halliday, “International Society as Homogeneity: Burke, Marx, Fukuyama” Millennium: 
Journal o f International Studies (Vol. 21, No.3, 1992), pp. 435-461, p. 435.
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society of states.
It is a mark of the English School’s intellectual honesty and its sensitivity for 
historical change that most of the recent contributions to this theoretical approach 
have been concerned with the challenges to the idea of international society in the 
post-war period. One of the school’s masters, Hedley Bull, himself led the way by 
considering the implications for international society of the Third World’s ‘revolt 
against the west.’16 In his last piece on the subject, Bull recognised that international 
society had largely been a product of European imperial domination, and that “[a]s 
Asian, African and other non-Westem peoples have assumed a more prominent place 
in international society it has become clear that in matters of values the distance 
between them and Western societies is greater than ... it was assumed to be.” 17 The 
consequences of this for the concept of international society, however, were never 
clearly spelt out by Bull. It was left to his successors -Armstrong, Jackson and 
Mayall- to examine further the impact upon international society of decolonization 
and the revolutionary struggles of the post-war period. Although all three authors set 
out from very similar definitions of international society, their conclusions regarding 
the influence of revolutions, decolonisation and nationalism, vary considerably. In 
his own discussion of the ‘revolt against the west’, for example, Armstrong identifies 
the existence of four different approaches to international society after World War II. 
Two of these -the reformist and revolutionary perspectives- were defended by Third 
World states which either sought to transform institutions of international society like 
the United Nations into the principal agents of anti-colonialism, anti-racism and a 
more equitable international economic order, or those states, such as Iran or Cuba, 
which entirely rejected existing international society as being a product of western 
imperialism. The upshot of this, for Armstrong, was a profound disagreement over
16 See “The Third World” in J. D. B Miller and R .J. Vincent, Order and Violence: Hedley Bull and 
International Relations (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990) for a discussion of Bull’s writings onthe revolt 
against the west.
17 Hedley Bull, “The Revolt Against the West” in Bull and Watson, The Expansion pp.218-228.
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the rules and norms of international society after 1960: “ [ajlthough all four groups 
upheld the idea of sovereign equality, there was far less agreement amongst them in 
relation to other norms of international society.” 18
In a different take on the same theme, Robert H. Jackson made a distinction 
between an ‘old sovereignty game’ and a ‘new sovereignty game’. Whereas the 
former was a product of the Westphalian system where “states historically were 
empirical realities before they were legal personalities” the latter reflected a 
decolonised world where, “rulers can acquire independence solely by virtue of being 
successors to colonial governments.”19 For Jackson, the anti-colonial struggles of the 
post-war period had substantially altered the central premise of international society 
by creating a new conception of sovereignty: one where ex-colonial ‘quasi-states’ 
benefited from a negative sovereignty acquired through international recognition but 
which was not complemented by a positive sovereignty guaranteeing a liberal 
democratic order domestically. Despite identifying the transition from one 
understanding of sovereignty to another in international society, Jackson seemed to 
accept that the ‘new sovereignty game’ would not upset the norms and institutions of 
the society of states, as in the last instance it upheld the principle of nonintervention. 
Since “Nonintervention is the foundation stone of international society”20, it followed 
that quasi-states built on the concept of negative sovereignty would in the future 
continue to be participants in the society of states.
That the emergence of some 100 new states in the aftermath of decolonization 
did not substantially alter the nature of international society, was a central argument 
in James Mayall’s study of nationalism and international society. Like Armstrong and 
Jackson, Mayall set off from the assumption that the anti-colonial struggles for 
national self-determination challenged the Eurocentric understanding of international
18 Armstrong, Revolution and World Order, p. 167.
19 Jackson, Quasi-States, p. 34.
20 Ibid., p. 192
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society which had predominated over the past three centuries. Yet unlike his two 
colleagues, Mayall contented that the revolt was not necessarily against ‘the west’ but 
rather against the idea of dynastic sovereignty. It was the advent of popular 
sovereignty, chiefly propagated through the principles of the French Revolution, that 
allowed the idea of national self-determination to modify the rules and institutions of 
European international society. In the conclusions to his study, Mayall recognised the 
importance of Third World nationalism in constructing the multilateral institutions of 
the post-war years, and in extending the scope of international law to areas such as 
colonialism and international economic inequality. Yet ultimately, the revolts inspired 
by notions of popular sovereignty were also obliged to accommodate to existing 
patterns of international relations. This tension between challenge and accommodation 
produced a situation where, M[t]he primacy of the national idea amongst 
contemporary political principles has modified the traditional conception of an 
international society but has not replaced it.”21
This brief survey of the English School’s approach to the term ‘international 
society’ will hopefully have revealed the core elements of the concept. We have seen 
that, for the authors associated with this school, international society refers to a set 
of diplomatic practices, legal precepts and institutional arrangements which bind 
sovereign states into a shared understanding of how international relations should be 
conducted. These norms, values and institutions are buttressed by a common standard 
of civilisation which was not substantially contested until the middle of this century. 
Since then, international society has adapted to these challenges by extending its 
membership and modifying some of its guiding principles. Despite its historical 
evolution, so its advocates argue, the concept retains both descriptive validity and 
analytical purchase: it helps students of international relations to explain the 
behaviour of states and it does so in ways which are at once more sophisticated and 
more accurate than those offered by alternative theories.
21 Mayall, Nationalism and International Society, p. 145
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The rest of this chapter aims to criticise this understanding of international 
relations. It will be argued that the International Society approach offers a historical 
and analytical account of the modern international system that reifies the discourse 
and practices of ruling classes, and which consequently fails to credit the essential 
role of popular political action in the development of this system. In essence, the 
claim being made is that the English School’s conception of international society is 
fundamentally state-centric and therefore inherently incapable of theorising the role 
of collective political agency in world politics.
One of the basic reasons behind this disregard for questions of collective 
agency lies in the superficial usage of the term ‘society’ by the English school. In 
order to accommodate social movements within a theory of international society, it 
is imperative to have some notion of how and why modern collective social and 
political activity emerged in the first place. Social theory has generally recognised 
that social and political movements are central to our understanding of the term 
‘society’; indeed, the introductory chapter to this thesis argued that theories of civil 
society, both classical and contemporary, reflect this long-standing preoccupation 
with the link between self-conscious collective action and the constitution of society 
as we know it today. Yet, like the “moral and political paucity” of IR once decried 
by Martin Wight, our discipline has also suffered from a general sociological 
shallowness. Until very recently, and with a few notable exceptions, IR theory had 
very little to say about how interstate relations might be connected to wider social 
structures and processes. Class conflict, gender inequality, racial hierarchies, the 
workings of the capitalist market or the bureaucratic extension of the state to take but 
a few examples, seem to have been excluded from the domain of the international. 
This sociological naivety is especially damaging when IR theorists employ the loaded 
term ‘society’ without recognising its complex and contested genealogy.
A classic example of this conceptual poverty is, of course, the English 
school’s use of the term ‘society’ simply to denote a loose association of states; a 
collection of political entities which share some basic behavioural characteristics.
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Without exploring the historical and sociological evolution of the idea of ‘society’, 
however, it is impossible to seriously consider the role of social movements in the 
construction of the international system. Employing the term international civil 
society can, I suggest, begin to redress the English school’s narrow conception of 
international society and provide a richer account of the origins and development of 
the modern international system.
The sections that follow will therefore attempt to show how, by considering 
the interplay between states and social movements, we can arrive at an historically 
and sociologically deeper understanding of international society. From this 
perspective, the practices and institutions of international society are seen not as 
natural outgrowths of an autonomous system of states, but rather as the product of the 
historically specific interactions between states and societies. The essential 
components of international society -sovereignty, the standard of civilisation, 
national self-determination- are explained with reference to the concrete social and 
political struggles between and within states and civil societies, and not as the result 
of the mysterious expansion of international codes of conduct through negotiation and 
consensus among ruling classes.
3.2 State Sovereignty: the Popular Contribution
A striking feature of recent IR literature on sovereignty is the absence of sustained 
discussions of the notion of popular sovereignty. With the notable exceptions of 
James May all’s juxtaposition of nationalism and popular sovereignty, and Daniel 
Deudney’s heterodox retrieval of the ‘Philadelphian system’22, few contemporary IR 
theories consider the principle and practice of popular sovereignty in the construction 
of the international system. Yet, as this chapter has suggested thus far, an adequate
22 In Daniel Deudney “Binding sovereigns: authorities, structures, and geopolitics in the Philadelphian 
systems” in T. J. Biersteker and C. Weber (eds.), State Sovereignty as Social Construct (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 190-249.
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understanding of the nature and development of state sovereignty requires that we pay 
attention not only to the transformations in the practices and institutions of the ruling 
classes, but also to the changing forms of resistance and agitation among the 
populace. State sovereignty is ultimately the historical product of a clash of interests 
between ruling and subaltern classes. This section aims to elaborate on this point with 
reference to some historical examples. Before doing so, however, it is important to 
register two caveats.
First, as with the concept of civil society, the notion of popular sovereignty 
should not be confused with that of democracy. Struggles for democracy have 
certainly been premised on the idea of popular sovereignty, but not all formulations 
of this principle are inherently democratic. This is true both conceptually and 
historically. The early modern theorists of popular sovereignty invoked the concept 
in the battle against royal absolutism, but their vision of enfranchisement never 
extended beyond that of propertied men. In contrasting the early expressions of 
popular sovereignty in France and England, Ellen Meiksins Wood points out that
This conceptual device, with roots in the Middle Ages, had no necessarily 
democratic implications, since the ‘people’ could be very narrowly defined. 
It had long been available to aristocratic opponents of royal pretension and 
had been forged as a weapon against absolutism elsewhere. Bodin’s 
conception of absolute and indivisible sovereignty, for example, was 
constructed in just such claims of popular sovereignty, enunciated by 
Huguenot pamphleteers to justify resistance during the Religious W ars.23
Likewise, contemporary history offers plenty of instances where popular sovereignty 
has sustained undemocratic regimes. Yet the interesting point about popular 
sovereignty in this context, is not so much its connection or otherwise to democracy,
23 E.M. Wood, The Pristine Culture of Capitalism: A Historical Essay on Old Regimes and Modem 
States (London and New York: Verso, 1991), p. 59.
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but the fact that, despite its medieval origins, it has been at the root of the 
transformations in the modes of popular protest which I have identified as being 
characteristics of modern civil society. This in turn altered the terms of the political 
relationship between state and society in such a way as to affect the nature and 
practice of sovereignty. In the words of Reinhard Bendix
Until the revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, European 
rulers assumed that the general population would quietly allow itself to be 
ruled. Popular uprisings were regarded as violating the divine order and were 
suppressed by force ... If some questioned this practice, it was without much 
effect [...] But with the Reformation, the persuasiveness of the ruler’s old 
appeal to divine sanction was irreparably weakened. And since the French 
revolution, the right to rule has come to depend increasingly on the mandate 
of the people.24
There is, to be sure, an uncomfortable Whiggish resonance in Bendix’s account of the 
shift from absolutist to popular mandates in the west. Although this does not cancel 
the overall validity of his argument, one should be wary of an excessively linear 
conception of this movement, and certainly of somehow associating this development 
to a theory of modernisation. The transition from absolutist to popular conceptions 
of sovereignty was the subject of bloody social and political upheavals; or in 
Koselleck’s more elegant formulation, the product of “critique and crisis”25. Far 
from being a natural, evolutionary process, the acceptance that the ‘people’ might 
have a say in government was the outcome of a protracted struggle from the 
seventeenth century onwards which yielded very uneven results across Europe. Amo
24 R. Bendix, Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: 
University of California Press, 1978), pp. 7-8.
25 R. Koselleck, Critique and Crisis: the Parthogenesis o f Modem Society (Leamington Spa: Berg, 
1987).
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Mayer’s documentation of the “persistence of the Old Regime” into the present 
century serves as a timely reminder of just how variegated historical change can be.26 
Nonetheless, the aim here is simply to recognise the shift from absolutist to popular 
sovereignty, not to delve into the details of how this took place. For the purposes of 
our argument, the most important consideration is to relate these changes in the terms 
of political engagement to the consolidation of state sovereignty as a norm of 
international society. I hope the foregoing discussion will have clarified that this does 
not involve either conflating democracy and popular sovereignty, nor subscribing to 
an evolutionary understanding of historical change. It is merely an attempt to recover 
for IR theory, and more specifically, for our comprehension of international society, 
the centrality of the principle and the practice of popular sovereignty - a move that 
runs counter to the English school’s account of sovereign statehood.
The prevailing explanation among theorists of international society for the 
emergence of state sovereignty focuses upon the transition from an overlapping 
patchwork of political communities which characterised medieval Christendom to the 
secularised states-system that sprung up in Europe from the fifteenth century onward. 
As was mentioned above, Martin Wight, the English school theorist with greatest 
historical acumen, placed the chronological limits of this transition somewhere 
between the Council of Constance (1414-18) and the Peace of Westphalia (1648): “In 
the fifteenth century the old constitution of the Respublica Christiana finally breaks 
down ... The papacy is transformed from an ecumenical theocracy into an Italian 
great power. The assertion of sovereignty by secular powers, growing since the 
thirteenth century, becomes normal [...] At Westphalia the states-system does not 
come into existence: it comes of age.”27 This has since become the standard 
interpretation among scholars adopting the International Society approach and is
26 A. J Mayer, The Persistence o f the Old Regime: Europe to the Great War (London: Croom Helm, 
1981).
27 Wight, Systems o f States, p. 151-152
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accepted unproblematically as signalling the origins of the modern international 
system. Aside from the pitfalls of reading back into the past in order to legitimise a 
particular historical turning-point (in this case, Westphalia), the major fault of the 
‘secularisation’ thesis lies in its essentially descriptive nature. Exploring the historical 
• changes in European politics and society which accompanied the Renaissance, the 
Reformation and the wars of religion certainly sharpens our awareness as to the 
historicity of state sovereignty; but it explains very little about how the transition 
from a continent dominated by feudal domains to one characterised by sovereign 
states was actually accomplished. The principle of cuius regio, eius religio, for 
example, was plainly a manifestation of the growing capacity among local barons and 
princes to establish military and economic supremacy over their territories; but in 
itself, it hardly serves as a category capable of explaining the sources and nature of 
this transformation. In order to provide a satisfactory account of the origins and 
development of state sovereignty, it is necessary to consider the socio-historical roots 
of phenomena like the Reformation and the wars of religion, a task left largely 
unaddressed by the members of the English School.
A telling admission in Martin Wight’s essay on systems of states which goes 
some way in explaining this kind of omission is his distinction between ‘internal’ and 
‘external’ sovereignty: “Historians of political thought ... have traced the 
development of internal sovereignty [...] We are more concerned with the 
development of external sovereignty, the claim to be politically and juridically 
independent of any superior.”28 The uncontested acceptance of this separation 
between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ sovereignty suggests that Wight saw no necessary link 
between these two spheres: ‘external’ sovereignty (mutual recognition, regular 
communication, international law and so forth) could be taken for granted as the 
central preoccupation for students of international relations. Rather than examining 
the social and historical conditions which allowed for the distinction to be made in
28 Ibid., p. 130.
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the first place, Wight and his followers set off from the premise that external 
sovereignty is a given, then to describe its origins in the process of secularisation. 
Not only does this give rise to a descriptive and circular account of state sovereignty 
(‘external’ sovereignty is defined with reference to a state’s capacity to engage in 
legal-diplomatic relations with other independent states), but the crucial interaction 
among ‘external’ and ‘internal’ forms of sovereignty is left unexplored. The net result 
of these manoeuvres is an approach to state sovereignty that necessarily obviates any 
contribution from the ranks of civil society. The historical record, however, suggests 
that modem forms of popular agitation have been instrumental in defining the limits 
of state sovereignty.
Offering a comprehensive account of the origins and development of state 
sovereignty is obviously beyond the scope of this chapter. Aside from reasons of 
space, this task is unfeasible because it requires taking a position on extremely 
complex and intense multi-disciplinary debates on the historical-sociological roots of 
sovereignty. Moreover, the claim being made is not so much that state sovereignty 
was exclusively forged by an organised populace demanding a popular mandate, but 
rather that once defined as the appropriate domain of political struggle, the shape 
state sovereignty adopted from the seventeenth century onwards was heavily 
conditioned by movements which contested the authority of the ruling classes.
The English civil war provides one of the earliest instances of an organised 
populace affecting both the discourse and practice of sovereignty. Although by no 
means exclusively pitched in terms of a contest between elite and plebeian interests, 
the social and political upheavals experienced across England during the 1640s and 
50s generated a number of popular movements which, by challenging the authority 
of the ruling class, were to have a long-standing influence upon the nature of the 
English and later, British state in the decades to come. Foremost among these 
organisations were the so-called Levellers, a heterogenous group of individuals 
represented by pamphleteers such as John Lilburne, William Walwyn or Richard 
Overton, who campaigned for the extension of the male franchise and the radical
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reform of the institutions of political representation in England. The Levellers 
organised as a party, drawing their membership from the rank and file of the New 
Model Army, radicalised parishes and the ‘middling sorts’ around London. Their 
main vehicle of mobilisation, however, were petitions which in some cases 
accumulated over 40,000 signatures. One of the most celebrated Leveller documents 
was the Agreement o f the People, a first version of which was released in 1647 in the 
context of the famous Putney debates over England’s constitutional future. In 
opposition to the moderate schemes of ‘mixed government’ presented by Cromwell’s 
second-in-command, Commissary-General Henry Ireton, the Leveller’s Agreement 
aimed to form the basis of a constitution,
That would embody the fundamental principle that just power was derived 
from the consent of the people, which meant ending the veto of the king and 
Lords, since they did not represent the people, and subordinating them to the 
Commons, which did, or should, represent the people. But the Commons 
would be supreme only in matters delegates to it by the people ... Therefore 
the Agreement bridled not only the king and the Lords but also the Commons 
in the interest of sovereignty of the people.29
The Leveller movement was short-lived and regionally circumscribed. Furthermore, 
as noted earlier, the Leveller conception of ‘the people’ was strongly limited. This 
should not blind us, however, to the impact this kind of collective action had upon 
early modern notions of popular sovereignty. The Levellers were in several important 
respects part of a broader pattern of struggles for popular sovereignty across Europe. 
In France, the mid-seventeenth century uprisings against the absolutist state, 
collectively known as the ‘Fronde’ included movements such as the republican
29 B. Maiming, Aristocrats, Plebeians and Revolution in England, 1640-1660 (London and East Haven, 
CT: Pluto Press ,1996), p. 103. See also E. Meiksins Wood and N. Wood, A Trumpet o f Sedition: 
Political Theory and the Rise o f Capitalism, 1509-1688 (London, Pluto Press, 1997).
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Ormee, which drew on the Leveller experience, and particularly on the Agreement 
o f the People, to support the call for popular sovereignty.30 Although it is important 
not to conflate the very specific and often contradictory expressions of popular 
discontent in early modem Europe, it would likewise be a parochial oversight not to 
recognise the similarities in the language and aspirations of groups as diverse as the 
French Ormistes, the English Levellers, or the Castilian comuneros.
The link between early modern struggles for popular sovereignty and the 
process of state formation in Europe is by no means definitive. As we saw above, the 
social movements defending the right to popular sovereignty operated within the 
existing territorial boundaries already imposed by the ruling classes. In so far as these 
movements had an impact on the contours and nature of the emerging sovereign state, 
it was expressed in a reactive fashion. Rather than shaping the actual form of state 
sovereignty, early modern resistance movements can only be said to have chiselled 
away at the existing state structures when these impinged upon the interests of 
specific sectors of the population. By the eighteenth century, however, revolutionary 
movements emerged along both shores of the Atlantic which gave a new impulse to 
the aspiration of popular sovereignty. It is in this ‘Age of Democratic Revolutions’ 
that the connections between the agitation within civil societies and the construction 
of state sovereignty become most apparent.
In the cities of colonial America, new forms of political engagement had been 
developing since the beginning of the eighteenth century. The growing integration of 
the New England seaports into the world market, coupled with the inflationary
30 According to Nannerl O.Keohane: “The use of these ancient phrases -le bien commun, le salut du 
publique- in this context indicates that the Ormists were aware that they were rejecting the politics of 
raison d ’etat for a very different vision, the vision o f an assembled community o f men pursuing the 
common good together. They had the grandiose thoughts of extending this vision to other parts of France, 
liberating other Frenchmen as they themselves were freed from tyranny and oppression.” N. O. Keohane, 
Philosophy and the State in France: The Renaissance to the Enlightenment (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1980), p. 219. For an extensive study of the way the French public- both ruling and 
subordinate classes- linked the revolutionary upheavals in England to the French ‘Fronde’ see P.A. 
Knachel, England and the Fronde: the Impact o f the English Civil War and Revolution on France 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1967).
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consequences of war with France accentuated the impact of wage and price 
fluctuations upon the ‘middling’ and ‘lower’ ranks of the colonial population.31 The 
response to this economic hardship was hardly new: as in the past, different forms 
of direct action ensured that those responsible for unpopular policies felt the heat of 
discontent. The novelty lay in the mechanisms and language of agitation. Whereas 
fifty years earlier popular protest may have been expressed through spontaneous 
responses to the infringements on the ‘moral economy’, the first decades of the 
eighteenth century witnessed the rise of factional politics organised around specific 
interests and disseminated through printed media such as pamphlets, newsletters and 
petitions. The deferential politics geared toward maintaining a semblance of cohesion 
within the body politic gradually gave way to the overt recognition that contradictory 
political viewpoints could be expressions of socio-economic divisions within a 
community. The very notion of forming a ‘party’ to defend particular interests would 
have been an anathema to the seventeenth century public accustomed to the medieval 
emphasis on the pursuit of a collective harmony of interests. Yet by the early 1700s, 
the political life of cities like Boston, Philadelphia and New York was transformed 
by the rise of political clubs and caucuses which for the first time deliberately 
organised and mobilised the poorer sectors of society in defence of their own 
interests. It is worth stressing again that, together with the timeless and well-tested 
methods of violent cooption and the prospect of free liquor, the medium privileged 
in this endeavour was that of the printed word:
[i]n the eight years from 1714 to 1721, economic dislocation brought forth a 
rush of pamphlets. Printed at the expense of political factions and often 
distributed free, they made direct appeals to the people, both those who 
enjoyed the vote and others who participated in the larger arena of street 
politics [...] It was testimony to the power behind the written word that even
31 See G.B. Nash, The Urban Crucible: Social Change, Political Consciousness and the Origins o f the 
American Revolution (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1979).
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those who yearned for a highly restricted mode of politics were compelled to 
set their views in print for all to read. For unless they did, their opponents 
might sweep the field.32
It was the consolidation of this kind of modern political agency which by the last 
quarter of the century produced the revolutionary ferment that led to independence 
for the American colonies. Naturally, the American War of Independence was not 
simply the result of accumulated plebeian agitation. Like the other democratic 
revolutions, crises emerged principally out of the contradictions among different 
sectors of the ruling class. Yet the popular input into these crises should not be 
underestimated. Be it through their participation in militias, political clubs or town 
assemblies, the ‘common people’ of the American colonies had by the late eighteenth 
century begun to take conscious control over their own lives. The patriotic struggles 
against English despotism thus became inextricably bound to the broader struggles 
for the social and economic transformation of colonial society. In this respect, the 
realisation of American independence was in part the assertion of popular 
sovereignty. For all the limitations of the revolution -and there were certainly many 
for the women, the peoples of colour and the unpropertied of the colonies- the 
creation of a new state was achieved through the mobilisation of the populace into 
modern social movements. As Gary B. Nash has put it:
Although no social revolution occurred in America in the 1770s, the 
American revolution could not have unfolded when and in the manner it did 
without the self-conscious action of urban labouring people ... who became 
convinced that they must create power where none had existed before or else 
watch their position deteriorate... Thus, the history of the Revolution is in 
part the history of popular collective action and the puncturing of the gentry’s
32 Ibid., p. 86.
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claim that their rule was legitimized by custom, law and divine will.33
Across the Atlantic, similar experiments in popular politics contributed a period of 
revolutionary transformation in Europe. The notion of popular sovereignty was given 
concrete historical expression as the events in France during 1789-92 inspired similar 
upheavals across the continent and beyond. Again, far from being the exclusive 
consequence of an unstoppable surge in popular agitation, the French revolution and 
its ramifications emerged out of specific crises within the absolutist state which were 
exploited by enlightened sectors of the ruling class. As in the American case, 
revolutionary change did not necessarily engender a more democratic or egalitarian 
society. Yet the participation of previously disenfranchised sectors of the population 
in the construction of new state forms certainly had a momentous impact on the 
character of state sovereignty during following centuries. For one, the French 
revolution generalised and radicalised the practices of state sovereignty which had 
been developing in Europe since the sixteenth century: small standing armies gave 
way to the levee en masse\ the corporate rights of estates and cities were abolished 
and codified into universal citizenship rights; the process of fiscal centralisation 
encouraged by Colbert and Louis XTV was finally completed under the Republic; the 
baroque ideological symbols sustaining royal absolutism were transformed into a 
nationalist iconography. All these familiar characteristics of the contemporary state 
bear the imprint of the transformations effected by the French Revolution in the name 
of ‘the people’. Even more pertinent to the substance of the argument being 
presented, however, was the consolidation of factional politics during the course of 
the French revolution. As Lynn Hunt has suggested, during the Revolution
[...] the very nature of "the political" expanded and changed shape. The
structure of the polity changed under the impact of increasing political
33 /ta /.,p .384
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participation and popular mobilization; political language, political ritual, and
political organization all took on new forms and meanings.34
By the late eighteenth century, the debating societies and discussion circles which had 
proliferated under absolutist France were transformed into political clubs such as the 
Parisian Societe de la Revolution, otherwise known as the ‘Jacobins’. For generations 
to come, the Jacobin political club remained the most important model of popular 
mobilisation. Socialist and communist parties certainly drew on Jacobin principles, 
as did many of the nationalist movements which emerged in Europe during the 
nineteenth century. In this respect, again, the social movements associated to the 
French revolution can be seen as the practical incarnation of the idea of popular 
sovereignty.
The history of nineteenth and twentieth-century working-class and nationalist 
movements clearly underlines the role of civil society in the construction of state 
sovereignty. The relevance of nationalist organisations in this domain should be 
obvious: most of today’s states are the product of national liberation struggles 
generally sponsored by mass nationalist movements. Socialism, on the other hand 
appears as a weaker candidate for a force behind state sovereignty. Proletarian 
internationalism was from the outset one of the guiding principles of working-class 
movements across the world. The global expansion of capitalism was, according to 
socialists, breaking down ancestral ties of locality, ethnicity or creed and replacing 
them with the universal conflict among bourgeois and proletarians. As such, socialists 
organised internationally, making class, and not nationality, religion or colour the 
mainspring of their political solidarity. The avowed cosmopolitanism of working-class 
organisations, however, did not preclude their commitment to democracy and equality 
at the national level. As Marx himself once put it: “It is perfectly self-evident that in 
order to be at all capable of struggle the working class must organise itself as a class
34 L. Hunt, Politics, Culture and Class in the French Revolution (Berkeley, Los Angeles and London: 
University o f California Press, 1984), p.2.
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at home and that the domestic sphere must be the immediate arena of its struggle.”35 
Since then, working-class movements have been among the staunchest advocates of 
national unity and have arguably been the most important force behind processes of 
state-building. One need only consider the socialist contributions to the extension of 
the franchise, the development of the welfare state or in the case of many third world 
states, the anti-imperialist struggles, in order to acknowledge the centrality of modern 
social agency in the explanation of state sovereignty.
The examples of popular sovereignty briefly outlined above should provide 
some sense of the limitations inherent to a view of sovereignty which excludes any 
consideration of modern social movements. The idea of international society is 
premised on the notion of state sovereignty; the latter in turn, must be explained as 
the outcome of historical changes -still under way today- unleashed by modernity. 
This much can be conceded to the advocates of the International Society approach to 
international relations. The problems arise when a definition of modernity and an 
explanation of the historical and sociological sources of state sovereignty is requested 
from the theorists of the English school. Here, the clearest answer comes in the shape 
of Martin Wight’s idealist philosophy of history which ascribes the origins of modern 
international society to the Protestant Reformation. However if the preceding 
discussion carries any weight, a richer and ultimately more accurate rendition of the 
rise of state sovereignty must consider the interaction between state and civil society 
since the seventeenth century. It must address the changing nature of popular 
contestation and agitation, and examine the consequences of such modes of political 
agency for our understanding of sovereignty. Once this is accomplished, I have 
argued, the principles and practice of popular sovereignty take on a deeper 
significance for international relations as they help us to identify the agency of change 
in the struggles between ruling and subaltern classes. In this respect, the history of
35 K. Marx, Critique o f the Gotha Programme, in D. Fembach (ed.) The First International and After, 
Political Writings, Vol.3 (Aylesbury, Bucks.: Penguin Books in association with New Left Review, 
1974), p.350.
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international society becomes the history of its interaction with the forces of 
international civil society.
3.3 The Standard of Civilisation as the Expansion of Capitalism
For the thinkers of the English school, a central feature of international society is the 
adoption of common norms and values in the interaction among sovereign states. A 
society of states is distinguished from a system of states, among other things through 
the existence of a shared understanding of what rules and institutions should guide 
international intercourse. From this perspective, international society becomes a 
reality through the behaviour of states and statesmen in their dealings with each other. 
As we saw above, Gerrit W. Gong gave specific historical meaning to these 
behavioural norms in his study on the standard of civilisation. According to Gong, 
the end of the nineteenth century witnessed the codification of this standard through 
international law, diplomacy and the spread of international institutions. Such was the 
triumph of the standard of civilisation, that by the turn of the century a general 
consensus on the norms, rules and values of international relations had fashioned a 
‘universal’ international society.
The notion of a standard of civilisation provides a useful tool with which to 
chart the expansion of international society. It clearly identifies the process by which 
the ruling classes across the world came to accept an international code of conduct, 
and there is no a priori reason to reject the view that these elites actually attached a 
meaning to such practices. Yet, however historically enriching such an account of 
international society may be, it still remains a fundamentally descriptive exercise. 
There is precious little in the English school’s investigations on the standard of 
civilisation which explain why this standard was accepted in the first place. 
Astonishingly, there is no sustained discussion in Gong’s work, nor that of his fellow 
contributors to the volume on the Expansion o f International Society of capitalism and 
its international diffusion. Even a cursory examination of the origins and development
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of the idea of ‘civilisation’, however, reveals that it was contemporaneous with, and 
indeed germane to the extension of capitalist social relations in Europe and beyond. 
It is in this sense that the expansion of international society must be studied in 
conjunction with the extension of capitalism.
The word ‘civilisation’ was invented in the late eighteenth century as a 
compound of the terms ‘civility’, ‘civilized’ and ‘to civilize’, first used by Erasmus 
in the context of a pedagogical treatise, De civilitate morum puerilium.36 The new 
word appeared in French and English in 1756 and 1772 respectively, as means of 
distinguishing a ‘polished’ and ‘civil’ society from a ‘barbarian’ or ‘savage’ 
existence. The second chapter of this thesis already highlighted the connections made 
in Ferguson’s History o f Civil Society between the idea of civilisation and the 
institutions of commerce, specialised labour, private property and commodity 
exchange. Together with notions of rationality, politeness and refined manners, these 
components of capitalist market society defined the essence of ‘civilisation’ as it 
became understood after the eighteenth century. Indeed, the Scottish Enlightenment 
-one of the privileged sites for the theorisation of ‘civilisation’- reveals in the starkest 
light the association between the extension of capitalism and the development of this 
concept. In a recent study “On the Scottish Origin of ‘Civilisation’” , George C. 
Caffenztis argues that
[t]he development of ‘civilisation’ is genetically intertwined with that of the 
British financial system, with the subjugation of Scotland to the British crown, 
and the eighteenth-century social struggles in and out of Scotland. Thus, 
‘civilisation’ originally referred to three different but interconnected 
processes: the rationalization of intercapitalist relations (civilisation qua 
reason); the disenfranchisement of the English workers from their ‘traditional’
36 See F. Braudel (trans. R. Mayne), A History o f Civilisations (London: Allen Lane/Penguin Press, 
1994), chapter 1; E. De Dampierre, “Note sur ‘culture’ et ‘civilisation’”, Studies in Comparative Culture 
and Society (Vol. 3, 1961), pp. 328-340; N. Elias (trans. E. Jephcott), The Civilizing Process: The History 
of Manners, Vol. I, (Oxford and Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell, 1982), Part Two.
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rights and liberties (civilisation qua repression); and the destruction of 
communal relations in the Scottish Highlands, resulting in the integration of 
Scottish society into the orbit of Britain’s imperial economy (civilisation qua 
progress from Barbarism).37
Of these three expressions of civilisation it is the latter which is most pertinent to our 
discussion. For one, it undermines the identification of civilisation with something 
inherently or exclusively ‘western’.38 Far from being a geographical or cultural 
category, the idea of civilisation originally referred to a socio-historical phenomenon 
tied to the expansion of capitalism. To be sure, it acquired a culturally-specific 
meaning as European imperialism extended across the globe, imposing its own laws 
and values on other societies; but these laws and values were not so much ‘western’ 
as capitalist. The ‘civilising mission’ visited upon non-European peoples during the 
nineteenth century was simply the extension of a process that had been tried and 
tested with the Scottish Highlanders and other European populations in the previous 
century. This constitutes the second significant reason for paying attention to the 
early processes and representations of ‘civilisation’, namely that the features of the 
standard of civilisation invoked by the English school actually refer back to the 
eighteenth century experiments in ‘civilisation’ within Europe. With minor 
modifications, the standard of civilisation which guided the expansion of international 
society at the end of the nineteenth century was the same as that which inspired the 
eighteenth century Scottish Enlightenment in its quest for extending capitalist market
37 George C. Caffenztis, “On the Scottish Origin of ‘Civilisation’” in S. Federici (ed.) Enduring Western 
Civilisation: The Construction o f the Concept o f Western Civilisation and Its ‘Others ’ (Westport, CT: 
Praeger, 1995), pp. 13-36, p. 14 .
38 A welcome antidote to the facile assumption that the contrast between ‘civilisation’ and ‘barbarism’ 
is an ethnocentric construct can found in Roger Bartra (trans. C.T. Berrisford), Wild Men in the Looking 
Glass: the Mythic Origins of European Otherness (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1994). 
For Bartra, “[t]he wild man and the European are one and the same, and the notion of barbarism was 
applied to non-European peoples as the transposition of a perfectly structured myth with a character that 
can only be understood within the context of Western cultural evolution” (p.4)
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relations across Britain. It should therefore follow that an investigation into the 
standard of civilisation as a vehicle for the expansion of international society must be 
studied as part and parcel of a broader process of capitalist expansion.
The spread of capitalist social relations across the globe was of course effected 
in a number of different ways. Direct and indirect imperialism, colonialism, unequal 
treaties and capitulations all served as vehicles in the construction of a world 
capitalist market. One consequence of this differentiated articulation of global 
capitalism was that the legal framework imposed on pre-capitalist societies was 
equally versatile. Many early modern trade colonies, for example, operated as 
commercial outposts with no intention of altering indigenous law. The widespread 
acceptance of consular jurisdiction (ie. the privilege accorded to foreign merchants 
to live according to their own laws within the parameters of their settlement), coupled 
with the imperatives of commercial activity made any European encroachment on 
autochthonous law unproductive. As Jorg Fisch has pointed out, in those situations 
where they represented a minority of the population,
[Ejuropeans usually tried to adopt procedures used by the extra-European side 
rather than to impose their own legal forms and figures. The reason was 
obvious. If they attempted to bind their counterparts with obligations that 
were meaningless to them, there was little chance of their being kept. ”39
Once European powers began to construct territorial empires, however, the question 
of jurisdiction became more acute. In the case of the Maghreb as we shall see, the 
standard of civilisation was imposed either through outright annexation (as in the 
Algerian case after 1848) or through the establishment of ‘protectorates’ (Tunisia 
1882, Morocco 1912). Differences in administrative structure were replicated in the
39 Jorg Fisch, “Law as a Means and as an Ends: Some Remarks on the Function of European and Non- 
European Law in the Process of European Expansion”, in W. J. Mommsen and J. A. de Moor (eds.) 
European Expansion and Law: The Encounter o f European and Indigenous Law in the 19th and 20th 
century Africa and Asia (Providence, RI and Oxford: Berg Publishers, 1992), pp. 15-39, p.21.
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sphere of law: the French authorities left much of the pre-colonial framework intact 
in the two protectorates, but in Algeria substantial changes were imposed. Similarly, 
the Moroccan sultan and the Tunisian bey remained nominally sovereign and their 
subjects bound by shari ’a law, Berber customary law and the special dhimmi status 
for the religious minorities. In Algeria, however, Islamic law was gradually confined 
to personal status through the senatus-consulte of 1865 which separated French 
citizens (including most Algerian Jews and Christians) from the mass of the Muslim 
population. One arena where legal transformation proved to be uniform across the 
Maghreb concerned property law. Here, all three countries experienced the gradual 
abolition of pre-colonial systems of land tenure -private shareholdings (mulk), 
religious endowments (habous), communal lands ( ‘arsh)- and their incorporation into 
modern European property law. Thus, by the second decade of the twentieth century, 
a standard of civilisation had certainly penetrated North Africa through the vehicle 
of imperial conquest: the anarchic and unproductive pre-colonial regimes -so the 
European imperialists saw it- had been ‘civilised’ through their incorporation into the 
European sphere of commercial and property law.
Although capitalist imperialism clearly played an instrumental role in the 
expansion of international society, it remains notably absent in the English school’s 
investigations into this phenomenon. Curiously, the volume edited by Bull and 
Watson prefers to focus on those parts of the world - the Ottoman Empire, China, 
Japan- where capitalist imperialism made no significant inroads. Yet despite never 
being formally colonised or subjected to European rule (Hong Kong and France’s 
North African acquisitions are of course exceptions), these states were only accepted 
into international society as they underwent a processes of capitalist transformation 
‘from above’. Both the Ottoman Empire and Japan introduced socio-economic 
reforms during the second half of the nineteenth century with the explicit aim of 
countering European encroachments. Their gradual integration into international 
society was therefore accomplished not only through the adoption of ‘civilised’ 
mechanisms of international intercourse, but also by way of radical changes in the
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domestic political and socio-economic arrangements of these states. To this extent, 
the expansion of international society can be seen as the ‘internalisation’ of 
international norms and values and the ‘homogenisation’ of domestic structures in 
accordance with those prevailing internationally.40
In Japan, for example, the Meiji Restoration of 1868 transformed the feudal 
regime dominated by the Tokugawa shogunate into a modern capitalist state within 
the space of three decades. Much of the impetus behind this extraordinary change in 
Japan’s socio-economic and political make-up was the result of internal contradictions 
within the country’s social structure. Peasant revolts against the commodification of 
agricultural production coupled with an undermining of daimyo (overlord) and 
samurai (warrior) status in favour of the chonin (merchant) class, gave rise to a 
feudal-merchant coalition which eventually overthrew the Bakufu, or central 
Tokugawa government. These internal crises, however, were spurred on by the 
external challenge of European imperialism. Indeed, the anti-Tokugawa forces rallied 
around the slogan, “Revere the Emperor, expel the barbarians”; the latter in this case 
referring to the European merchants who had been granted licence by the Bakufu to 
trade in Japan. Paradoxically, the ‘expulsion of the barbarians’ did not entail the 
rejection of western ideas. Quite the contrary: the protagonists of the Restoration 
(,samurai, chonin and some of the daimyo households) had maintained extensive 
contacts with foreigners and in many cases adopted western technological, economic 
and military innovations. In the words of E. Herbert Norman, “[The Restoration] 
was carried out under the brilliant leadership of samurai-bureaucrats who, in the teeth 
of opposition directed against them even by members of their own class, wisely 
pursued the path of internal reconstruction ... in preference to the path of foreign 
conquest. ”41
40 This is one of the main arguments developed by Halliday in “International Society as Homogeneity”.
41 E. Herbert Norman, Japan’s Emergence as a Modem State: Political and Economic Problems o f the 
Meiji Period (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1940), p. 101.
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Over the space of the forty-odd years which delimit the Meiji Restoration 
(1868-1912), Japan experienced the radical overhaul of the feudal legal-political 
structures that had prevailed for almost three centuries, and their replacement by a 
modern capitalist framework. A series of laws in the early 1870s legalised the sale 
of land and enforced a taxation system which facilitated the expropriation of peasants 
from their holdings. This in turn produced a sizeable reserve army of labour which 
fuelled the beginnings of state-sponsored heavy industry. Organising and legitimising 
these infrastructural transformations was the rationalised bureaucracy run by ex- 
samurai imbued with the organicist ideology of Herbert Spencer, and the attendant 
constitutional representative bodies like the Diet. Finally, as in other parts of the 
world, the turn of the century also witnessed the gradual emergence in Japan of 
political parties and trade unions which both contested and reinforced the legitimacy 
of the new regime.
The Meiji Restoration therefore represented the internalisation of western 
standards of civilisation precisely as a means of resisting their imposition from 
without. As such, it remains one of the clearest instances of the overlap between 
capitalist transformation and the expansion of international society. The Japanese 
adoption of the ‘standard of civilisation’ can not be gauged merely with reference to 
the practices of international relations, but must also consider the internal socio­
economic and political adjustments made in the face of imperialist challenges.
A similar story could be told of the Ottoman Empire’s reformist experiments 
in the face of European expansionism. As in the case of Tokugawa Japan, the 
Ottoman Empire had been subject to increasing commercial penetration by European 
traders since the sixteenth century. It was not until the second half of the eighteenth 
century, however, that European dominance in this sphere was codified in the form 
of ‘capitulations’ which granted foreign vessels freedom of navigation in Ottoman 
waters. The Treaty of Ku^iik Kaynarca (1774) first secured these rights for Russians, 
but similar treaties soon followed with Austria (1784), Britain (1799), France (1802)
119
Chapter Three: International Society From Below
and Prussia (1806).42 To be sure, these capitulations were imposed in the aftermath 
of military defeat; yet their content betrays the economic motivation behind European 
encroachment. During the following decades, both trade and investment from the 
west increased exponentially, while the Sublime Porte became increasingly indebted 
to European credit institutions. By the turn of the century, the most significant 
regions of the Ottoman Empire had been integrated within the capitalist world 
economy through trade, investment and debt. Interestingly, this process was 
accompanied by the development of institutions of external relations. As Re§at Kasaba 
has noted:
Concomitant with the new treaties that were being signed with European 
states, the Ottoman government set up its first permanent embassies in 
London, Paris, Vienna and Berlin ... In addition to the embassies, a consular 
network was set up, covering North and South America, parts of Africa and 
Asia, as well as Europe. Also, starting from the early nineteenth century, this 
global network was supported at home by a strengthened Translation Office 
... which in effect became the seed of the Foreign Ministry. During the 
nineteenth century this office would become the most developed component 
of the Ottoman state apparatus, second only to the Interior Ministry in 
budgetary allocation.43
The nineteenth-century construction of Ottoman institutions for external relations 
plainly resulted from pressures exerted by foreign, mainly European powers. As in 
the case of Japan, however, this challenge also elicited responses in the sphere of 
domestic politics. From 1839 through to 1876, the Ottoman state underwent a process 
of social, political and administrative reform which historians have dubbed the
42 R. Kasaba, The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy: the Nineteenth Century (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York, 1988), p. 33.
43 Ibid., p. 33
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Tanzimat (re-ordering) period. The Tanzimat reforms introduced substantial changes 
in the military organisation, the fiscal system and the political institutions of the 
Empire. Most important for our purposes however, were the changes which affected 
the status of religious minorities (millets) and the land tenancy laws. An imperial 
edict of 1856, known as the Hatt-i Hiimayun, stipulated the legal equality of all 
religious communities of the Empire, thereby securing the status of Christian 
communities as commercial intermediaries of European capital. Two years later, a 
Land Code legalised the private ownership of land, while in 1867 this right was 
extended to foreigners. Both these sets of reforms were implemented as a direct result 
of European pressure and petitioning. They were also a perfectly logical response to 
the domestic socio-economic and political requirements of the Empire. For all their 
admiration for western values and institutions, the bureaucrats which instigated the 
Tanzimat were operating at the interface of the domestic and the international: the 
reforms were as much a result of European penetration as they were a failure on the 
part of the existing Ottoman authorities to rise to this challenge. As Caglar Keyder 
has noted
In the Ottoman Empire the secular bureaucracy accepted and justified their 
adhesion to European models and principles in the name of progressive 
reformism. They welcomed the institutionalisation of economic integration 
into Western capitalism as a victory over the retrograde tenets of the old 
Ottoman statecraft.44
The incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into international society was therefore 
accomplished in tandem with its insertion into the world market. In this respect, one 
can discern a similar pattern of response to that of Japan. The outcome was certainly 
different in both countries: while Japan managed to pursue an autonomous route of
44 C. Keyder, State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development (London and New York: 
Verso, 1987), p. 28.
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capitalist development, the Ottoman Empire experienced a dependent integration into 
the world capitalist system. Yet there was a crucial common denominator in both 
cases, namely the need to engage in radical political, social and economic 
transformation at the domestic level in order to be accepted into the international 
society of states. On the surface of it, the expansion of international society was 
measured by the adoption of civilised norms of international intercourse; underlying 
this process, however, were the more surreptitious forces of capitalist accumulation 
and exchange, imposing the universal logic of surplus-value extraction.
The point of this excursus into the nature of Japanese and Ottoman entrance 
into international society is not to ignore the relevance of norms, values and 
institutions in this process but rather to explain their adoption with reference to the 
broader experience of capitalist expansion. It is a reflection of the English school’s 
unidimensional approach to the expansion of international society that the 
contributions in the Bull and Watson volume dedicated to Japan and the Ottoman 
Empire make no mention of capitalism, and only a passing reference to the 
momentous socio-economic upheavals brought about by the Meiji Restoration and the 
Tanzimat. The authors of these chapters seem oblivious to the fact that the first 
treaties between the western powers and these two states were commercial treaties. 
More seriously, their exclusive focus on the external indices of membership of 
international society obscures the internal reforms along capitalist lines which 
accompanied this privilege. In short, through their highly legalistic and statist 
interpretation of the expansion of international society, English school authors such 
as Gong, Naff and Suganami45 fail to consider the fundamental transformations 
operated at the societal level in order to meet the capitalist standard of civilisation. 
The argument presented above, on the contrary, has suggested that separating the 
‘high politics’ of diplomacy, treaties and international institutions ffom the ‘low 
politics’ of legal reform, land expropriation and capitalist industrialisation
45 In their respective contributions to Bull and Watson, The Expansion o f International Society.
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impoverishes our understanding of international society. An approach to this category 
that emphasises the capitalist origins of the European standard of civilisation, on the 
other hand, offers a perspective attentive to the changes at the level of civil society, 
and their interaction with international transformations. Keeping an eye on the 
relationship between these two distinct spheres, I have argued, provides for a much 
richer historical and sociological understanding of the expansion of international 
society.
3.4 The Revolt Against the West: Popular Sovereignty and National Liberation
The English school’s concern with the historical evolution of international society did 
not stop with the universalisation of this phenomenon at the turn of the century, but 
was extended into the post-war period. The disintegration of European empires in the 
aftermath of World War II and the accompanying creation of new states across the 
Third World posed important challenges to the notion of an international society. Did 
the emergence of new states undermine or reinforce the values and institutions of 
international society? Were the norms and values of international society actually 
encouraging claims to sovereignty and self-determination? What was the nature of 
sovereign statehood acquired by the ex-colonial peoples? These and other related 
questions have occupied much of the (mainly recent) literature on international 
society. In itself, this would justify considering the experience of decolonisation in 
the construction of international society; the focus of this thesis, however, makes it 
all the more important to evaluate the consequences of anti-colonial struggles in our 
understanding of the category. In essence, the argument developed in this section is 
that far ffom representing a ‘revolt against the west’, the Third World struggles for 
national liberation reflected the adoption of so-called ‘western’ values and practices 
-sovereignty, nationalism, mass political mobilisation, democracy- precisely as a 
means of combatting colonial oppression. As I hope to indicate in the next three 
chapters, the values and practices deployed by Tunisian civil society in the struggle
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for independence were similar to those adopted by their western counterparts in then- 
own experience of state-formation. In this respect, imperialist expansion created its 
own antithesis in the shape of nationalist and socialist movements which identified the 
nation-state as the appropriate locus of their political aspirations. To be sure, the way 
in which such ‘western’ values and norms were applied was conditioned by the 
specific historical and cultural legacies of each colonial society. Nonetheless, the fact 
remains that rather than challenging the accepted norms of international society such 
as sovereign equality, national self-determination or international law, the Third 
World movements for national liberation actually endorsed these principles as they 
lent legitimacy to their political demands, both domestically and internationally.
The suggestion that national liberation should be understood as an outgrowth 
and not an obstacle in the expansion of international society runs contrary to the 
general position of those English school authors dealing with the issue. As I shall 
indicate below, the English school’s conception of the relationship between 
decolonisation and international society is often contradictory. On the one extreme, 
Robert H. Jackson claims that the end of empire represented the shift to a ‘new 
sovereignty game’ which had substantially altered the nature of international society. 
James Mayall, on the other hand, accepts that Third World liberation might be 
interpreted as a realisation of popular sovereignty which simultaneously challenged 
and reinforced the norms and institutions of international society. Operating in a 
middle-ground between these two positions, Hedley Bull offered equivocal responses 
to the question of how decolonisation had affected international society: while in 
some instances his writings accept that the expansion of international society 
encouraged colonial peoples to achieve their own statehood, other passages insist on 
anti-colonialism as a ‘revolt’ against the western standard of civilisation. Despite 
these contrasting views, the English school’s approach to decolonisation and its 
impact upon international society displays an important common denominator: all 
these authors fail to consider the grassroots pressures for decolonisation. Typically, 
popular anti-colonial politics are ignored, deemed at best to be a marginal expression
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of dissatisfaction among westernised elites, and at worst, an entirely negligible factor 
in the emergence of new states. Thus the historiography underscoring much of the 
international society approach to decolonisation adopts the elitist, ‘official mind’ 
perspective which views the end of empire as the outcome of a planned strategy 
devised by prescient civil servants at Whitehall. This flawed history in turn leads to 
an understanding of post-colonial states as somehow distinct from their ‘western’ 
counterparts, either because as Jackson would have it, they are ‘quasi-states’, or as 
Bull suggests, the norms and values that guide their behaviour are non-western. The 
paragraphs that follow aim to dispel the view of post-colonial states as being artificial 
entities conjured up in metropolitan capitals and propped up by colonial elites. 
Certainly many post-colonial regimes have proved to be undemocratic and repressive, 
but it does not follow from this that post-colonial states are in any sense less 
legitimate than other members of international society. In order to avoid this double 
misrepresentation of anti-colonial nationalism and its consequences for international 
society, it is necessary, I argue, to address the social roots of post-colonial states i.e 
to consider the legitimation of newly independent states ‘from below’.
Underlying the English school’s understanding of post-colonial international 
society is the assumption that the end of empire marked a significant departure from 
the prevailing norms and values of international society. This understanding is 
premised on a view of decolonisation that focuses almost exclusively on the legal- 
political features of this process and obscures their historical-sociological dimensions. 
Robert H. Jackson’s influential argument on the ‘negative’ nature of post-colonial 
sovereignty, for example, relies very heavily on an account of decolonisation as the 
product of an international moral victory by anti-colonial forces. According to 
Jackson
Independence became an unqualified right of all colonial peoples: self-
determination. Colonialism like-wise became an absolute wrong: an injury
to the dignity and autonomy of those peoples and of course a vehicle for the ir
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economic exploitation and political repression. This is a noteworthy historical 
shift in moral reasoning because European overseas colonialism was originally 
and for a long time justified on legal positivist and paternalist grounds...46
By way of explaining this momentous reversal in the international legitimacy of 
colonialism, Jackson considers different routes to the end of empire. For the author, 
some European empires faced anti-colonial movements with ‘positive’ claims to 
national self-determination but in the British colonies however, a “[f]orceful and 
credible anti-colonial nationalism capable of inheriting sovereignty in rough 
conformity with positive international law usually did not develop.”47 In a move that 
remains unexplained, Jackson takes the British experience of decolonisation as being 
paradigmatic of the ‘new sovereignty game’ where “numerous artificial ex-colonial 
entities are postulated, created and protected” through the international acceptance 
of the right to self-determination for colonial peoples.
While Jackson’s work remains one of the most thorough examinations of the 
impact of decolonisation on international society, in some respects it is 
unrepresentative of the broader consensus of English school authors on this theme. 
Both James Mayall and Hedley Bull, for example, accept that the states emerging out 
of decolonisation shared many of the key characteristics of their ‘western’ 
counterparts. Mayall is most forthright when he states categorically that, “Perhaps 
Asian and African societies have found some western ideas indigestible, but the 
concept of the sovereign state is not one of them. On the contrary it is the most 
successful western export to the rest of the world.”48 Bull, on the other hand is more 
elusive: although he consistently argues that the revolt against western domination did 
not necessarily entail the revolt against western values, his writings on the subject
46 Jackson, Quasi-States, p. 85.
47 Ibid, p. 83.
48 Mayall, Nationalism and International Society, p. 111.
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leave the question open as to whether since the 1960s and 70s the former was being 
conflated with the latter. In the Hagey lecture on “The Concept of Justice in 
International Relations” Bull initially concedes that, “Third World demands for just 
treatment seem entirely compatible with the moral ideas that now prevail in the West; 
indeed all of these demands take western moral premises as their point of departure” , 
only to insist later that, “[w]e have to remember that when these demands for justice 
were first put forward, the leaders of Third World peoples spoke as supplicants in a 
world in which the western powers were still in a dominant position ... the moral 
appeal had to be cast in terms that would have most resonance in Western 
societies.”49
Despite the important nuances in their understanding of decolonisation, the 
work of these three English school authors displays two commonalities relevant to our 
argument. The first of these involves contrasting an ideal-type of Westphalian 
sovereign state (what Jackson unabashedly terms “empirical statehood”) to the quasi - 
states emerging out of decolonisation. This allows the English school to consider 
post-colonial states as problematic for international society in so far as they fail to 
uphold domestic norms of governability and respect for basic rights such as life, 
property and the freedom of speech and association. Secondly, as was noted earlier, 
nowhere in the English school’s elaborations on decolonisation is there a sustained 
consideration of the role played by collective action in this process. With the notable 
exception of Mayall’s passing reference to popular sovereignty, the authors associated 
with this school seem uninterested in exploring the kind of socio-political dynamics 
that led to the campaigns for national self-determination in the first place. From the 
perspective of the English school, post-colonial sovereignty was above all the result 
of a recognition by the imperialist powers that colonial peoples might have a moral 
claim to national self-determination; independence therefore appears as something that 
was granted from above and not actually fought for politically from below. Both these
49 H. Bull, Justice in International Relations: the Hagey Lectures (Waterloo, Ontario: University of 
Waterloo Press, 1984), p.
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assumptions are highly problematic historically, and furthermore, lead to thoroughly 
contestable readings of the status of international society as an analytical category in 
IR.
Let us first consider the distinction between positive and negative sovereignty 
which according to Jackson, marks the break between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ 
sovereignty games. There are two related objections here: one concerns the validity 
of this distinction; the other, the place of the distinction in Jackson’s overall argument 
on quasi-states .
For Jackson, as we have seen, post-colonial states at the time of decolonisation 
lacked the ‘empirical sovereignty’ of their European counterparts as they were 
essentially products of colonial administration bereft of popular legitimacy and merely 
sovereign by virtue of a ‘negative’ international recognition. By contrast, the 
European states-system crafted at the Peace of Westphalia reflected both a legitimate 
overlap between states and the populations they ruled over, and the recourse to a 
‘positive’ sovereignty capable of “provid[ing] political goods for its citizens”50. 
Leaving aside for the moment the legitimacy and effectiveness of the methods 
deployed by European states securing such ‘political goods’, a brief survey of 
European history since 1648 would unmask Jackson’s picture of ‘empirical 
sovereignty’ for the chimera that it is. Far from reflecting a clearly-defined and 
continuous states-system, the ‘old sovereignty’ game in Europe has been characterised 
by the constant revision of territorial boundaries among states and the protracted 
social and political instability within states fuelled by wars, revolutions, annexations 
and struggles for national unification. To suggest that the European system of states 
can be held up as an ideal-type of how positive and negative sovereignty combine to 
produce the ‘old sovereignty game’ is to overlook how both these notions of 
sovereignty have been violated at regular intervals in the modern history of the
50 Jackson, Quasi-States, p.29.
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continent. If the capacity of a state to “provide political goods for its citizens”51 is a 
crucial benchmark in the distinction between states and quasi-states, then European 
states like Spain, Greece, Germany or France to name but a few must have at 
different junctures during the past three centuries qualified as quasi-states.52
In fairness, Jackson does recognise that “History offers many examples of 
large or strong states and small or weak states and indeed ramshackle or derelict 
states both inside Europe and outside.”53 Hence, he is careful to emphasise that 
”What has changed is not the empirical conditions of states but the international rules 
and institutions concerning those conditions.”54 The point, however, is that both 
inside and outside Europe the claims to self-determination of the peoples living in 
these ‘weak or ramshackle’ states were not merely premised on lofty ethical 
principles, but on the very material shortcomings of the existing political and social 
arrangements. The benefit of hindsight might allow observers to debate whether the 
living conditions of ex-colonial peoples have improved or not after independence. But 
it would take a highly tendentious account of colonial history (and a large dose of 
imperialist nostalgia) to argue that at the time of independence the colonial powers 
were delivering ‘positive’ sovereignty to their subject populations, either in Africa 
or elsewhere. Jackson’s elitist and legalistic view of international society ‘from 
above’ fails to consider why the rules and institutions that define the ‘empirical 
condition of states’ were questioned in the first place. For all his disclaimers to the 
contrary, Jackson’s central argument on the ‘new sovereignty game’ ultimately hinges 
upon an idealised view of the ‘classical’ European system of ‘positively’ sovereign 
states, to be contrasted to an equally ephemeral post-colonial system of ‘quasi-states’.
51 Ibid., p.29.
52 This argument is thoroughly explored in S. Halperin, In the Mirror o f  the Third World: Capitalist 
Development in Modem Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).
53 Jackson, Quasi-states, p. 22
54 Ibid., p. 23
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Recognising that European state sovereignty has historically been subject to 
the same challenges as those faced by post-colonial ‘quasi-states’ undermines 
Jackson’s radical contrast between the old and the new sovereignty games: historical 
evidence suggests that the sharp break posited by Jackson cannot be treated as an 
accurate rendition of the differences between two historical ideal-typical forms of 
sovereignty, but should rather be seen as a rhetorical exaggeration aimed at 
highlighting the shortcomings of contemporary post-colonial regimes. That Jackson’s 
specific historical-geographical distinction is unsustainable, however, should not 
preclude identifying the varying expressions of state sovereignty across time and 
place. Clearly, the processes of post-colonial state formation taking place in Africa 
during the 1960s and 70s differed substantially from those experienced by European 
peoples during the preceding centuries. The challenge therefore lies in explaining why 
and how specific historical conjunctures give rise to diverse expressions of 
sovereignty. The argument of this thesis is that in order to address this challenge we 
need to pay attention to the expansion of international civil society. In the specific 
case of post-colonial states, the form taken by state sovereignty was heavily 
conditioned by the nature of the collective struggles for national liberation. In order 
to explain the claims to national self-determination of colonial peoples, it is necessary 
to investigate their forms of social and political organisation and the processes which 
they engendered. In other words, it is essential to probe the dynamic interrelationship 
between state and civil society within an international context.
Whereas the English school’s account of decolonisation focuses upon interstate 
relations and their attendant international organisms, the approach adopted here 
emphasises the role of modern social and political agency typical of civil society. 
Thus, contrary to the English school’s juridical-diplomatic approach to the end of 
empire and Third World state-formation, the aim here is to highlight the place of 
modern social movements in the realisation of national liberation. As an Africanist, 
Jackson chooses the experience of that continent to illustrate his theoretical claims
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about the nature of quasi-states and the ‘new sovereignty game’ for the whole of the 
post-colonial world. Although he recognises that even within Africa, many national 
liberation movements did actually meet the criteria necessary for the construction of 
’positively’ sovereign states, Jackson seems to draw his conclusions exclusively from 
those British colonies where national liberation movements appeared weakest. This 
in itself is patently inadequate. At the very least, one would expect Jackson to qualify 
his blanket denomination of post-colonial states as quasi-states, and contrast say, the 
revolutionary road to independence in Algeria or Mozambique to the reformist routes 
taken by some of the British colonies he mentions. Yet even if we accept Jackson’s 
narrow focus on Britain’s African colonies as being paradigmatic of weak and 
inefficient anti-colonialism yielding artificial and unstable quasi-states, empirical 
objections must again be raised. In comparative terms, the political parties and trade 
unions of Britain’s African colonies may not have been as powerful and numerous as, 
say, their French or Portugese counterparts, but they existed and played an important 
role in the end of empire. Successive generations of colonial historians have debated 
over the impact of anti-colonial movements such as the Ghanian Convention People’s 
Party or the Nigerian Action Group in achieving independence for their countries. 
These historical disputes will undoubtedly continue unresolved, but they do at least 
acknowledge the relevance of collective action in the process of decolonisation. IR 
scholars, and the English school in particular, have failed to account for the role of 
anti-colonial civil society in the construction of the post-colonial international order. 
This is not just a problem of historical insensitivity in IR, but more seriously, it 
reflects the disciplines’s embedded disregard for the role of social and political 
agency in the construction and transformation of the international system. In the 
specific case of decolonisation and its impact upon international society, it leads to 
a static and elitist account of struggles for national liberation and the post-colonial 
order it gave rise to, where the dynamics of international society remain restricted to 
the negotiation of moral and legal norms among statesmen in diverse international 
forums.
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3.5 Conclusions: International Civil Society and International Society
The basic aim of this chapter has been to outline the theoretical value of the term 
‘international civil society’ for the study of international relations. I have chosen to 
do so through a critique of one of the defining categories of our discipline: that of 
international society. While accepting that the research agendas opened up by the 
study of international society still remain central to IR, the arguments presented in 
this chapter have suggested that the prevailing approach to international society -that 
associated with the English school- is unsatisfactory in two key respects. First, 
through its limited conception of ‘society’ as applied to international relations, the 
International Society approach is unable to accommodate broader social phenomena 
such as capitalist social relations or collective social and political agency into its 
account of the international system. Secondly, and following on from this, the 
interpretations of world politics offered by the International Society perspective tend 
to reify existing international norms, values and institutions in way that obscures their 
socially and politically contested nature. In other words, contrary to some of their 
best intentions, many of the authors adopting the International Society school assume 
an elitist, statist and ultimately conservative view of international relations.
As I hope the preceding sections have demonstrated, some of the key 
components of international society -sovereign statehood, the standard of civilisation, 
national self-determination- must be explained with reference to historical processes 
such as the global reproduction of capitalism and social forces like modern social 
movements. In order to identify and explain the origins and transformations of 
modem international society, it is imperative to look beyond the surface expressions 
of international intercourse among mling classes and their attendant norms, values 
and institutions, and consider the social processes which engender these practices 
both domestically and internationally.
The conceptual tool I have proposed should be employed in this endeavour is
132
Chapter Three: International Society From Below
that of international civil society. As applied thus far, international civil society refers 
to that domain of international relations where the modern social movements 
emerging out of the global expansion of capitalism pursue their political goals. These 
movements have from the outset been forged in constant interaction with the 
institutions of international society, and have in turn shaped the values, norms and 
institutions of this very society of states. Thus, as this chapter has sought to 
demonstrate, the development of sovereign statehood, the extension of a western 
‘standard of civilisation’ or the emergence of a post-colonial international society 
cannot be adequately explained without making reference to the social and political 
transformations taking place at the level of civil society. In the specific case of North 
Africa, for example, the processes associated to the expansion of international society 
-acceptance of certain norms of international intercourse, internal social and economic 
reform, the eventual achievement of sovereign statehood- all developed in tandem 
with the expansion of international civil society i.e. the rise of modem forms of social 
and political agency in response to the penetration of capitalist imperialism. One 
important feature of the term international civil society, therefore, is that it allows 
students of international relations to investigate systematically the way in which the 
historical interaction between state and civil society has constructed modern 
international society.
A second significant benefit in considering international civil society 
when explaining the dynamics of international society relates to the political horizons 
it throws up. The incapacity of most International Society theorists to encompass 
collective social and political agency within their account of international relations 
limits severely the political potential of the concept. If, as the prevailing 
understanding presents it, international society is essentially a society of states 
sustained by a code of international conduct agreed upon by ruling elites, then the 
scope for radical social and political change both at the domestic and international 
level is immediately circumscribed. From this perspective, change in international 
society only arises when government officials and international bureaucrats reach a
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new consensus on the norms and values that should guide their international 
behaviour. Thus, as we have seen, the end of empire is explained by authors such as 
Robert H. Jackson and Hedley Bull as the outcome of a reversal in the ethical 
assumptions among western elites on the right of colonial peoples to self- 
determination. Likewise, the appearance of racial equality as a principle of post-war 
international society is ascribed to “the new dominance of two strongly anti-colonial 
great powers, the United States and the Soviet Union.”55 On this account, momentous 
social and political transformations in world politics are attributed to the logic of 
statecraft as it is manifested in international forums like the United Nations or to the 
bilateral negotiations among diplomats. International political change is ultimately 
effected by states and social forces beyond the state remain tangential to global 
transformations.
The concept of international civil society on the other hand aims deliberately 
to incorporate social forces outside the state into an account of international social and 
political change. It seeks not only to identify the way in which non-state actors have 
influenced the course of modern international society, but also to emphasise that 
international society itself has proved instrumental in forging many of these social 
movements which inhabit international civil society. What is at stake here, therefore, 
is not so much the sterile arguments within our discipline as to whether it is interstate 
or transnational forces that best define the workings of the international system, but 
rather, how these two spheres of the international combine to produce a wider totality 
of international relations. The history of modern international society is the history 
of the interaction between state and civil societies within an international context. 
Once this premise is accepted, the potential of international social and political 
transformation is no longer limited to an international society of states, but comes to 
embrace collective social and political activity outside, though not necessarily against 
the state. While it is unlikely that such social movements will in the future ignore the
55 R. J. Vincent, “Racial Equality” in Bull and Watson, The Expansion o f International Society, p. 252.
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territorial state as the locus of their political aspirations, it would be equally short­
sighted to reduce the possibilities of international political change exclusively to the 
realm of interstate activity. In order to avoid the pitfalls of both unalloyed 
transnationalism and state-centric realism, it is, I have argued, necessary to 
complement the study of international society with the investigation of international 
civil society.
The purpose of the next three chapters is to lend historical weight to these 
claims. Through the investigation of the expansion of international civil society to 
Tunisia from the turn of the century until independence in 1956, these narrative 
chapters will hopefully offer a clearer historical conception of how international 
factors encouraged the establishment of modern social movements in the Maghreb, 
and how in turn, these organisations contributed to the making of inter-war and post­
war international society. By focusing upon the practical and ideological interaction 
between Tunisian social movements and their counterparts elsewhere in the world, 
these contributions will become readily apparent. More specifically, a consideration 
of how local nationalist organisations turned to various institutions of international 
society during the immediate post-war years should also highlight the importance of 
such interaction between Tunisian civil society and the wider world, both for the 
evolution of the country’s own history and in its impact upon broader international 
developments. From these mainly analytical considerations, a more concrete political 
agenda will also hopefully emerge. This is tied to the historical experience of 
internationalism -socialist and otherwise- in the western Mediterranean. For the 
expansion of international civil society to the Tunisia also entailed, as we shall see, 
a set of complex and often contradictory experiments in political solidarity across 
ethnic, religious and national boundaries. The chapter on the inter-war crisis and its 
impact upon the Maghreb, in particular, should underline the relevance of 
internationalism in the unfolding social and political events of the period. As the 
concluding chapter to this study will indicate, this historical experience has much to 
offer for similar contemporary experiments in transnational solidarity. At this
135
Chapter Three: International Society From Below
juncture, however, it is necessary to examine in closer detail the actual historical 
processes that have made thinking about such political experiments possible at all.
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The International Origins of Tunisian Civil Society 1900-1924
Around the turn of the century, Tunisia witnessed one of the most important social 
and political transformations of its contemporary history. For the first time, 
autonomous associations with modes of organisation and a political idiom typical of 
civil society emerged in the country. To be sure, these were initially small groupings 
confined mainly to an elite of men from the Regency's capital (the so-called beldi1). 
Furthermore, the objectives of these associations were not immediately political - 
most of them insisted on the exclusively pedagogical nature of their activity. The 
benefit of hindsight however, allows us to identify cultural-educational associations 
like the Khalduniyya and the Sadiqiyya as the source of the constitutional reformism 
which underpinned the creation in 1920 of the Destour (Constitution) party - the first 
Maghrebi nationalist party.
Dubbed ‘Young Tunisians’ by the colonial press, the group of men which 
animated these associations drew their inspiration from a variety of sources including 
elements of European liberalism and later, the Young Turk experience itself. In the 
early stages of its development however, two major tendencies were discernible in the 
programme of the Young Tunisians. The first was a tradition of constitutional 
reformism initiated by the enterprising prime minister Khayr al-Din from 1873 until 
his dismissal in 1877. Reacting to the growing imperialist pressure on North Africa, 
Khayr al-Din (1822-1890) had set about reforming key institutions of the Regency 
such as the army, the fiscal system, and the schools and mosque-universities with a 
view to creating a modem state capable of fending off the European powers. Although 
ultimately unsuccessful, Khayr al-Din1 s experiment became the central reference point 
for later generations of reformists including the Young Tunisians.
1 This Arabic term is a corruption o fbaladi, meaning ‘from the town or city’. It refers to an urban 
elite from Tunis (many of them descendants of mamluks) which included ulema, traders and some 
government officials. They prided themselves in being more distinguished in manners and education 
from both the rural population (arabi) and the lower sorts from the city itself. See the entry for 
Baldiyya in K. J. Perkins, Historical Dictionary o f Tunisia 2ld Edition (Lanham, MD and London: 
Scarecrow Press, 1997), p 29.
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A second important influence came from the so-called ‘salafiyya’ movement 
which claimed that an adequate response to European imperialism could only be 
achieved through a re-evaluation of the central tenets of Islam, and through the 
substantial reform of the existing Islamic institutions. Many Young Tunisians felt the 
salafiyya doctrines offered the ideal political language with which to disseminate their 
modernising programme without jeopardising the cultural legacy of Islam. These two 
reformist trends -one constitutionalist, the other Islamic- combined to create some of 
the early expressions of Tunisian civil society which we shall be exploring below.
Parallel to this gradual emergence of Tunisian nationalism was the slow 
implantation of working-class movements in the Protectorate. Various working-class 
parties opened sections in Tunisia from 1907 and while trade unions were not 
formally legalised until 1932, most of the European workers had been affiliated to the 
local branch of the CGT set up in 1911. The indigenous membership of these 
organisations was curtailed by both the limited development of the Tunisian 
proletariat and by the administrative obstacles placed on Arab workers wishing to join 
trade-unions and political parties. The root cause for the overwhelmingly European 
character of the Tunisian working-class movements, however lay in the racist attitude 
which pervaded much of their early activity. Most branches of the Confederation 
Generale du Travail (CGT) and the Section Frangaise de la Internationale Ouvrier 
(SFIO) were unwilling to attack head-on the various forms of discrimination faced by 
indigenous working people, nor to embrace the political issues which motivated this 
population. Despite this glaring insensitivity for the social and political aspirations of 
the majority of Tunisians, the European working-class organisations managed to 
attract a growing number of Arabs to their ranks. In the years following World War 
I, indigenous workers participated in strikes and demonstrations side by side with 
their European comrades, while their presence became more noticeable in the 
governing bodies of working-class organisations. The upshot of this activity was the 
creation in 1924 of an independent Tunisian trade union, the Confederation Generale
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des Travailleurs Tunisiens (CGTT).
This chapter is concerned with the international dimensions in the rise and 
consolidation of these different social movements, which I suggest, formed the 
backbone of an incipient Tunisian civil society. While acknowledging some of the 
domestic sources of its genesis, the discussion that follows will argue that modern 
civil society emerged in Tunisia as a result of a number of international factors. 
European imperialist expansion was plainly foremost among these: it was the colonial 
enterprise launched by France in 1881 and its aftermath which provided the 
overarching conditions for the rise of a modern civil society in the Protectorate.2 1 
shall therefore start by describing what the colonial process entailed and considering 
its social, political and economic implications. It will be suggested that out of these 
transformations there emerged three broad types of political organisation: the 
European working-class movements, the associations inspired by the salafiyya trend 
in Islamic political thought, and the constitutionalist organisations seeking equal civil 
rights for Muslims within the colonial framework. The following sections will explore 
the way in which these movements absorbed and reshaped foreign political ideas; how 
they interacted internationally with other political movements in order to further their 
particular cause; and finally, how wider international events impacted upon their 
activity. The sum of these interactions, I argue, represents the beginning of a process 
of the expansion of international civil society, the analytical implications of which I 
would like to address in the concluding section of this chapter.
It should be highlighted from the outset that the socio-economic and political 
forces that accompanied the expansion of international civil society grafted their own 
features and their singular logic upon existing forms of trans-boundary communication 
and activity. The peoples of the Maghreb had obviously established complex social
2 The terms ‘Protectorate’ and ‘Regency’ will be used interchangeably in the rest of the thesis to 
describe colonial Tunisia. The former term refers to the political-administrative structures imposed by 
the French at the al-Marsa convention of 1883 within the context of the so-called ‘protectoral system’ 
of the late nineteenth century. The latter is the word used by the French to describe the suzerain states 
of Ottoman North Africa, known in Turkish as ogaklar (garrison).
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and political interconnections among themselves and with the outside world long 
before European conquest. Trade, pilgrimages (most notably the hajj), the high 
geographical mobility of religious scholars and the extensive sufi networks all 
contributed to the forging of strong social, cultural and political bonds within the 
region and beyond.3 Julia Clancy-Smith has recently evoked this intricate web of 
social relations in her study of pre-Saharan oasis towns during the nineteenth century.4 
Through an examination of communication and exchange at markets and fairs, the 
movement and migration of religious notables and the expansion of turuq (lodges or 
orders) such as the Rahmaniyya or the Qadiriyya across the region, she demonstrates 
the importance of these connections when exploring Tunisia, and indeed the whole o f 
the Maghreb's encounter with European imperialism. More importantly, it was 
precisely these pre-colonial solidarities which informed much of the social and 
political activity in the Tunisia during later decades. Hence, any consideration of the 
origins of Tunisian civil society should be sensitive to the influence of previously 
existing forms of social, cultural and political affiliation. This said, any historical- 
sociological analysis worthy of this label must combine a focus on historical breaks 
as well as on continuities. As such, the key development underlying the expansion of 
international civil society to Tunisia was the colonial penetration of the country during 
the late 1880s. It was the advent of capitalist imperialism that heralded the most 
significant transformations in the socio-economic and political structures of 
contemporary Maghreb. The following section will therefore examine the broad 
parameters of this momentous process.
3 The contribution of religious notables (sufi or otherwise) toward the construction of trans-local 
connections in the Maghreb and beyond is well captured in R. S O’ Fahey, Enigmatic Saint: Ahmad 
Ibn Idris and the Idrisi Tradition (London: Hurst and Company, 1990) and D.K Eickelman, Knowledge 
and Power in Morocco: The Education of a 20th Century Notable (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1985).
4 J. Clancy-Smith, Rebel and Saint: Muslim Notables, Populist Protest, Colonial Encounters 
(Algeria and Tunisia, 1800-1904) (Berkeley. Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 
1994), p. 2.
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4.1 Colonialism and its Consequences
The French colonisation of the Maghreb was a long drawn-out affair. Initiated with 
the invasion of Algiers on 14 June 1830, it passed through at least three phases, 
roughly coinciding with the colonisation of each of the three major countries that form 
the region. Because of the important interaction among the different stages of this 
colonialisation and the mutual impact of each experience, the consequences of 
imperialist penetration will in this section be considered for the region as a whole.
From 1830 to 1881, French efforts focused on the suppression of Algerian 
resistance led by the Amir Abd el-Kader. Newly conquered lands were settled by a 
combination of unemployed workers, poltical prisoners and vagrants expelled from 
the metropole. This method, however, did not yield the results the French government 
had aimed for, namely the creation of a colony of small-holders. Of the 109,000 
Europeans living in Algeria in 1848, only 15,000 (9,000 of whom were French) came 
under the category of rural settlers, the rest being urban dwellers.4 The French defeat 
at Sadowa in 1870 and the final quelling of rural rebellions in Algeria during the 
following year, furnished the French government with an excuse to launch a second 
colonising campaign. In June 1871 approximately a thousand families from annexed 
Alsace-Lorraine -totalling 8,000 people- were granted 100,000 hectares of Algerian 
land. During subsequent decades, the colonial population continued ascending, mainly 
as result of immigration, so that by 1906, for example, it had reached the figure of 
654,114 out of a total population of 5,231,850.5
Although Algeria had been formally declared a colony in 1848, it was during 
the last decades of the century that the discriminatory legal and political apparatus 
characteristic of imperial regimes was completed. A series of laws enacted during the
4 M. Bennoune, The Making o f Contemporary Algeria, 1830-1987 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press), p. 71.
5 These figures are taken from Mahfoud Bennoune "The Origin of the Algerian Proletariat", 
Dialectical Anthropology (Vol. 1, No. , 1976) pp. 201-223 , p. 212.
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1870s, known collectively as the code de Vindigenat, effectively created a separate 
legislation for native Algerians whereby they could be punished for infractions such 
as "speaking disrespectfully to or about a French official, defaming the French 
Republic or failing to answer questions put by an official", together with some thirty 
other arbitrary offences.6 In terms of political representation, the colonial assembly 
(made up of the Delegations financieres established in 1898 and 1900) was composed 
of sixty-nine members of which twenty-one Muslim representatives were partially 
elected by a body of 5,000 men. Through a law passed in 1884, the rest of the 
Muslim men were eligible to vote in local and provincial elections only if they were 
landholders, civil servants or leaseholders of land over the age of twenty-five. A mere
35,000 out of a total of three and a half million Algerians met these criteria in the 
1880s.
The nineteenth century had witnessed the growth of European trade with the 
Ottoman provinces of North Africa. Increasingly, the Europeans began to use the 
threat of force in order to impose capitulations and other commercial privileges on 
Tunisia and Morocco. With the French invasion of Algeria, both the Moroccan Sultan 
and the Tunisian Bey became weary of European encroachment on their sovereignty. 
By the 1880s, their fears proved justified as North Africa ceased to be of purely 
commercial interest to the European powers and became a target of their imperialist 
designs. According to Jamal Abun-Nasr, at the Congress of Berlin held in 1878 
"Bismarck unambiguously encouraged the French to occupy Tunisia so as to divert 
their attention from the loss of Alsace-Lorraine. "7 From this moment on the French 
consul at Tunis, Emile Roustan, endeavoured to find a suitable justification for 
enforcing a French protectorate over Tunisia - something he had been unable to 
achieve through diplomatic means over the past decade. The opportunity arose in
6 J. Ruedy, Modem Algeria: The Origins and Development o f a Nation (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1992), p. 89.
7 J.M. Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), p. 
276.
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early 1881 as the French accused the Bey of being unable to control a raid by 
Tunisian tribesmen into Algerian territory. French forces invaded Tunis on 25 April 
1881 and Muhammad as-Sadiq Bey was presented with a treaty which he signed at the 
Bardo palace on 12 May, allowing for the French military occupation until "[t]he 
Tunisian administration became able to re-establish order in the country and ensure 
the security of the frontiers. ”8 With the signing of the al-Marsa Convention two years 
later, Tunisia officially became a French protectorate.
The French occupation of Tunisia was initially dictated by a combination 
strategic and economic concerns. The French felt it necessary to secure their Algerian 
conquest through a presence in the neighbouring territories and also preempt Italian 
ambitions on the Regency. On the other hand, the high costs of enforced colonisation 
in Algeria had suggested the possibility of taking an alternative route of economic 
exploitation, namely the creation of a ‘colony for capital’. In a famous speech given 
in July 1885, Jules Ferry drew on the principles outlined by the theorist of 
imperialism Paul-Leroy Beaulieu in his work De la colonisation chez les peuples 
modemes suggesting that the French objective in Tunisia was "to reserve for its 
capitalists and its products this technologically and economically backward country”.9 
Consequently, the first decade of the Protectorate was characterised by the mass 
influx of private capital into Tunisia. French banks, corporations, and individual 
businessmen took heed of Ferry's advice and proceeded to buy vast tracts of land off 
absentee landlords and to establish highly profitable commercial enterprises under the 
privileged conditions meted out by the French administration.10 This first wave of
8 Ibid., p.279.
9 Quoted in J. Poncet, La Colonisation et I'Agriculture Europeennes en Tunisie depuis 1881 (Paris 
and The Hague: Mouton, 1961), p. 141. See also Martin, L'Empire Triomphante, p. 99.
10 Carmel Sammut offers some examples in his L ’ imperialisme capitaliste frangais et le 
nationalisme tunisien (1881-1914), (Paris: Publisud, 1983): “[d]es nombreuses societes financieres 
s’etaient constitutes au lendemain du Rrotectorat pour pouvoir acheter des grands domaines tunisiens; 
La Banque Nationale de Tunisie avait fonde line filiale qui avait pour seul but d’acheter des terrains 
agricoles; il s’agit de la Societe Fonciere de Tunisie qui put acquerir le domaine de la Momaghia qui
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capitalist colonisation was facilitated by the destruction of pre-colonial systems of land 
tenure. A decree of 23 May 1886, for example, legalised the alienation of habous 
lands (under Islamic law, an inalienable religious endowment) to colonists via a 
‘Habous Association’.11 It was not until the beginning of 1890s, however, that the 
French opted for a policy of ‘official colonisation’.
The immediate cause for this change of strategy was the growing Italian 
presence in Tunisia. This had been a long-standing feature of the Regency's social 
make-up and, as was mentioned above, it was one of the reasons which prompted the 
French invasion. In 1881 there were 15,000 Italians living in Tunisia as against 700 
French nationals; in subsequent years their number rose to 20,000 in 1891, 55,000 
in 1896 and 71,000 by 1901.12 Fearful of this ‘Italian menace’, the French 
government set out to colonise the protectorate with settlers. By 1931 there were
91,000 French living in Tunisia, still not a majority of an overall European population 
which on the eve of independence had reached the figure of 255,000.13 Parallel to 
this, the French authorities deepened the administrative reforms first initiated under 
the Bey. A regular standing army was established and a modern bureaucracy, with its 
corresponding directions of Education, Finances and Public works, or Agriculture, 
Commerce and Colonisation were gradually introduced during the 1890s.14 These
comprenait environ 3,500 hectares ... la Societe Marseillaise de Credit Industriel et Commercial (qui 
possedait, en dehors d’Enfida, les domaines de Sidi Tabet et d’El-Azib ayant respectivement 5,000 et 
1,500 hectares ...la Compagnie des Batignolles, concessionaire di chemin de fer Tunis-Bone-Guelma, 
(qui revendit a Gery, president de la Banque de Tunisie, le domaine de l ’Oued Zarga qui comprenait 
9,000 hectares).” (p. 93).
11 See E. Moudoud, Modernization, the State, and Regional Disparity in Developing Countries: 
Tunisia in Historical Perspective 1881-1982 (Boulder, CO.: Westview, 1989), p. 112.
12 Martin, L ‘Empire Triomphante, p. 103.
13 Ibid., p 193 and Mahfoud Bennoune, "Primary Capital Accumulation in Colonial Tunisia", 
Dialectical Anthropology (Vol.4, No.2, July 1979) pp.83-100.
14 L. Anderson, The State and Social Transformtaion in Tunisia and Libya: 1830-1980 (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 146.
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policies were not uniformly successful, but they certainly brought about a series of 
crucial transformations in the socio-economic, cultural and political structure of the 
protectorate.
Despite regional variations and historical particularities, colonialism effected 
a threefold transformation of the Maghreb. In the first place, the process of land 
expropriation left the mass of the autochthonous population without a direct means of 
subsistence. This landless population was gradually transformed into a new set of 
social classes. Most of them joined the ranks of an under-proletariat which inhabited 
the shanty-towns or bidonvilles of Casablanca, Algiers and Tunis15; others still 
became the rural or urban proletariat of both the colonies and the metropole. The 
traditional artisanal industry of the urban centres, for its part, slowly succumbed to 
the competitive pressure of metropolitan imports. This dismantling of precolonial 
economic structures, however, was complemented by the selective modernisation of 
the North African productive system, most notably mining, transport, agriculture and 
banking.
Secondly, the colonial administrative apparatus, cemented through war and 
coercion, created a dual society where Muslims were systematically deprived of the 
most basic civil rights. Moreover, the colonial authorities made every effort to put 
down the indigenous religious or cultural expressions, save the occasions when this 
formed part of a policy of ‘divide and rule’ (as in the case of the Berber dahir of 1930 
that tried to exempt berberophone Moroccans from Islamic jurisprudence). The 
brutality and destruction which accompanied colonisation further accentuated the 
humiliation and suffering felt by North Africans and certainly fuelled a sense of 
resentment, when not outright hatred toward all things French which was to linger 
well into the future. At the same time, however, this very process of political 
colonisation allowed for the centralisation of the state and the delimitation of its
15 See the historical background in Calude Liauzu’s study of the 1930s “Un aspect de la crise en 
Tunisie: la naissance des bidonvilles" Revue Frangais d'Histoire d'Outre Mer (Vol. LXIII, 2e et 4e 
trimestre, 1976).
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territorial boundaries, a development which had obvious consequences for the later 
ascent of nationalism.
Lastly, the French occupation afforded a small but important Maghrebi elite 
(the so-called evolues) the chance to enrich themselves and attain a high social status 
under the colonial regime. Colonisation was therefore also important in that it 
furnished some sectors with a whole new set of economic, social and cultural 
aspirations. This is particularly significant in explaining the adoption of modern 
political language by the many North Africans who received a European education in 
the Maghreb or who later lived and studied abroad.
These, then, were the changes responsible for the rise of a modern civil society 
in the Maghreb. As was pointed out at the outset of this chapter, the new colonial 
structures were grafted upon the existing patterns of social, economic and political 
organisation. Rather than being neatly reproduced in some ideal-typical form, the 
basic elements of modern civil society were refracted through the lens of imperialism, 
racism, violent political domination and forced expropriation - all arguably 
international phenomena. In this respect, the implantation of civil society in Tunisia 
clearly represents the variegated impact of the expansion of international civil society. 
The universal forms associated to civil society -private property, modern classes, 
modern social and political agency- acquired a specific character in the colonial 
setting. As was noted in the introductory chapter, bearing in mind this dialectical 
relationship between the universal and the particular is essential when analysing the 
modern social movements which emerged in Tunisia during the first two decades of 
this century. As I hope the following sections will demonstrate, the social and political 
associations germane to Tunisian civil society adapted the organisational and 
ideological norms prevalent in other parts of the world to the concrete socio-historical 
circumstances of their own country. It is in this sense that the expansion of 
international civil society becomes a process played out simultaneously at the domestic 
(particular) and the international (universal) levels. Let us now turn to an historical
145
Chapter Four: The International Origins o f Tunisian Civil Society
illustration of this process by considering the three most significant expressions of 
Tunisian civil society during the early part of this century.
4.2 The Impact of the Salafiyya Movement
The outstanding civilisational achievements of Islam -its profound political, spiritual 
and cultural force- had for several centuries provided Maghrebi society with a firm 
reference-point for the maintenance of social cohesion and moral order. Faced with 
the deepening of imperialist penetration by the latter half of the nineteenth century, 
North Africans naturally turned to Islam as the most immediate source of resistance. 
The way Islam served as a vehicle of political mobilisation, however, varied a great 
deal according to the place and moment of its occurrence.
As in other parts of the Muslim world, the expansion of Islam in the Maghreb 
yielded a form of popular religion imbued with a number of pre-Islamic characteristics 
such as saint-worshipping and certain esoteric forms of spiritual enlightenment. This 
syncretism produced forms of social and political mobilisation with a strong mystical 
and millenarian hue -summarised by the concept of maraboutism- which contrasted 
with the rational, scripturalist legalism of the orthodox Islamic traditions.16 The first 
Algerian resistance to colonialism, for example, was led by the Emir Abd el-Kader, 
a perfect example of the charismatic and messianic leadership characteristic of 
maraboutism,17 Similarly, the bedouin reaction to the French invasion of Tunisia in 
1881, and the 1906 revolt of Mawlay Ahmad Haybat Allah (el Hiba) in southern
16 Maraboutism. (derived from the Arabic for fortified tower -ribat- where religious notables were 
held to live) is central to the idea of North African popular Islam. For the classic discussion on the 
distinction between popular and scriptuialist (‘catholic’ and ‘protestant’) Islam see, E. Gellner, Saints 
of the Atlas (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1969) and Muslim Society (Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981); See also M. Gilsenant Recognizing Islam (London: Croom Helm, 
1982).
17 See the comparison between the thought and action of the two resistance leaders Abd al-Kader 
and Abd el-Krim in Pessah Shinar, "Abd al-Qadr and Abd-Alkrim: Religious Influences on their 
Thought and Action" Asian and African Studies (Vol. 1, 1965) pp. 139-174.
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Morocco represented two other instances where the resources of popular Islam were 
deployed against foreign intervention.18 These forms of popular protest were 
undoubtedly part of a long tradition of resistance to the encroachment of the 
centralising state. Nonetheless, by couching their actions in the language of jihad , 
these movements clearly sought to revive the imagery of Dar al-harb (Abode of war) 
and Dar al-Islam (Abode of Islam) which could conjure up a continuity between the 
Crusades and the contemporary expansion of capitalist imperialism. Similarly, while 
Sufism in North Africa was a much more complex phenomenon than is conveyed here 
through its association with rural uprisings and maraboutism, one should not overlook 
its essential role in defining the particular mode of rural protest outlined above.
A second recourse to Islam in the face of imperialist penetration focussed on 
the state apparatus. The commercial and military pressure deployed by the European 
states in the Maghreb led to various reformist experiments similar to those taking 
place simultaneously at the heart of the Ottoman Empire under the Tanzimat period 
discussed in chapter three. The eighteen-year (1837-1855) rule of Ahmad Bey 
introduced the first systematic military, administrative and educational reforms into 
the Regency.19 Further innovations followed during the 1870s under the guidance of 
the Tunisian Prime Minister Khayr al-Din. In both cases, the programme of 
modernisation involved the adoption of European tools of state-building -rationalised 
and centralised administration, extension of taxing system, creation of standing army, 
educational reform- in the belief that only imitation could deter European expansion. 
The reforms were rejected by some sectors of the Tunisian population on the grounds 
that they represented heretical innovations {bid'a) alien to the traditions of Islam. For
18 For a discussion of these modes of resistance see respectively, Mohamed-Hadi Cherif, "Les 
mouvements paysannes dans la Tunisie du XIXe siecle", Revue de L'Occident Musulman et de la 
Mediterranee (No. 30, 2e semestre 1980) pp. 21-55 and E. Burke III, Prelude to a Protectorate: 
Moroccan Resistance 1860-1912 (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1976).
19 For a detailed account of this period see L. Brown, The Tunisia o f Ahmad Bey, 1837-1855 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1974).
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the most part, however, the religious establishment, embodied in the ulema, displayed 
no overt opposition to these initiatives. In fact, Khayr al-Din managed to enlist the 
support of certain members of the Tunisian ulema and explicitly invoked the Sharia, 
the Umma and the traditions of the Prophet in his programmatic manifesto, the Surest 
Path (Aqwam al-masalik), published in 1867.20
The Tunisian Tanzimat could simply be explained in sociological terms as a 
‘revolution from above’ designed to counteract international military and economic 
pressures through domestic modernisation. This is undoubtedly a crucial element of 
the interpretation; but it is also important to bear in mind that this particular reaction 
to European expansion turned to Islam as a source of legitimacy. In this respect, 
despite all the Weberian resonances of rationalisation and secularisation, the reformist 
experiments in Tunisia were part of a general trend in the Muslim world to seek a 
response to imperialism in Islam.
The most coherent and historically significant expression of this trend was 
embodied in the salafiyya movement. Derived from the concept of al-salafal salih 
(‘the virtuous forefathers’), the term ‘salafiyya’ refers to those Muslim thinkers of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century -names like Jamal al-Din Al-Afghani, 
Mohammed Abduh and Rashid Rida are usually associated to the trend- who argued 
for the return to the values which had guided the Prophet Muhammad and his 
followers during their exile at Madina.21 The leitmotif of their argument was that the 
original postulates of Islam had been abandoned through the centuries by heterodox
20 See A. H Green, The Tunisian Ulama, 1873-1915: Social Structure and Response to Ideological 
Currents (Leiden: E.J Brill, 1978); and Kenneth J. Perkins, '"TheMasses Look Ardently to Istanbul': 
Tunisia, Islam, and the Ottoman Empire 1837-1931" in J. Ruedy (ed,),Islamism and Secularism in 
North Africa (London: Macmillan Press, 1995).
21 Good overviews of these thinkers include: A. Al-Azmeh, Islam and Modernities (London: Verso, 
1993); H. Enyat, Modem Islamic Political Thought (London: Macmillan, 1982). Albert Hourani, 
Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983); E. 
Kedourie Afghani and 'Abduh : an Essay on Religious Unbelief and Political Activismin Modem Islam 
(London: Frank Cass, 1966); and A. Rahmena (ed..) Pioneers of Islamic Revival (London and Atlantic 
Highlands, NJ: Zed Books, 1994).
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practices like Sufism and by corrupt governments. The results, according to the 
Salafis, were plainly visible in the Muslim world's feeble response to European 
imperialism, and the remedy lay in the revival of the pristine culture of the first 
Islamic community. The Salafis did not reject European values and achievements per 
se, but on the contrary, sought to reconcile Islam with modernity. Their objective was 
to combine elements of European industrial society -positivistic science, technology, 
rationalised organisation- with the heritage of Islam -moral order, spirituality and just 
governance. According to Aziz Al-Azmeh
[The] work of Muhammad Abduh and others, was part of a modernist 
reinterpretation of Muslim texts of sacred or semi-sacred character, in which 
these texts were regarded as a code, open modernist interpreter which yielded 
ideas in keeping with science, with evolutionism, and other ideas in 
currency...22
As opposed to the other two Islamic reactions to imperialism outlined above, the 
Salafiyya trend became a ‘movement’ in that it actually established a permanent 
network of institutions characteristic of civil society. Interestingly, this was 
particularly true of the Maghreb where, as we shall see, the Salafis had a considerable 
social and political impact. Essentially, the Salafiyya influence was transmitted 
through two vehicles: educational institutions and cultural or religious associations.
The Salafiyya movement's first inroad into North African political life was 
through education. Given the emphasis placed by the Salafiyya thinkers on the need 
for Muslims to combine Islamic learning with training in the modern sciences, it 
comes as no surprise that their efforts were first focussed on educational reform. The 
most important phenomenon to arise from this project were the so-called "ffee 
schools" (maktab al-hurriyya) or "Kuttab reformes", which took this name by virtue
22 Al-Azmeh, Islam and Modernities, p. 34.
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of being independent from colonial regulation. Initially, the aim of these institutions 
was simply to put into practice the tenets of Salafi ideology. By offering a curriculum 
comprised of both traditional and modern subjects taught mostly in Arabic, the 
schools provided an alternative to both the secular francophone institutes and the 
declining Koranic schools.
After the success of the first ‘free school’, established in Tunis in 1906 by 
Khairallah ibn Mustafa, the movement spread across the Maghreb, gradually adopting 
a more political hue. Islamic modernists, who had in many cases already been heavily 
involved in the reform of the Zaytouna or al-Qarawiyyin Mosques, took on the task 
of setting up free schools as a response to the advancement of westem-style education. 
With considerable foresight, the Salafis had identified the Kuttab reformes (free 
schools) as the corner-stone of future Muslim resistance against European 
imperialism. By 1925, Morocco boasted a dozen such institutions (distributed between 
Fez, Rabat, Casablanca, Tetouan and Marrakesh) while in Algeria, the movement 
pioneered by Ibn Ben Badis in 1917 accounted for the country's 100 free schools by 
the mid-1930s.23 An important off-shoot of all this activity was the circulation of a 
number of journals and newspapers -both in Arabic and French- such as Ben Badis' 
al-Shihab (The Meteor) or the Tunisian As-Sa’da al'Uzma (The Greatest Happiness).
The uneven extension of Salafiyya influence in the Maghreb reflects the 
particular domestic circumstances which fuelled the movement in different places at 
different times. Furthermore, this early expression of the Salafiyya movement only 
offered a glimpse of what was later a central component of political activity in North 
Africa, particularly in Morocco and Algeria. Nonetheless, the fact remains that the 
Salafiyya doctrine had initially evolved outside the Maghreb by men who had little 
relation to the region. In this respect its heavy impact across North Africa needs to
23 For a description of the ‘free-school’ movement in the Maghreb see John P. Halstead, "The 
Changing Character of Moroccan Reformism", Journal of African History (Vol. 5, No.3, 1964) pp.435- 
447 and John Damis, "The Free-School Phenomenon:the Case of Tunisia and Algeria", International 
Journal of Middles East Studies (Vol. 5, No. 4, September 1974) pp. 434-449.
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be explained with reference to the wider contacts with the outside world, as one of the 
most notable characteristics of the Salafiyya trend was its Pan-Islamic character.
A central figure in this process was the Egyptian Mohammed Abduh (1849- 
1905), scholar, activist and disciple of Jamal al-Din Al-Afghani (1838/39-1897). For 
Al-Afghani, Abduh and Rida, the concept of umma (community of believers) lay at 
the heart of the an Islamic revival. The imperialist encroachment of Muslim lands had 
been possible due to the division among the Islamic umma, and the only way of 
evicting the European powers was through the political reconstitution of this very 
community. To this end, Al-Afghani and his disciple Abduh, had established a Pan- 
Islamic secret society called "The Strongest Link" (<al-Uwra al-Wuthqa). Despite its 
brief existence (1882-1884) the Society was able to extend its membership across the 
Muslim world, and in December 1884 two of its Tunisian associates, Muhammad b. 
Mustafa Bayram and Muhammad as-Sanusi arranged Abduh's first visit to Tunisia and 
a second sojourn in 1903.24 There is some controversy regarding the historical 
significance of these events for the later development of Tunisian nationalism. 
According to Moncef Chenoufi, for example, Abduh's impact first found expression 
four months after his departure as 3,000 demonstrators marched the streets of Tunis 
in opposition to water restrictions imposed by the Regency.25 Furthermore, it is 
argued, Abduh's Tunisian followers played a crucial role in the development of 
reformist institutions such as al-Hadira newspaper and the Khalduniyya association, 
which as we shall see below were instrumental in the forging of Tunisian civil society. 
Other interpretations are more sceptical about the salafi contribution, arguing that 
their impact among the Tunisian ulema was marginal and that furthermore, their ideas 
were not central to the reformist project of the 1890s. According to Arnold H. Green
24 For an exhaustive account of Abduh's visits to Tunisia see Moncef Chenoufi, "Les deux sejours 
de Muhammad 'Abduh en Tunisie", Les Cahiers de Tunisie (Vol. 16, 1968), pp.57-96.
25 Ibid.
151
Chapter Four: The International Origins o f Tunisian Civil Society
[...] a few broad-minded ulama associated themselves with the revived reform 
movement... but this was no purely Tunisian coalition purporting to advance 
national values by impugning the Protectorate administration, as some have 
suggested. Rather, the essential and significant alliance in force during this 
period was that linking the progressive Tunisians with the administration 
itself.26
Either way, there is a degree of consensus regarding the salafi participation in the 
early institutions of Tunisian civil society, including for instance the Khalduniyya 
association and the al-Hadira newspaper, minimal as it may have been. Similarly, 
there appears to be little dispute about this trend having emerged in the Regency as 
a result of Mohammed Abduh's efforts of propagation. The consequences of this were 
to be strongly felt in subsequent years as leading North African politicians such as 
Abd al-Aziz Thaalbi, Shaykh Abd al-Hamid Ben Badis or Allal Al-Fasi incorporated 
the tenets of salafi doctrine into their own versions of nationalism, thus imbuing it 
with elements of Islamic internationalism.27 Again, it is important to underline that 
the success of the salafiyya trend in the Maghreb during this period owed a great deal 
to the indigenous traditions of Islamic reformism. Taking the case of the Rifian revolt 
of Abdelkrim, George Joffe has argued that, "The Rif example inspired others with 
the desire to resist European rule elswhere in Morocco ... If no more, the Rif war 
was one of those 'historic connections' that link primary [i.e millenarian, kin-based] 
and secondary [modern, mass-based nationalist] resistance in Africa . . . ”28 This kind
26 Green, The Tunisian Ulema, p. 169.
27 See J. Abun-Nasr, "The Salafiyya Movement in Morocco" St. Antony's Papers, N°16 (Middle 
Eastern Affairs, N° 3, 1963); A. Laroui.Ler Origines Culturelles et Sociales du Nationalisme Marocah 
(Paris: Francois Maspero,1977) and A. Merad, Le reformisme musulman en Algerie de 1925 a 1940 
(Paris and The Hague: Mouton, 1967).
28 E.G.H Joffe, "The Moroccan Nationalist Movement: Istiqlal, the Sultan and the Country"Journal 
of African History (No. 26, 1985), pp. 289-307,p. 291. See also P. Shinar, "Abd-al Qadr and Abd- 
Alkrim: Religious Influences on their Thought and Action" Asian and African Studies, (Vol.l 1965),
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of example, however, complements rather than cancels out the relevance of 
international factors in the emergence of 'secondary' resistance movements in the 
Maghreb. In fact, it reinforces the need for an analysis which focuses on the interplay 
between the domestic and the international in the genesis of such movements. In this 
respect, the salafiyya movement represents a clear example of the international 
dimensions to the rise of civil society in Tunisia.
4.3 Constitutionalist Reformism
In 1897, the prominent colon journalist Victor de Carnieres stated in his newspaper 
La Tunisie Frangaise:
The more the indigene is educated, the more he despises us. Our worst 
enemies are those young people from bourgeois families who have 
been brought up like Frenchmen by the direction of Education ... If 
there is ever a revolt in Tunisia, it will be they who we shall see 
heading the insurgency.29
Although anecdotal, Carnieres’ observation registered a new development in the 
political life of the Maghreb. It reflected the gradual but unequivocal rise of liberal 
constitutionalist politics in North Africa. In the Tunisian case, this soon took the 
shape of a nationalist party, the Destour; in Morocco and Algeria it manifested itself 
in a number of associations which sought to ameliorate the status of Muslims under 
the colonial regime by invoking the modern concepts of reformism, citizenship and 
constitutional rights. Taken together, these new organisations represented an
p. 175 .
29 Cited in Charles-Andre Julien, "Colons fran?ais et Jeunes Tunisiens (1882-1912)" Revue 
Frangaise d'Histoire d'Outre-Mer (Vol. LIV, Nos. 194-197, 1967), pp. 87-150, p. 114.
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important shift in the nature of political protest in the Maghreb. North African civil 
society was moving away from more traditional sources of political mobilisation and 
gradually adopting modern forms of political engagement. The political party became 
the prevailing form of organisation; strikes, petitions, manifestos and demonstrations 
the tools of protest; and the language of rights, self-determination and representation 
the dominant political idiom. Naturally, the break was not a clean one - the salafiyya 
trend found a prominent voice in the Young Tunisian movement. Nonetheless, it was 
a sufficiently fundamental break to beg the question of why and how it came about. 
Clearly, an exhaustive response to this question requires making reference to a 
multitude of factors. In line with the general thrust of this thesis, however, this section 
will concentrate on the international dimensions to the rise of Tunisian 
constitutionalism.
These fall into three basic categories. Foremost among them is the broader 
historical and sociological process whereby colonialism engendered its own antithesis 
in the form of modern anti-colonialism.30 Added to this were a series of ideological 
and organisational contacts with the outside world which strongly influenced the 
nature and direction of Tunisian constitutionalism. Last, a host of wider international 
events, such as the Young Turk and Bolshevik revolutions or Wilson's Fourteen 
Points, all heavily impacted upon the politics of the region. Before examining how 
these international factors played themselves out in the forging of Maghrebi civil 
society, it is necessary to outline some of the characteristics of this new stage in the 
region's history.
For all its racist overtones and its exaggerated language of "revolt" and 
"insurgency", Carnieres' remark was sociologically accurate on two important
30 For an exploration of the dialectics of colonialism see, J. Nederveen Pieterse, Empire and 
Emancipation (London: Pluto Press, 1989). Fora cogent application of this process to the Tunisian cas 
see Sammut, L' imperialisme capitaliste. Sammut emphasises the numerous other variables to be taken 
into account in the rise of Tunisian nationalism but maintains that ,"[...] les modes de penetration 
imperialiste frangaise ont donne une certaine forme aunationalisme tunisien qui s’est structure selon 
la nature de la penetration economique et politique frangaise.” (p. 177).
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accounts: it pointed to the centrality of education in the rise of Tunisian 
constitutionalism and it highlighted the bourgeois nature of this phenomenon. As we 
saw in the previous section, educational reform had been a major objective of both the 
salafiyya movement and the modernising administration of Khayr al-Din. Beyond the 
pedagogic concerns over more efficient training, the purpose of these programmes 
was to raise the political consciousness of the Muslim population. The new 
generation of Maghrebi political activists adapted this legacy and used similar methods 
to pursue their own political project. Indeed, many of the leading bourgeois 
constitutionalists had attended the free schools or the modern educational institutions 
set up by the reformist regimes.
Perhaps the most notable example of this phenomenon was the Sadiki College 
of Tunis.31 Set up in January 1875, the college was the product of a series of inquiries 
headed by the Prime Minister Khayr al-Din into the reform of the Tunisian 
educational system. Its objective, according to the preamble which introduced the 
college's foundational constitution, was to "a faire developper la civilisation [sic], 
dans l’interet de la population ... dont a besoin la nation musulmane pour la gestion 
des affaires en confromite avec la loi islamique.''32 In many respects, therefore, it 
epitomised the salafiyya ideal of an Islamic modernism. Nonetheless, as the French 
took over the Tunisian administration and the elite represented at Sadiki lost the 
prospect of securing an administrative position in the Beylical regime, the College 
gradually became a breeding ground for modern nationalist politics. The Sadiki 
students had, after all, acquired the necessary skills for confronting the colonial 
regime on its own terms: knowledge of a number of foreign languages; acquaintance 
of European history and political thought; widespread familiarity with the methods of 
modem science. Thus, according to Mustapha Krafem, a division was bound to arise
31 The most comprehensive study of the Sadiki College is N. Srai’eb, Le College Sadiki de Tunis 
1875-1956: Enseignement et nationalisme (Tunis: Alif, Editions de la Meditterannee, 1995). See also 
A. Abdessalam, Sadiki et les sadikiens (Tunis: Ceres Productions, 1974).
32 Cited in Sraleb, Le College Sadiki, p. 36.
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between the ‘modernist’ elites emerging from the College Sadiki and their traditional 
counterparts at the Grand Zaytouna Mosque:
Despite all the precautions taken, the cohesion of this elite was irredeemably 
shattered as, in the last instance, the choice was between two competing 
world-views. True, the sadikiens had a profound acquaintance of the Arab- 
Islamic legacy but their western education had opened their spirit toward the 
rationalism, the liberal-humanist principles, the sciences and the new 
technology which constituted the foundations of modern civilisation.33
Evidence of the College Sadiki's vanguard role in the development of Tunisian liberal 
constitutionalism was provided in the following decades as the Protectorate 
experienced the virtually uninterrupted growth of constitutionalist organisations. Like 
their European counterparts, the bourgeois political clubs and debating circles which 
proliferated during the early decades of the century were intended to serve the dual 
purpose of influencing policy and educating the general public. The most significant 
examples of this development were the Khalduniyya club and the Alumni Association 
of Sadiki College (Association des anciens eleves du college Sadiki) or Sadikiyya, set 
up in 1896 and 1905 respectively. Both groups were animated by a small number of 
Sadiki graduates dedicated to the dissemination of the ‘modern sciences’ (geography, 
political economy, physics, chemistry) among the general public. They chose the 
vehicle of lectures, debates and a public library as a means of realising this project, 
and found a considerable response among certain sectors of the Tunisian population.34
33 Mustapha Krai'em, "Les elites du mouvement nationaliste Tuiiisien pendant la periode de l'entre- 
deux-guerres" in CERES (ed.), Elites et pouvoir dans le monde arabe pendant la periode modeme et 
contemporaine (Tunis: Universite de Tunis, 1992) pp. 7-29. p. 14.
34 For figures reflecting the Khalduniyya and the Sadikiyya's impact on Tunisian civil society see 
Charles-Andre Julien, "Colons fran^aises et Jeunes Tunisiens (1882-1912)",Revue Frangais d'Histoire 
d'outre Mer (Vol. LIV, 1967).
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Both associations had received strong backing from the Residency in an attempt by 
the colonial administration to undermine the Zaytouna's status as the major Tunisian 
academic institution, and to replace it with a docile elite of francophile intellectuals. 
Nonetheless, by the mid-1900s the Khalduniyya and the Sadikiyya had become the 
major centres of an incipient constitutionalist movement. Predictably, the ostensibly 
apolitical activities of the two association had furnished a considerable number of 
Tunisian men with the ideological tools for the shaping of a nationalist consciousness. 
More interestingly, for all their salafiyya roots and their links with the Zaytouna 
ulema, both associations proved to be instrumental in the shift from the traditional to 
the modern forms of political agency. As Sraieb points out:
Nous voions ainsi naitre de nouveaux systemes de valeur ou le patriotisme, le 
bien materiel des concitoyens, l’idee de progres et travail se substituent 
brusquement a celle de la piete, de la communaute religieuse et du bienes 
l’au-dela ,35
While there is little controversy about the centrality of education in the emergence of 
liberal-constitutionalist movements in the Maghreb, the bourgeois character of this 
phenomenon requires further elucidation. ‘Bourgeois’ is understood here as referring 
to a comprehensive political project, the explicit or implicit aim of which is to 
facilitate the development of capitalist social relations in a particular society. It does 
not imply the self-conscious agency of a homogenous bourgeois class united under the 
banner of liberty, equality and fraternity - the leadership of North African bourgeois 
nationalism was largely drawn from a Turkish mameluk aristocracy that had in the 
past displayed little respect for these principles. Rather, it is meant to convey the 
existence of a particular set of class interests which express themselves in a 
programme for capitalist reform. In exploring the nature of bourgeois revolution in
35 Sraieb, Le College Sadiki, p. 270.
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Germany, for example, Geoff Eley defines the concept in the following fashion:
[...] we associate bourgeois revolution with a larger complex of change ... 
which cumulatively established the conditions of possibility for the 
development of industrial capitalism.36
My contention is that the constitutionalist organisations which emerged in the 
Maghreb during the beginning of this century were bourgeois in that their principal 
objective was to reform the social, economic and political structures of their 
respective countries so as to promote the capitalist social relations they saw prevailing 
in Europe. They were also interested in advancing the liberal constitutionalist politics 
which could sustain a liberal-democratic regime; but this was not inherent to their 
primary concern, namely the defence of their class interests in the face of French 
imperialism. As Eley and numerous other theorist of bourgeois revolution have 
emphasised, there is no necessary correlation between the social and economic 
development of capitalism and the establishment of a legal-political framework 
characteristic of liberal democracy.37
This insistence on the bourgeois character of the emerging Tunisian civil 
society is helpful in two respects. First, it permits the sociological and political 
distinction between movements such as the Young Tunisians or the De stour and their 
contemporary rivals, the working-class organisations we shall be exploring below.
36 D. Blackboum and G. Eley, The Pecularities of German History: Bourgeois Society and Politics 
in Nineteenth-Century Germany (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 145.
37 In his discussion of the notion of bourgeois revolution, Perry Anderson, for exampi, emphasises 
that, “[njone of the great turbulences of the transition to modernity has ever conformed to the simple 
schema of a struggle between a feudal aristocracy and industrial capital of the sort presupposed in the 
traditional Marxist vocabulary. The porous pattern of feudalism above, the unpredictable presence of 
exploited classes below, the mixed disposition of the bourgeoisie within, the competitivepressure of 
rival states without, were bound to defeat this expectation. In that sense, one could say that it was in 
the nature of ‘bourgeois revolutions’ to be denatured these transformations could never have been the 
linear project of a single class subject.” P. Anderson,’’The Notion of Bourgeois Revolution” mEnglish 
Questions (London and New York: Verso, 1992), p 112.
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Second, it accounts for the elitist nature of these movements.
Taking the issue of the political aspirations of bourgeois nationalism first, it 
is clear that their project amounted to the fuller integration of the Muslim population 
into the French colonial system - the policy of assimilation. This did not involve 
questioning the basis of the protectoral and colonial regimes per se. Rather, it meant 
advocating the introduction of reforms to the existing political framework which might 
grant some Muslims full French citizenship rights. Aside from the demands for equal 
political representation, the bourgeois constitutionalists were interested in laying down 
the foundations of a modern capitalist economy which they felt had not been delivered 
through French colonisation. Thus, the first Young Tunisian Manifesto stated in 1907:
Concerning the economic situation, we will ask the government to develop 
professional and agricultural education, and to make it available to the children 
of our working classes. In a country which is again opening itself up to 
economic activity, the natives must be the primary producers. It is urgently 
necessary to train the working population and to prepare it for an adequate 
response to the new requirements of private industry and public enterprise.38
Bourgeois constitutionalists were very much aware of the elitist character of their 
organisations, but not all of them sought to enlist the mass of the disadvantaged 
population to their cause. In his examination of the Young Tunisian newspaper Le 
Tunisien, for example, Byron Cannon identifies a ‘rhetoric of social justice’ which 
showed a distinct concern for the plight of subordinate classes like the peasantry or 
the khamassat (share-croppers). When faced with the concrete problems of land 
reform and the medjba head-tax, however, the Young Tunisians came to the 
realisation "... that their positions had EITHER to reflect the socio-economic biases
38 Quoted in B. Tlili, Crises et mutations dans le monde islamo-mediterraneen contemporain (1907 
1912) (Tunis: Universite de Tunis, 1978), p. 289.
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of established classes on whom they depended for support OR show a much more 
innovative bent to which an only gradually emergent section of the Tunisian 
population could rally."39
The previous sections have discussed in some depth the defining 
characteristics of bourgeois constitutionalism as it arose in the Tunisia during the 
beginning of this century. We have seen how the essence of this project lay in the 
economic and political reform of the existing regimes, and how the chosen vehicles 
for its propagation were educational associations, printed media and in some cases, 
the participation in electoral contests. The rise of this new kind of politics was 
undoubtedly related to the progress of French imperial penetration. The socio­
economic transformation of the Maghreb by colonial capitalism threw up a new 
constellation of class forces which formed the basis of the bourgeois reformism. 
Furthermore, the deepening of French administrative power and cultural influence 
over the Maghreb heavily conditioned the shape of political protest in the region. Both 
these factors formed part of dialectics of colonialism alluded to above, whereby the 
colonial process creates its own antithesis. Yet for all the internal logic responsible 
for the evolution of liberal constitutionalism in North Africa, there was also a crucial 
international dynamic which has to be brought into account.
The most significant of the international dimensions was the ideological and 
organisational contact between Tunisian movements and the outside world, and indeed 
with their Maghrebi counterparts. It is, of course, impossible to trace the exact 
meanderings of these international contacts from their origin through to their 
subsequent development. Some links were personal, others institutional; many were 
one-off but later proved to be of great importance, while others were long-standing 
yet insignificant. Furthermore, the influences from abroad were often meshed together 
in such a way as to complicate the identification of their exact provenance. For the
39 Byron Cannon, "Rural Social Justice Rhetoric and the Young Tunisian Movement, 1907-1912", 
Revue d' Histoire Maghrebine (No. 59/60, October 1990).
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sake of clarity, however, I shall focus on the two main geographical sources of this 
foreign influence: Turkey and Europe.
The impact of the Young Turk revolution of 1908 on the reformist politics of 
the Regency was perhaps the most pervasive. Although the term ‘Young Tunisians’ 
was an invention of the colonial regime and the French press, it was never disowned 
by the membership of the associations which came under this rubric. In fact, being for 
the most part of Turkish descent, the Young Tunisian leaders cherished the idea of 
being associated with the political developments taking place in Istanbul. This 
affiliation to the Ottoman Empire was part of what Ali Merad, taking Algeria as a 
case in point, has referred to as ‘Turcophile’ sentiment which sought to counter the 
trauma of imperialist conquest through the glorification of an Ottoman past:
For the generation that witnessed the conquest, the establishment of French 
power [in North Africa] did not abolish its old allegiances, starting with the 
moral allegiance to the sultan of Istanbul recognised as the Emperor of all 
Muslims.40
It would be a mistake, however, to reduce the Tunisian admiration of the Young 
Turks to an expression of Pan-Islamism or Pan-Ottomanism. There was, as we shall 
explore below, a trend within the Young Tunisian movement which emphasised this 
aspect of Maghrebi-Turkish relations. Yet the central element to the ideological 
parallelism between Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) and the bourgeois 
constitutionalists of the Maghreb lay in their common programme for a comprehensive 
reform of their respective regimes. This was not initially the product of some pan- 
Islamic agency, but rather the self-conscious participation in a wider international
40 A. Merad, "La turcophile dans le debat national en Algerie au debut du siecle (1911-1918)" 
Revue d' Histoire Maghrebine (No. 31-32, 1983), p. 338. A similar relationship is examined in Kenneh 
J. Perkins, "'The masses Look Ardently to Istanbul': Tunisia, Islam and the Ottoman Empire 1837- 
1931" in J. Ruedy (ed.) Islamism and Secularism in North Africa ( London: Macmillan, 1994).
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movement against despotism. As the Young Tunisian, Abdeljalil Zaouche wrote in Le 
Tunisien in the wake of the Young Turk revolution:
Nous ne pouvons que feliciter le Jeunes-Turcs de ce magnifique resultat. Et, 
nous l’avouons sans difficulte, nous suivons avec sympathie un mouvement qui 
demontre clairement que les musulmans ne sont pas comme on se plait a les 
representer dans certaines milieux europeens des fanatiques ayant au coeur la 
haine de tout ce qui est etranger a leur foi, des ennemis irreductibles de tout 
progres dans l’ordre economique.41
Admittedly, the actual organisational contacts between the CUP and the Young 
Tunisians only flourished after 1912, when the latter movement was proscribed and 
some of its top leaders were exiled to Istanbul. The Unionist regime took advantage 
of this circumstance to enlist a section of the Young Tunisians in their war efforts 
during World War I. At the beginning of 1913 a Benevolent Islamic Society was 
established in Istanbul under the auspices of the CUP, with the covert intention not 
only of furthering the Pan-Islamic cause but also, according to Jacob Landau, "[t]o 
undertake political and military operations in countries where the Ottoman army could 
not openly intervene, such as Tunisia. "42 This policy was buttressed with the founding 
in May 1916 of the Revue du Maghreb, a monthly publication with the subtitle 
Tribune des revendications des indigenes (Platform for the Defense of Native 
Demands). Mohammed Bach Hamba, brother of the notable Young Tunisian Ali Bach 
Hamba, edited the journal from Geneva with Turkish support, thus maintaining a 
degree of constitutionalist activity in exile.
While the example of the Young Turk revolution remained the closest to the
41 Le Tunisien, 29 September 1908, cited in B. Tlili, Crises et mutations Vol. 1, p. 291.
42 J.M. Landau, The Politics of Pan-Islam: Ideology and Organisation (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1990), p.92.
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Young Tunisian aspirations, it was the principles advanced by the French Revolution 
a century earlier which lay at the heart of the Young Tunisian programme. Like most 
other bourgeois constitutionalist movements across the world, the Young Tunisians 
adopted the language of rights, progress, reform and maxims such as ‘careers open 
to all’ or ‘constitutional accountability’ in order to reinforce their liberal credentials. 
As we saw above, the Young Tunisian leaders were unembarassed about their 
Francophone upbringing and their admiration for Enlightenment science and 
philosophy; their political project, after all, involved realising the promises of the 
French revolution in Tunisia. The editorial of Le Tunisien's opening issue had stated 
this quite unequivocally:
Nous avons la ferme conviction qu'en poursuivant la defense des interets 
legitimes de nos compatriotes, nous servons la politique d*association 
preconnisee par le Gouvernement de la Republique. Conscients des bienfaits 
resultant, pour les indigenes de ce pays, de la protection d'une nation dont 
nous connaissons les traditions de liberte et de justice, nous apporterons notre 
concours loyal a la France pour 1'aider dans sa mission civilisatrice.43
Given this unabashed ‘assimilationism’, what kind of solidarity did the Young 
Tunisians receive from French liberals? Khaled Guezmir has documented some of the 
cooperation offered by French liberals at a personal level. The editorial secretary of 
Le Tunisien, for example, was the Alsacian Kelin Koberty, while the newspaper itself 
was printed at a press owned by Louis Nicolas, a self-proclaimed ‘socialist dreamer’ 
and close friend of Ali Bach Hamba.44 Similarly, a number of liberal deputies at the 
French Assembly and a host of French artists and intellectuals afforded the Young 
Tunisians moral and material backing. By and large however, this support came from
43 Quoted by Sammut, V  imperialisme capitaliste frangais, p. 24
44 Khaled Guezmir, Les Jeunes Tunisiens (Tunis: Editions Alif, 1986).
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the fringes of French politics.45 The Young Tunisians had made a conscious effort to 
present their ideas before the French public - both in the Regency and in France. A 
year after the first issue of Le Tunisien had appeared, a delegation of prominent 
Young Tunisians made their ideas heard at a North African Congress held in Paris 
during October 1908. Likewise, the Young Tunisians had welcomed the opportunity 
of participating in the Protectorate's annual parliament -the Consultative Council- even 
though it was the Regency which appointed the sixteen indigene representatives. Yet 
none of these accommodating gestures was reciprocated with any kind of solidarity 
from the French public. The bulk of French parties either ignored or vilified the 
Young Tunisians as elitist arrivistes with little interest in the welfare of their 
compatriots.
The aftermath of World War I saw some changes in this respect. A group of 
surviving Young Tunisians led by Abdelaziz Thaalbi reassembled to from a loosely- 
knit Parti Tunisien in early 1919. Encouraged by President Wilson's Fourteen Points 
and their defence of the right to self-determination, members of the group attended 
the Versailles Conference under Algerian-Tunisian delegation and addressed a letter 
to Wilson demanding the restitution of their countries’ "lost freedom".46 Wilson 
allegedly responded by suggesting that Tunisia's independence was a question 
pertaining to French domestic politics. It was this failure to secure endorsement from 
the nascent institutions of post-war international society, which led Thaalbi and his 
associates to turn toward the metropole for support. During the summer of 1919 
Thaalbi established contact with representatives of left-wing associations, including 
a number of socialists, through the mediation of a Paris-based Tunisian student, 
Ahmed Sakka. On some accounts, it was Sakka who actually penned Thaalbi's
45 Bechir Tlili studies the case of the group forged around the journal La Tunisie Liberal in 
great detail. See Tlili, Crises et mutations Vol. 2, pp. 149-214.
46 D. Goldstein, Liberation ou annexion: Aux chemins croises de I'histoire tunisienne (1912-1922) 
(Tunis: Maison Tunisienne de 1'Edition 1978), p. 204
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seminal pamphlet La Tunisie Marty re, later to become the programme of the first 
Tunisian nationalist party the Liberal Constitutionalist or Destour Party.47
There is little doubt that the evolution of the Tunisian nationalist movement 
owed much to the persistence of an idea of Tunisian independence anchored in a sense 
of historical and cultural identity. This patriotic sentiment was consistently upheld, 
developed and reformulated by an outstanding group of Tunisian intellectuals and 
politicians, often operating under extremely adverse conditions. Yet the history of this 
evolution cannot be understood without reference to the myriad international factors 
outlined above. Whether originating from Europe, Turkey or the Mashreq, the 
Tunisian bourgeois constitutionalist movements drew much of their ideological and 
organisational support from outside the Regency. They consciously developed a 
reformist socio-economic and political programme moulded on the western capitalist 
experience of their time, and deliberately cultivated international contacts that might 
further their cause in this respect. Much of this adaptability responded to the tactical 
requirements of specific political battles, yet for the most part it would be fair to 
argue that the constitutionalist reformists had genuinely internalised the norms of 
political engagement deployed by their counterparts in other parts of the world. In so 
far as this process was achieved through a systematic interaction with the broader 
social and political forces of the international system (foremost among them, French 
imperialism), it represented, I maintain, an instance of the expansion of international 
civil society.
4.4 The Working-Class Movements
From a Marxist perspective, civil society represents a social sphere defined by 
capitalist relations of production ie. by the capitalist market. Although incomplete,
47 A. Mahjoubi, Les origines du mouvement national en Tunisie 1904-1934 (Tunis: Publications de 
l'Universite de Tunis, 1982), p. 206.
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this definition of civil society is very much relevant to the Maghreb as it points to the 
role of capitalist expansion in the emergence of modern forms of political agency. 
Hence, in some respects, the expansion of international civil society can be equated 
with the international expansion of capitalism.
This is especially clear when examining the origins and later development of 
the working-class organisations of the Maghreb.48 Initially, this process was spurred 
on by European immigrant workers exporting the politics of class antagonism to the 
Maghreb. Many of the Spanish, Maltese, Italian or French workers arriving at North 
African shores had been politically active in their own countries and some were in fact 
political exiles.49 In Tunisia, working-class politics made its first appearance during 
the early years of this century as metropolitan parties and trade unions set up branches 
and divulged their publications in the Protectorate. According to Bechir Tlili, a 
section of the SFIO was already established in Tunisia in 1907, with an official 
newspaper, La Bataille (later to be replaced by Le Socialiste) coming out during a 
brief period between 1911 and 1912. As a prolongation of this activity, the French 
CGT set up a Departmental Union in Tunis in 1911, although trade unions were not 
formally legalised until 1932.50 With the split in the SFIO at the 1920 Tours Congress, 
a small section of the Communist International was set up at the port of La Goulette 
in December 1921, together with its accompanying party organ, L'Avenir Social and
48 The main sources for the following overvbw are: A. Ay ache, Le Mouvement Syndical au Maroc, 
Vol.1:1919-1942 (Paris : L'Harmattan, 1982); F. Benseddik, Syndicalisme et Politique au Maroc (Paris: 
L'Harmattan, 1990); R. Gallissot (ed.), Mouvement Ouvrier, Communisme et Nationalisme dans le 
Monde Arabe (Paris: Editions Ouvrieres, 1978); R. Gallissot, Maghreb-Algerie, Classe et Nation (2 
Vols.) (Paris: Arcantere Editions, 1987); B. Lopez Garcia, Politico y Movimientos Sociales en el 
Magreb (Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicasl991) and B. Tlili, Nationalismes, socialisme 
et syndicalisme dans le Maghreb (Tunis: Universite de Tunis, 1984).
49 This included, for example, some 20,500 workers expelled from Paris after the 1848revolution. 
See M. Bennoune, The Making o f Contemporary Algeria, 1830-1987 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1988), p. 67.
50 B. Tlili, Crises et mutations dans le monde islamo-mediterraneen contemporain (1907-1912) 
(Tunis: Universite de Tunis, 1978), p. 289.
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the associated trade union, the Confederation Generate du Travail Unitaire (CGTU). 
An independent socialist association grouped around the journal Le Liberal and a 
variety of libertarian and syndicalist organisations completed the picture of working- 
class movements in Tunisia during the first two decades of the century.
As was mentioned at the outset of this chapter, the membership of these first 
Tunisian working-class organisations was overwhelmingly European. Although never 
overtly imperialist, the mainstream of French socialism defended the possibility of a 
‘humane colonialism’ which might extend the benefits of developed capitalism to 
‘backward’ peoples.51 The political consequence of this was the alienation from 
socialist organisations of those very masses which were meant to be its major 
protagonists. As we saw above, there were some isolated instances of internationalist 
cooperation between Maghrebi constitutionalists and metropolitan socialists. 
Furthermore, there is some evidence of North Africans going against the grain and 
joining their European comrades in marches, strikes and demonstrations during the 
beginning of this century. For the most part, however, these were exceptions to the 
general rule held by most socialists whereby the indigenous proletariat was still 
politically immature and therefore had to subordinate itself to the dictates of the 
‘European vanguard’.
The social and political changes brought about by World War I, coupled with 
the rise of the Third International changed all this. Approximately 73,000 Tunisians 
were enlisted by the French army while a further 30,000 Tunisian workers were 
recruited to sustain the French war effort.52 The effects of this North African presence
51 For an examination of this policy and the historical context in which it developed see Manuela 
Semidei, "Les socialistes franfais et le probleme colonial entre les deux guerres (1919-1939)" Revue 
Franqais de Science Politique, (December, 1969) pp. 1115-1153; Madelaine Reberioux and Georges 
Haupt, "Le socialisme et la question coloniale avant 1914: L'attitude de L'Internationale", Le 
Mouvement Social (N° 45, 1963), pp.7-34 and H. Carrere D'Encausse and S. Schram, Le Marxisme 
et L'Asie 1953-1964 (Paris: Armand Colin, 1965).
52 M. Bennoune, The Making of Contemporary Algeria, 1830-1987 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986) p. 77 and L. Anderson, The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and 
Lybia, 1830-1980 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1986) p. 144.
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in France were two-fold. On the one hand, returning immigrants brought with them 
a direct experience of metropolitan politics, and in particular, socialist activism. On 
the other hand, those North Africans who remained in France extended the boundaries 
of Maghrebi civil society by inaugurating the politics of exile and immigration on 
French soil. Both these developments had enormous consequences for the shape of 
Maghrebi politics during the following decades.
Even more momentous, however, was the impact of the Bolshevik revolution. 
As in the rest of the world, this was partly expressed in the close attention paid by all 
sectors of North African society to the demonstration effect of the events in Russia. 
A more specific influence of the Bolshevik take-over, however, was the endorsement 
of national liberation movements by the newly-created Communist International. 
While the Second International had only payed lip-service to the anti-colonial politics, 
its successor made the anti-imperialist struggle a fundamental component of its 
project. Clearly, part of this shift in the locus of revolutionary activity from the heart 
of world capitalism to its periphery corresponded to a tactical move by the new Soviet 
state geared toward safeguarding its own strategic interests. Nonetheless, the 
establishment of the Third International also reflected an ideological commitment to 
revolutionary internationalism. As the eighth of Lenin's twenty-one conditions for 
membership of the new organisation put it:
Every party which wishes to join the Communist International is obliged to 
expose the tricks and dodges of "its" imperialists in the colonies, to support 
every colonial liberation movement not merely in words but in deeds . . . 53
The French Communist Party (PCF) initially took heed of these requirements. In July
53 Cited in D. Joly, The French Communist Party and the Algerian Whr(London: Macmillan Press,
1991), p.25.
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1921 it helped to create the Intercolonial Union (Union Intercoloniale), a movement 
made up of communists from the French colonies and which eventually incorporated 
a number of North African activists. A month later, a Committee for Colonial Studies 
{Comite d'Etudes Coloniales) was set up by Charles-Andre Julien, in an attempt to 
report and discuss colonial issues in the communist press.54 The outbreak of the Rif 
revolt during 1924-25 prompted a sustained campaign within France in favour of Abd 
el-Krim, which Georges Oved has thoroughly documented.55 A year later, the first 
North African immigrant party and precursor to the Algerian nationalist movement, 
the Etoile Nord-Africaine, was established under the auspices of the PCF.
Although the communist movement's direct impact was limited during these 
early years of its development, it nonetheless shifted the terms of the political debate 
in Tunisia. Those elements of Tunisian civil society which had already experienced 
a certain degree of evolution now had to revise their programmes in order to 
incorporate the ‘social question’ introduced by the working-class movements. As 
Mustapha Kraiem has pointed out:
Avec 1'emergence de T ideologic socialiste, la constitution du premier parti 
communiste et de la premiere central syndicate tunisienne, nous assistons a 
1'apparition d'une nouvelle culture assumee et prise en charge par une nouvelle 
elite qui refusait non seulement 1'ideal et les valeurs defendus par les 
zeitouniens mais aussi le liberalisme militante des jeunes Tunisiens.56
Thus, the dual influence of nationalism and socialism gradually made inroads into
54 See M'barka Hamed, "L’Union Intercoloniale: premiere ecole d'activite politique des immigres 
coloniaux en France au lendemain de la premiere grande guerre" in Les Cahiers de Tunisie (Nos. 162- 
163, 4eme semestre 1992/ le 1993).
55 G. Oved, La Gauche Frangaise face au Nationalisme Marocain (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1983) 
V ol.l.
56 Mustapha Kraiem, "Les elites du mouvement nationaliste tunisien” p. 22.
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North African politics. The immediate effects of this development were felt first in 
1924 when the political divorce between European and indigenous working-class 
movements was consummated with the formation of an independent Confederation 
generate des travailleurs tunisiens (CGTT). Although the founders of the new union 
recognised an ideological and organisational debt to their European comrades, they 
felt it necessary to support the struggle for national independence alongside the 
Destour. As the leader of the CGTT Mohammed Ali explained
The creation of a Tunisian federation does not mean that we shall not be united 
with the workers of the world as a whole. France, Germany and England have 
national federations. Why are we denied similar rights?57
There is no need to delve here into the complex events which lead to the formation 
of the CGTT.58 Suffice is to say that it was essentially the result of three factors: the 
continuing poverty and discrimination experienced by the budding Tunisian working- 
class; the insensitivity toward this fact displayed by the European CGT; and the 
growing attractiveness of the nationalist option represented by the Destour. While a 
considerable number of Tunisian workers had joined the CGT and the CGTU over the 
years, they rarely reached positions of authority within the organisation. More 
importantly, debates within the unions were generally directed to the political situation 
in France or Italy, and were always carried in French or Italian. In short, the Arab
57 Quoted in Ahmad, E. and Schaar, S. (1978), "M'hammed Ali and the Tunisian Labour 
Movement", Race and Class (Vol. XIX, No. 3, 1978), pp. 253-276, p. 266.
58 For a detailed account of the formation of the CGTT see Ibid. Three protagonists of the 
movement wrote their own account of the CGTT: A. Ben Miled, M'hamed Ali: la naissance du 
mouvement ouvrier tunisien (Tunis: Ed. Salambat, 1984); T. Haddad (trans. A. Halioui) Les 
travailleurs tunisiens et Vemergence du mouvement syndicate (Tunis: Maison Arabe duLivre 1985) 
and J-P. Finidori, Batailles Ouvrieres: La CGT Tunisienne et les imperialistes des annees 20 (Paris: 
Textes-Documents de Robert Louzon 1981).
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participation in these predominantly European institutions was always a subservient 
one. The explosiveness of this situation finally came to the fore when the CGT refused 
to support a wild-cat strike called by the predominantly Tunisian dockers at the ports 
of Tunis and Bizerte. With the strike-action spreading across other industrial towns, 
the leaders of the movement, M'hammed Ali and Tahar Haddad decided to go ahead 
with the constitution of a new, nationalist-oriented trade union in November 1924.
There is some dispute as to the political pedigree of the CGTT. At least seven 
of the union's thirteen-member executive committee belonged to the Destour party, 
while three had been identified by the police as communists.59 This nationalist 
inclination was reflected both in the social composition of the new union and in the 
programmatic statements made by its leaders. Like the Destour, the CGTT derived 
most of its support from the north of the country while its affiliated unions centred 
around the traditionally nationalist sectors: dockers, medina artisans, tram and railway 
workers. Similarly, while it emphasised its working-class character, the CGTT 
understood class struggle in national terms as a conflict between French capital and 
Tunisian labour. Yet paradoxically, the CGTT jealously guarded its syndicalist 
autonomy and refused to align itself with any political party. The Destour reciprocated 
this position by joining the SFIO in denouncing the CGTT as a communist ffont- 
organisation. This accusation might initially seem at odds with the fact that the 
communists already had a union in the shape of the CGTU. But the communist 
support for the CGTT, their presence in the union's executive committee, and most 
importantly, Mohammed Ali’s stated preference for the Moscow-aligned Red 
International Labour Union, all suggest that, "[1]’influence communiste n’est pas, 
comme s’est tant plu a le repeter, absolument 6trangere a Taction de Mohamed Ali."60
59 M. Kraiem Nationalisme et Syndicalisme en Tunisie 1918-1929 (Tunis: Union Generate 
Tunisienne du Travail 1976), p. 568.
60 Juliette Bessis "Le mouvement ouvrier tunisien: des ses origines a 1' independance" Le Mouvement 
Social (No. 89, octobre-d£cembre, 1974), pp. 85-108, p. 91
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The socialist hostility toward the CGTT was accentuated as the newly-formed 
union managed to effect considerable impact on the Tunisian working world. Figures 
provided by Abdelbaki Hermassi suggest that the CGTT had attracted 6,000 members 
by the time of its first Congress in January 1925.61 After touring the mining towns of 
the south and supporting another wild-cat strike at the cement factory in Hamman-Lif, 
just outside Tunis, Mohammed Ali's union became too dangerous for both the colonial 
authorities and the established European labour movement. In February 1925, the 
French authorities arrested Mohammed Ali and several other of his associates, 
subsequently banishing them form Tunisia and thus effectively dismantling the CGTT. 
Despite this brief existence, the CGTT had demonstrated the relevance of addressing 
both the needs of the working-class and the aspirations of a colonised population. As 
Julliette Bessis has observed:
Cette experience syndicale purement tunisienne a comme consequence positive 
le fait d ’avoir fait decouvrir aussi bien au Destour qu’aux organisations 
politiques et syndicates de la gauche l'existance indeniable d ’une classe 
ouvriere autoctone, consciente, combative, et capable de s’ organiser.62
4.5 Conclusions: The Genesis of Civil Society in Tunisia
The preceding sections will hopefully have provided an historical and sociological 
overview of the first modern social movements which constituted the beginnings of 
Tunisian civil society. More importantly, it should also have illuminated the 
international factors which conditioned the emergence of these movements. By way 
of summary, and in order to ascertain the validity of the concept ‘international civil
61 A. Hermassi, Mouvement ouvrier et societe coloniale: La Tunisie entre les deux guerres (These 
de 3e cycle, Sorbonne,19). Cited in Claude Liauzu, "La Presse OuvriereEuropeene en Tunisie (1881- 
1939)", L'Annuaire d'Afrique du Nord, 1971, pp. 933-955, p. 942.
62 Ibid., p. 91.
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society’ in this context, the last section of this chapter seeks to identify the main 
features associated to the initial expansion of international civil society to Tunisia.
In the first place, the expansion of international civil society must be seen as 
a process facilitated by the expansion of capitalist imperialism. As was stated earlier, 
these two phenomena are virtually synonymous in the Marxist understanding of civil 
society: the international extension of capitalist social relations is the expansion of 
international civil society. The approach adopted here starts from this basic premise 
but then proceeds further by suggesting that out of the class relations introduced by 
capitalism there arise social and political movements which are bearers of different 
class interests. The expansion of international civil society also involves the extension 
of modern forms of political activism which mediate such interests. Thus the 
emergence of the early protagonists of Tunisian civil society -Young Tunisians, 
Destour, the different trade unions and parties, even the salafiyya trend- must be 
explained with reference to the introduction of capitalist social relations into the 
Protectorate. This point is worth underlining as it runs contrary to much of 
historiography -nationalist or otherwise- which assumes the paramountcy of ethnic, 
national and even religious factors when explaining the rise of modern Tunisian social 
movements. While not underestimating the relevance of these categories, this chapter 
has sought to lay greater stress on the fact that Tunisian civil society developed 
simultaneously with the expansion of capitalist imperialism in the Protectorate, and 
consequently, that the movements which operated within this sphere were part of a 
broader pattern involving the internationalisation of class conflict.
Secondly, the early decades of this century witnessed the expansion of 
international civil society to Tunisia in so far as the movements discussed above were 
broadly comparable to their counterparts in other parts of the world. In other words, 
the salafiyya trend, the constitutionalist reformists and most obviously, the Tunisian 
working-class organisations were all part of an expanding international civil society 
because their modes of organisation and their political language corresponded to those
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employed by similar movements across the globe. This is a sociological point about 
the international transmission of modern forms of social and political agency. 
Although the organisations constitutive of Tunisian civil society clearly drew on the 
rich historical and cultural legacy of their country's past, the shape taken by these 
movements was heavily conditioned by the various international factors explored 
above. The Young Tunisians, for example took up the language of Khayr al-Din's 
constitutionalist reformism and translated it into the political idiom and political 
practice of modern liberalism. Similarly, the CGTT emerged directly out of the 
experience of European trade unionism in Tunisia, but emphasised the nationalist 
character of its aspirations. In short, the expansion of international civil society refers 
to that historical and sociological process whereby forms of social and political protest 
within a particular country become adjusted to the predominant international norm. 
My contention is that the genesis of Tunisian civil society, as examined in this 
chapter, provides a clear example of how even those social movements with a 
considerable indigenous tradition adopt the mechanisms of modern political agency 
prevailing internationally in order to pursue local political objectives.
While imperialism has been identified as the main conduit for the expansion 
of international civil society, other international factors such a specific world- 
historical conjunctures or the simple international transmission of ideas via individuals 
or printed media, also contributed to the consolidation of international norms of 
political agency. Perhaps the most important phenomenon in this context however was 
the actual organisational collaboration among different national social movements, 
otherwise known as internationalism. As was suggested in the preceding chapter, the 
very attempt at realising the ideological aspirations of internationalism necessarily 
involves extending modern forms of political agency. Hence, the rise of working-class 
movements in Tunisia was not only the outcome of capitalist imperialist penetration, 
nor the exclusive result of a demonstration effect encouraged by the triumph of the 
Bolshevik revolution; it was also a consequence of an attempt at applying the
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internationalist principles of such movements to a concrete political practice. It is 
unlikely, for instance, that trade unionism would have established itself so strongly 
among Tunisian workers at a relatively early stage in the development of Tunisian 
capitalism without the concerted effort of the existing unions at extending international 
and inter-ethnic class solidarities.
The combination of these three historical phenomena -the extension of 
capitalist imperialism, the rise of modern social movements and the operation of 
internationalism- marked the beginning of the expansion of international civil society 
to Tunisia. Clearly, all of these features were inter-related and should be taken as 
distinct expressions of an overarching historical process. The following chapters will 
consider how this process evolved during the inter-war and post-war periods. It will 
hopefully become apparent in what follows that, for all its characterisation as the 
unfolding of an historical process, talk of the expansion of international civil society 
need not assume the identification a specific telos. Nor should it be surmised that such 
an expansion, and more specifically, the practice of internationalism which 
encouraged it, necessarily created an international community of interests among the 
different social movements in question. On the contrary, as this chapter has aimed to 
indicate, the expansion of international civil society should be seen sociologically as 
a process whereby specific forms of social and political practice were reproduced 
internationally. On occasion, this facilitated the concerted social and political 
mobilisation of groups across ethnic, religious or national boundaries, as in the case 
of pan-Islamic solidarity of the Mashreqi salafis toward their Maghrebi brethren, or 
the French communist support of Tunisian trade unionism. Above all, however, the 
expansion of international civil society to Tunisia implied the extension of modern 
forms of social and political agency which often articulated political programmes with 
radically opposed contents. It is in this sense that international civil society comes 
closer to the analytical conception of social interaction as forming part of a 
Gemeinschaft, rather than as a normatively-charged Gesellschaft.
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Tunisian Civil Society and the Inter-War Crisis 1934-1938
With the banning of the CGTT in 1925 and the ensuing repression of nationalist 
opinion via the so-called ‘Scelerat Decrees’ of January 19261, Tunisian social 
movements were forced out of the Protectorate's political life during the late 20s. The 
onset of economic crisis in Tunisia, and the rise to power in France of the left-wing 
Popular Front during the Spring of 1936, however, reinvigorated the forces of civil 
society in Tunisia. This chapter, like the previous one, seeks to identify the 
international context of this resurgence of social and political activism in the 
Protectorate. As we shall see below, the dynamics of Tunisian civil society during the 
1930s need to be explained with reference to the historical developments of the two 
preceding decades. Yet at the same time, this intense period of Tunisian history is 
self-contained in so far as it formed an integral part of the European inter-war crisis. 
During these years, Tunisia was fully engulfed by the European civil war as the 
economic depression, the rise of fascism, the sharpening class antagonism, and of 
course, the outbreak of World War II itself, played themselves out within the 
Protectorate. The rise of Arab nationalism in the Mashreq and the critical political 
developments elsewhere in the Maghreb completed the incorporation of Tunisian civil 
society into the wider international conjuncture. In many respects, therefore, the 
1930s represent a privileged historical moment for scrutinising the workings of 
international civil society. It was during these years that the international factors 
affecting the development of Tunisian civil society revealed themselves in the starkest 
light.
The chapter opens with an consideration of the origins of the two pillars of
1 These decrees, promulgated on 29 January 1926 sought to proscribe any form of criticism towad the 
colonial authorities, hence their French soubriquet meaning ‘villainous’ or ‘wicked’. Article No.4 of 
the first decree stated quite unequivocally, “[q]uiconque par des ecrits, des actes ou des paroles publics 
ou non, provoque a la haine, au mepris ou a la deconsideration du souverain, du gouvemement et de 
1’ administration du Protectorat, des fonctionneres frangais ou tunisiens investises des memesattribution 
ou cherche a faire naitre dans la population un mecontement susceptible de troubler l’ordre public, sea 
puni d’un emprisonnement de deux mois atrois ans.” Cited in A. MahjoubiLes origines du mouvemeit 
national en Tunisie 1904-1934 (Tunis: Publications de 1’ Universite de Tunis, 1982), p. 415.
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Tunisian nationalism during this period: the Neo-Destour and the second CGTT. As 
in the first chapter, the international dimensions of these two organisations will be 
explored without thereby doing injustice to the domestic sources of their development. 
A second section examines the full impact of the international conjuncture on Tunisia 
through the prism of the Popular Front experience. Although short-lived, the period 
of Popular Front governments lays bare like no other the mechanisms of international 
civil society outlined at the beginning of this thesis. In the closing paragraphs of this 
chapter, I shall point to some of the emerging contradictions in the expansion of 
international civil society, thus preparing the ground for their full treatment in 
chapter six which deals with the post-war struggle for independence.
5.1 Mass Nationalism in Tunisia
In March 1934 a group of young Destourians led by Habib Bourguiba met in the 
Sahelian town of Ksar Hellal to celebrate the opening congress of a splinter party, 
henceforth known as the Neo-Destour. Bourguiba and his followers had been 
preparing the split for almost two years, voicing their criticism of the existing 
leadership in their newspaper L 'Action Tunisienne and using the latter as a rallying 
point for those Destourian activists seeking "[t]o regain contact with the masses. "2 The 
reasons behind this schism have remained the subject of considerable historical and 
political controversy.3 In essence, however, the break can be seen as the combined 
result of a generational clash between Tunisian nationalists, a regional confrontation 
between the beldi aristocracy of Tunis and the petite-bourgeoisie of the Sahel, and a
2 Cited in L. Anderson, The State and Social Transformation in Tunisia and Libya, 1830-1980 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 168.
3 See for example Hamza Hassine-Raouf, "Elements pour une reflexion sur l'histoire du mouvemen 
national pendant l'entre-deux-guerres: la scission du destour de mars 1934" in Actes du 3e Seminaire 
sur l'histoire du Mouvement National: Les mouvementspolitiques et sociaux dans la Tunisiedes annees 
1930 (Tunis: Ministere de l'Education, de l'Enseignement et de la Recherche Scientifique, 1985), pp. 
51-78.
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tactical difference regarding the way nationalist should approach the French 
authorities. Above all, however, the break-away party was a reaction to the growing 
role of the masses in Tunisian politics, exacerbated by the onset of the economic crisis 
in the early 1930s. Its stated aim was the construction of an independent Tunisian state 
through the mobilisation against colonialism of all sectors of Tunisian society. In this 
respect, the Neo-Destour effected a double break with the old Destour by replacing 
the latter's elitism with a staunch populism and by consequently embracing European 
modes of political action more forcefully than its predecessors.
At the heart of the Destourian split was the sociological transformation of the 
nationalist party's cadres. The 1920s had witnessed the rise to the party's leadership 
of the first generation of Tunisians brought up under the Protectorate. Many of those 
who were later to become leading figures of the Neo-Destour had received a 
Francophone education in Tunisia and later in the universities of the metropole itself. 
Although this kind of career was not exclusive to the new generation -some of the 
leading lights of the Young Tunisian movement and the old Destour, for example, had 
been educated at the the bilingual Sadiki College- the exposure to and absorption of 
European political ideas and practices was much more intense among those Tunisians 
who came of age during the inter-war period.4 As Mustapha Kraiem has highlighted:
Les neo-destouriens...etaient formes dans l'universite ffangaise. Ils avaient 
rejoints le metropole au milieu des annees vingt voire meme pendant les 
premieres annees de la decennie ulterieure. Ils fiirent spectateurs de la 
fermentation intellectuelle et politique de la periode de l'apres-guerre a un 
moment done ou la capitale fran^aise etait la capitale cosmopolite mondiale de 
l'art et de la culture. Mieux encore, les neo-destouriens y trouvaient des
4 Noureddine Sraieb has offered the following break-down in the educational background of the 
Destour's and the Neo-Destour's leadership: while the former contained 7 members educated at a 
modem college and 15 at the Zaytouna Mosque-university, the latter's central committee was composed 
of only one person educated at the Zaytouna and 38 at modem colleges. See N. Sraieb, Le College 
Sadiki de Tunis, 1875-1956: enseignement et nationalisme, (Tunis: Alif-Editions de la 
Mediteranee,1995), p.297.
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nationalistes algeriens et marocains et ce lancerent dans une activite militante 
pan-maghrebine. Ils acquirent par consequent une initiation plus approfondie 
a la civilisation occidentale et prenaient une reele distance vis-a-vis du 
patrimonie arabo-musulman a 1'egard duquel ils affichaient une altitude 
reelment critique.5
The contradictions of imperialism therefore found expression in the personal 
experiences of an elite who saw their educational and social opportunities enhanced 
at a time when the majority of their compatriots faced the continued oppression and 
exploitation of colonial rule. The resulting world-view of this new nationalist elite 
combined a heightened appreciation for European models of political activism with 
the conviction that their adoption by Tunisian nationalism was the key to attaining 
independence.
In addition to the divergent educational backgrounds was an important regional 
and therefore, class contrast between the membership and leadership of the two 
organisations. The Destour's affiliation was almost exclusively from the North of the 
country and the capital's medina (old town). The bulk of this constituency was made 
up of artisans and small landowners. The Destour's national leadership, as we have 
seen, included numerous aristocrats tied to the old mamluk ruling families while the 
local party representatives generally fell either into the artisan or petty land-owning 
class. By the early 1930s, the old party had been making some head-way into the 
eastern region of the Sahel and the south of the Regency. Consequently, the 
artisan/landowner domination was complemented by the entry into the party of 
government employees and liberal professionals.6 Yet these were precisely the sectors 
which were to form the backbone of the Neo-Destour. According to figures provided
5 M. Kraiem, Elites et Pouvoir, p. 25.
6 These calculations are taken from Mustapha Kraiem's piece, "Le Neo-Destour: cadres, militants 
et implantation pendant les annees \izn\e'\Actes du 3e Seminaire sur l'histoire du Mouvement National 
Les mouvementspolitiques et sociaux dans laTunisie des annees 7950(Tunis: Ministere de l'Education, 
de l'Enseignement et de la Recherche Scientifique, 1985)., pp. 17-49, p. 25.
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by Mustapha Kraiem, almost two-thirds of the delegates present at the Ksar Hellal 
Congress originated from the Sahel and the southern districts. This tendency was 
reinforced in the following years as the new party exploited the climate of political 
freedom inaugurated by the Popular Front victory, and launched a powerful country­
wide recruitment campaign under the charismatic leadership of Habib Bourguiba. By 
the end of 1937, the party's president Dr. Materi could claim 480 cells with 
approximately 70,000 members across the country - a number which, though 
somewhat inflated, was probably not far of the mark.7 The vast majority of this 
membership belonged to party cells in the rural areas of the Sahel and the South. This 
was consequently reflected in the predominantly provincial origins the Neo-Destour's 
38-strong Political Bureau, although perhaps not so much in their professional 
background: almost half of the Bureau members were liberal professionals (10 
lawyers, 4 doctors, 3 journalists and a pharmacist) while the other half was made up 
of petty traders and small land-holders.8 In sum, although the contrasts between the 
old and the new Destour can often be exaggerated, the generational, educational and 
sociological differences in the leadership and membership of these two organisations 
represented a real shift in the nature and aspirations of Tunisian nationalism. By 
extending its influence across the whole of the country; by politicising previously 
marginalised sectors of Tunisian society; and perhaps most importantly, by fully 
developing the powerful mechanisms of modern political mobilisation, the Neo- 
Destour established itself as the most significant political force in Tunisia during the 
1930s.
The Neo-Destour's formidable ascent undoubtedly owed a great deal to the 
charismatic personality of Bourguiba and to the various sociological and historical 
factors internal to Tunisian nationalism explored above. Yet it is just as important to 
emphasise the fierce competition between the Neo-Destour and the left-wing parties
7 Ibid., p. 27
8 Ibid., p. 35
180
Chapter Five: Tunisian Civil Society and the Inter-war Crisis 1934-38
and organisations over the political allegiance of the nascent Tunisian working-class. 
Indeed, one commentator has gone as far as suggesting that, "No hay duda que en los 
anos treinta la concurrencia polltica por el control de las masas tunecinas se ejerce 
entre dos fuerzas, desturianos y comunistas".9 Although this claim somewhat 
overstates the influence of what was still a minuscule Tunisian communist movement, 
it rightly underlines the relevance of an expanded political public when explaining the 
nature of the Neo-Destourian project.
As was briefly expounded in the previous chapter, the early stages of capitalist 
expansion in Tunisia had produced a form of colonial capitalism which grafted 
metropolitan modes of surplus extraction onto pre-colonial patterns. This resulted in 
an economy which, although integrated into the wider circuits of the international -and 
more specifically, French- capitalist market, still retained many of the non-capitalist 
features of the pre-colonial mode of production. The inter-war years, however, 
witnessed the virtual extinction of these pre-colonial social relations and their 
replacement by capitalist relations. The extension and mechanisation of the 
agricultural sector coupled with massive investment in mining and transport and 
communication networks led to the transformation of the pre-World War I socio­
economic structures. Urban artisans and rural share-croppers or khammes -the two 
pillars of the pre-colonial economy- now faced the disappearance of their means of 
livelihood as a result of metropolitan competition or eviction from their lands through 
capitalist expropriation. Thus, the pauperised artisans and the mass of landless 
peasants were gradually converted into a new proletariat which sold its labour at 
mines, ports and agricultural estates or more commonly, into an under-proletariat 
which, unable to secure a stable employment was forced to join the ranks of a reserve 
army of labour which swelled the newly-formed bidonvilles or shanty towns around
9 B. Lopez Garcia, Politico y Movimientos Sociales en el Magreb (Madrid: Centro de 
Investigaciones Sociologicas.,1991), p. 60
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Tunis.10
The onset of the world economic crisis after 1929 accelerated these socio­
economic transformations in Tunisia and deepened their negative consequences for the 
working population of the Protectorate. Ali Mahjoubi has identified two stages in the 
unfolding of the crisis in Tunisia.11 The first involved what Mahjoubi terms a 
‘traditional’ crisis of underproduction caused by successive droughts in 1931 and 1932 
and the locust invasion of 1932.12 These resulted in a scarcity of staple crops such as 
wheat and barley, which left much of the population in the south and centre of the 
country on the verge of starvation.13 A second, ‘modern’ underconsumptionist crisis 
hit Tunisia from 1933, this time including a dramatic fall in the prices of key 
agricultural and mineral exports such as olive oil, wine, wool, phosphates, iron, and 
zinc. The combined effects of these two crises were felt at every level of Tunisian 
society. Clearly, the indigenous working population -artisans, sharecroppers and small 
landowners- experienced the worst of the crisis as expropriation, debt, unemployment 
and bankruptcy drastically reduced their standard of living, when not actually 
removing their means of livelihood. Yet the European population -working class and 
colons alike- also suffered the consequences of a production slump which left them 
without jobs or out of business. In short, though variegated in its immediate effects, 
the economic crisis in Tunisia displayed the same social symptoms as elsewhere in the 
world: rise in unemployment, pauperisation of large parts of the population and a 
general reduction in the standard of living. It was these conditions, added to the
10 See Mahfoud Bennoune, "Primary Capital Accumulation in Colonial Tunisia" Dialectical 
Anthropology (Vol. 14, No. 2, July 1979), pp. 83-100 and M. Kraiem.Le mouvement social en Tunisie 
dans les annees treinte, (Tunis: Cahiers du CERES, 1984), chapter 1. For the emergence of 
bidonvilles, see Claude Liauzu's interesting study, "Un aspect de la crise en Tunisie: la naissance des 
bidonvilles" Revue Frangais d'Histoire d ’Outre Mer (Vol. LXIII, 2e et 4e trimestre 1976).
11 Mahjoubi Les origines du mouvement national, Part IV, Chapter 3.
12 Ibid., pp.540-544
13 Andre Nouschi, "La crise de 1930 en Tunisie et les dehits du Neo-Destour" Revue de VOccident 
musulman et Mediterranee, (Vol. 8, No. 2, 1970), pp. 113-123.
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emergence of a rural and urban proletariat and underproletariat which fostered the 
eruption of mass politics in Tunisia during the 1930s.
As we saw above, the Neo-Destour self-consciously sought to represent these 
new social forces, arguing from the outset that the old Destour's shortcomings 
stemmed from its excessive elitism. In order to translate this rhetoric into practice, 
Bourguiba and his associates had set out on a two-month tour of the Regency 
immediately after the Ksar Hellal congress. Far from being an exclusively populist 
attempt at "regaining contact with the masses", the tour served as the cornerstone of 
what eventually emerged as a clientelist edifice in which, " The party became a social 
club, an employment agency, a school, a sanctuary".14 Like other mass nationalist 
parties across the world, the Neo-Destour sought to enlist all sectors of Tunisian 
society to its cause either by using the existing social and religious networks (sufi 
brotherhoods, mosques, Koranic schools) or through the establishment of affiliated 
associations with a cultural, recreational or social function (scouts, sports clubs, 
farmer's unions). As one of the party notables, Salah Ben Youssef insisted in an 
internal report of 1936, "II faut que toutes les associations soient progressivement 
integrees dans notre parti et que celui-ci deviennne peu a peu le parti de toute la 
nation et 1'emanation de ses desirs et de ses volontes".15 Perhaps the most interesting 
example of the Neo-Destour's attempt at securing a hegemony over Tunisian civil 
society lies in its fraught relationship with the second CGTT, founded in 1937.
The Neo-Destour's understanding of the proper relationship between trade 
unionism and mass nationalism was candidly layed out by Bourguiba himself in an 
often-cited article appearing in the March 1933 issue of L'Action Tunisienne. 
Emphasising the ultimate goal of national liberation, and the need for transcending 
class divisions among Tunisians within a unitary political movement, Bourguiba
14 Anderson, The State and Social Transformation, p. 173
15 Cited in Mustapha Kraiem, "La Seconde CGTT et le Neo-Destour", Actes du 2e Seminaire sur 
l'histoire du Mouvement National: Sources et Methodes de I'Histoire du Mouvement national (1920- 
1954) (Tunis: Ministere de l'Education, de l'Enseignement et de la Recherche Scientifique, 1985), pp. 
243-271, pp. 246.
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celebrated the creation of independent Tunisian trade unions, so long as they served 
to further independence:
Ces syndicats ... ne traduisent nullement le phenomene de la lutte des classes, 
la volonte des proletaries de se grouper en vue de se defendre contre la force 
ou la rapacite d'un patronat inexistant [...] II traduit plutot le besoin des 
ouvriers et des patrons d'une meme profession de s'unir pour se defendre 
victorieusement contre un etat des choses qui les frappe uniformement...Le 
Tunisien est un homme pratique qui sait tirer des instruments d'emancipation 
qu'on met a sa disposition et les adapter aux besoins reels qui existent en lui 
[...] Comme quoi il est prouve que chez un peuple que ne veut pas mourir, 
toute institution etrangere qu'on y transplante d'une fa?on plus ou moins 
artificielle est vite assimilee par ce peuple qui les adapte a ses besoins 
particuliers . . .16
Bourguiba was referring here to over a dozen unions which had been founded by 
workers of the traditional artisanal sectors -tanners, hat-makers, tailors, perfumers and 
so forth- since the liberalisation of trade union laws in 1932. It was from these 
virtually self-employed quarters that the second CGTT was to draw most of its 
support. As Ahmed Ben Hamida has suggested,
[e]n regroupant des syndicats d'artisans reunissant "patrons" et travailleurs et 
d'autres gens ayant des activites dans des secteurs ou la separation capital-travail n'est 
pas tres marquee ... la nouvelle centrale tunisienne est appelee a formuler ses 
revendications qui ne sont pas toujours specifiquement ouvrieres17
16 Quoted in Claude Liauzu, "Les syndicats en Tunisie en temps du cinquentenaire" Annuaire de 
I'Afrique du Nord (1973), pp. 1031-1044, p. 1042.
17 Ahmed Ben Hamida, "Syndicats, Affinites et solidarites de type traditionel dans la Tunisie 
colonial (1924-1956)" mJoumees d'etudes (Nice: Universite de Nice, Centre de la Mediteranee 
Modeme et Contemporaine, 1980), pp. 91-114, p. 97.
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The first news of a second CGTT being formed came in July 1936. At a meeting 
called to celebrate the Popular Front victory in France, a historic member of the first 
CGTT, Ali Karoui, took the podium and announced the future creation of an 
independent Tunisian union. It was not until the following year however, that the 
second CGTT elected an Confederal Bureau and formally constituted itself as an 
organisation comprising some thirteen unions. According to Mustapha Kraiem, the 
composition of the executive bureau reflected two divergent, though not incompatible 
tendencies within the new CGTT. One aimed at recovering the militant legacy of the 
first CGTT and included some of Mohammed Ali's old comrades (Tahar Ben Salem, 
Mohammed El Ghannoushi and Karoui himself); the other was represented by Neo- 
Destourians seeking to establish a nationalist trade union closely allied to Bourguiba's 
party.18 Though both tendencies recognised the importance of linking worker's 
struggles to the nationalist project, only the second of these saw the Neo-Destour as 
the natural outlet for such a combination. The tension between these two 
understandings of what nationalist trade unionism should entail eventually came to a 
head over the Neo-Destour's unilateral decision to call a general strike on 20 
November 1937 in solidarity with Moroccan and Algerian nationalists. The secretary- 
general of the CGTT, Belgacem Guennaoui refused to second the strike, arguing in 
an interview that his union was,"[u]n organisme purement corporatif. Elle n'est 
affiliee a aucun parti politique de quelque nuance il soit."19 The strike's resounding 
failure marked the Neo-Destour's own incapacity in developing a surrogate trade 
unionism. Yet this experience did not undermine Bourguiba's intent. The tension 
between party and trade union resulting from the events of November 20 occassioned 
the call for an extraordinary congress of the CGTT in January 1938. In truly fascist 
style, a group of Bourguibist members of the CGTT interrupted the proceedings of 
the congress and, after forcing their opponents to leave the hall where the meeting was
18 Kraiem, Le Mouvement Social, chapter 7.
19 Cited in Ibid., p. 231
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being held, unanimously elected a pro-Destourian Confederal Bureau. This violent 
schism within the CGTT signalled the end of the organisation as its affiliated unions 
either dissolved or re-joined the mainstream CGT by the Spring of 1938.
The CGTT's short-lived experience reflects the challenges faced by any social 
movement operating in Tunisia during the inter-war years. Put crudely, this challenge 
was characterised by the tension between two contending political forces: socialism 
and nationalism. The CGTT's ultimate failure lay in its incapacity to take either of 
these two sides: while clearly a nationalist organisation in its membership and 
ideology, the CGTT refused to carry the political weight of the Neo-Destour's more 
radical position in favour of independence. Similarly, though professing to defend the 
interests of Tunisian workers, it never managed to contest the CGT's overwhelming 
hegemony over this sector of Tunisian society. Yet to focus exclusively on the internal 
sources of the CGTT's weakness would do an injustice to its history. The tensions 
between nationalism and socialism in the Protectorate during this period have to be 
placed within a wider international context. The following section attempts to do just 
that by analysing the international dimensions to nationalist and socialist politics in 
Tunisia during the Popular Front years.
5.2 Tunisia, the Popular Front and Internationalism
Internationalism has been a central component of socialist politics since the inception 
of working-class movements in Europe during the nineteenth century. From the 
outset, the ideologues and activists of these organisations sought to emphasise the 
international character of proletarian struggles and the universal validity of the 
principles they stood for. As Marx and Engels noted in the Communist Manifesto, the 
bourgeoisie was creating a world in its own image: "It compels all nations, on pain 
of extinction, to adopt the bourgeois mode of production" so that "All fixed, fast- 
frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions are 
swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that
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is solid melts into air, all that is holy is profaned"20. If the ‘bourgeois mode of 
production’ was to be successfully contested, it was incumbent upon the revolutionary 
proletariat to organise internationally and act politically on a world scale. By 1864 this 
project began to take shape in the form of the International Working Men’s 
Association (IWMA) or the First International, to be followed in later decades by the 
Second and Third Internationals.
Until the late nineteenth century, French working-class parties saw 
internationalism primarily as a mechanism of practical cooperation with their 
European counterparts in matters relating to strike-breaking, immigration or the 
homogenisation of working conditions across the continent. It was not until European 
imperialism reached its apogee at the turn of the century that socialist internationalism 
became inextricably associated with the ‘colonial question’. Colonialism was first 
officially addressed by the French Left in 1895, when a resolution denouncing the 
"filibusteries coloniales" as "une des pires formes de exploitation capitaliste" was 
passed at the Romilly congress of the Parti ouvrier frangais.21 The subsequent history 
of the French left's attitude toward colonialism, however, was to prove much more 
ambiguous. Following Manuela Semidei's useful classification, we can identify three 
broad positions on the French left regarding imperialism.22 In line with the resolution 
adopted at Romilly, a considerable number of French socialists remained staunchly 
anti-colonialist, condemning European imperialism both in France and at the various 
congresses of the Second International. This ‘orthodox’ line was gradually contested 
by a growing number of socialists who, imbued with notions of racial supremacy, 
celebrated imperialism as a means of extending the more ‘advanced’ European 
civilisation among ‘primitive peoples’ outside the old continent. A third tendency
20 K. Marx and F. Engels, The Communist Manifesto (New York: Norton, 1988), p.59.
21 As cited in Madeleine Reberioux and Georges Haupt, "Le socialisme et la question coloniale 
avant 1914: L'attitude de L'Internationale", Le Mouvement Social (N° 45, 1963), pp.7-37, p. 9.
22 Manuela Semidei, Les socialistes frangais et le probleme colonial entre les deux guerres (1919- 
1939)", Revue Frangais de Science Politique (Vol. 18, No. 6, decembre 1968, pp. 1115-1153.
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within the French left offered qualified support to colonialist policies. They argued 
that a ‘humane’ or ‘socialist’ colonialism which respected the political rights of the 
indigenous population and raised their living standard to European levels could benefit 
both the metropolitan and the colonial working class. Sensitive to their growing 
electoral success and aware of the increasing role of nationalism in French domestic 
politics, many socialists saw this option as the most realistic and politically 
responsible approach to the colonial question.
In this continuing battle among the three tendencies, the bulk of the French 
left took a ‘centre’ position between the anti-colonial left and the imperialist right. 
The disaster of the First World War and the triumph of the Bolshevik revolution, 
however, were to bring a realignment within the French Left regarding the question 
of imperialism. As we saw in the previous chapter, the creation of the Parti 
Communiste Frangais (PCF) in 1920 strengthened the anti-colonial wing of the French 
Left as the party vigorously defended the Third International's call for the national 
liberation of colonial peoples. The electoral victory of the Rassemblement Populaire 
in May 1936, a coalition of left-wing forces including the PCF, put the ideological 
commitment of socialist internationalism to the test. For the first time in over a 
decade, the French Left faced the possibility of applying its internationalist principles 
from a position of power. It is this sense that internationalism becomes relevant to an 
understanding of how international civil society operated in Tunisia during the thirties. 
As we have seen, the French Left was strongly divided on the question of 
internationalism, and its role within a left-wing colonial policy. The three tendencies 
within the SFIO had remained fundamentally intact through the twenties and into the 
Popular Front.
By all accounts, the triumph of the Popular Front was received with 
excitement and optimism in Tunisia. In a letter to secretary-general of the SFIO in 
Tunisia, Habib Bourguiba emphasised how the Neo-Destour, ”[e]st convaincu que les 
partis de gauche qui forment le Front Populaire [...] auront a coeur d'aborder le 
probleme fondamental des rapports ffanco-tunisiens, de reviser les methodes et les
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doctrines a la lumiere des faits, en une mot de concilier les aspirations du peuple 
tunisien ave les interets de la puissance protectrice."23 There was precious little in 
the Rassemblement Populaire's election manifesto to warrant Bourguiba's high 
expectations. The only reference to the colonies in the Front's programme appeared 
in the section on ‘Defence de la Liberte’ in which it pledged "[la] constitution d'une 
commission d'enquete parlamentaire sur la situation politique, economique et morale 
des territoires frangais d'outre-mer ,.." .24 Beyond this, the Popular Front had not 
formally committed itself to further policy changes vis-a-vis the colonies. Yet the rise 
to power of the Popular Front was accompanied by a explosion of social and po litical 
activity in Tunisia, and by the introduction of several important political and socio­
economic reforms in the Protectorate. Furthermore, for a number of reasons to be 
explored below, Tunisia became fully engulfed in the struggle between fascism and 
democracy which had inspired the Popular Front in the first place. Clearly, the 
preceding years had prepared Tunisia for a full-blown encounter with both the 
principles and practices which characterise internationalism. In order to elucidate this 
point I shall examine three aspects of internationalism in Tunisia during this period: 
the reforms introduced by the Blum government; the increase in social and political 
militancy; and the rapport between colonial and metropolitan social movements.
The most immediate result of the new Popular Front government was the 
replacement of the reactionary Resident-General Peyrouton by Armand Guillon, a 
civil servant known for his liberal political attitudes and his previous involvement with 
the labour movement. Peyrouton had been responsible for the ferocious repression of 
the nationalist and working-class movements over the past three years. Since the 
tumultuous events of September 1934, trade-union branches had been closed,
23 Cited in Mohamed Lofti Chaibi, "La politique coloniale du Front Populaire en Tunisie (1936-38) 
Essai d'evaluation", pp. 549-567, p. 549 inActes du 3e Seminaire sur l'histoire du Mouvement 
National: Les mouvementspolitiques et sociaux dans la Tunisie des annees 1930 (Tunis: Ministere de 
1'Education, de l'Enseignement et de la Recherche Scientifique, 1985).
24 Cited in Andre Nouschi, "La politique coloniale du Front Populaire", Cahiers de Tunisie (Vol. 
27, Nos. 109-110, 3e et 4e trimestre, pp. 143-159), p. 144.
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nationalist and left-wing leaders expelled from the country, and virtually all critical 
press suspended. As Mustapha Kraiem has suggested, "La periode de Peyrouton fut 
ressentie par les nationalistes et les forces de gauche comme une dictadure."25
The arrival of Guillon to the Residency in April 1936 was therefore seen by 
the Left and nationalist forces as heralding the end of a difficult period of clandestine 
activity. The first few months of the new administration fulfilled this expectation as 
Guillon proceeded not only to lift Peyrouton's repressive regime but also to extend 
to Tunisia the progressive reforms introduced by the Popular Front government under 
the Matignon Agreement of 7 June 1936.26 The reinstallment of civic rights of 
association and expression led to a resumption of political activity inaugurated with 
a mass demonstration on 14 July 1936 in favour of the Popular Front. A week later, 
on 20 July 1936, a meeting between trade union and employers representatives led to 
the signing of the ‘Kasbah Accords’ whereby three decrees of the Matignon legislation 
referring to wage increases, payed holidays and eight-hour working-days became 
applicable in Tunisia.27
The second significant initiative launched by the new Blum government was 
the creation in July 1936 of a parliamentary committee to study the situation in the 
colonies, as promised in the Popular Front's electoral manifesto. A sub-committee on 
North Africa, comprising thirteen members from different professional backgrounds 
(bureaucrats, politicians and ‘specialists’) set out to evaluate the state of the colonies 
under thirteen headings, including demography, education, employment, 
administration and nutrition. The activities of the committee, spread approximately 
over a twelve-month period, displayed a rather adhoc methodology -including reports,
25 M. Kraiem, Le mouvement social en Tunisie dans les amees treinte (Tunis: Cahiers du CERES, 
1984), p. 105.
26 For a full description of the Matignon Agreement and the Popular Front in France see G. 
Lefranc, Le Front Populaire (1934-1938), (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1965).
27 See Juliette Bessis, La Mediterrannee Fasciste: LTtalie Mussolinienne et la Tunisie (Paris: 
L’Harmattan), p. 93 and B. Lopez Garcia, Politica y Movimientos Sociales en el Magreb(Madrid: 
Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas, 1991) p. 61.
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interviews and questionnaires- and produced very disparate recommendations.28 
Perhaps the most fruitful outcome of the exercise was the establishment of direct links 
between the respective authorities in Paris and the various Tunisian social movements. 
Admittedly, most of the correspondence received by the sub-committee on North 
Africa, for example, came from the Popular Front organisations in Tunisia. The Neo- 
Destour preferred to nurture its good relations with the Secretary of State Pierre 
Vienot, and viewed the committee's activities with some scepticism.
Thus, be it through a lack of commitment toward substantive alterations in the 
political and economic structure of the Protectorate or simply due to the limited 
duration of its mandate, the Popular Front government failed to advance major 
changes in the French colonial policy toward Tunisia. What it had managed, however, 
was to transform the nature of relations between the French administration and the 
various political movements representing the colonial population. It had opened 
channels of communication and influence previously closed to most of these 
organisations. As Charles-Andre Julien, one of the notable participants of this process 
has testified, "Le Quai d'Orsay et l'Hotel de Matignon cesserent d'etre des hautes 
lieux ou seuls les officiels, les colons et les hommes d'affaires pouvaient acceder. 
Pour la premiere fois, Algeriens, Marocians et Tunisiens eurent la possibility de 
s'expliquer librement devant les pouvoirs publiques."29
While the official colonial policy of the Popular Front had a limited impact on 
the social and economic structure of the Protectorate, the effect at the grass-roots level 
was much more pronounced. The importance of the political liberalisation introduced 
by Resident General Guillon in the resurfacing of social and political militancy has 
already been highlighted above. But this process was also the direct result of the
28 For details on the Commission see Charles-Robert Ageron, " La Commission d'enquefc du Front 
Populaire sur les colonies et la question Tunisienne" pp. 103-125 mActes du 3e Seminaire sur l'histoire 
du Mouvement National: Les mouvements politiques et sociaux dans la Tunisie des annees 793C(Tiinis: 
Ministere de 1'Education, de l'Enseignement et de la Recherche Scientifique, 1985).
29 Ch.-A Julien, L ’Afrique du Nord en marche: natbnalismes musulmans et souverainite frangaise 
(Paris: Rene Julliard 1952), p. 84.
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tightening links between the colonial and metropolitan working-class politics brought 
about by the triumph of the Left in France.
The first indication of this was the creation in the summer of 1936 of a 
Tunisian Rassemblement Populaire in the image of the French coalition.30 This 
reinforced the identification of the Tunisian Left with the events unfolding in France, 
and led to a sharp rise in the membership of the Tunisian working-class organisations. 
The most notable example of this trend occurred within the labour movement. Before 
1936, the membership of the Departmental Union of the CGT had a never exceeded 
a few thousand; by the end of 1936 the number climbed to 40,000 members, three- 
quarters of which were Tunisian.31 All the major Tunisian industrial centres and some 
of the agricultural areas saw the multiplication of local trade-unions which in some 
cases extended into previously non-unionised sectors such as domestic and cleaning 
workers or the bakers.32 Among the political parties, both the SFIO and the 
communists gained adherents as a result of their association with the French Popular 
Front, although neither reached beyond 1,000 members. The SFIO had not 
substantially altered its policy of "humane colonialism" and continued neglecting the 
political demands of the Tunisian nationalists. The communists for their part had 
moved away from their previous anti-colonialism toward an emphasis on the primacy 
of unity between the metropole and the colonies in the struggle against fascism. 
Despite these seemingly unpopular stances, both parties managed to increase their 
influence among the indigenous proletariat and on some occasions, represent the 
latter's interests before the Regency and the French administration in Paris. The wave 
of strikes which swept over the Protectorate in the aftermath of the Popular Front 
victory was a testimony to this. Similarly, the interventions of Tunisian socialists at
30 See Bessis, La Mediterrannee Fasciste, p. 181.
31 Ibid., p. 94 and Lopez Garcia, Politico y Moviminetos Sociales, p. 63.
32 For further details on the trade-unions during this period see Kraiem, Le Mouvement Social en 
Tunisie, Chapter 2 and R. Liauzu, Salariat et mouvement ouvrier en Tunisie: crises et mutations (1931 
1939) (Paris: Editions du CNRS, 1978) .
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the SFIO Congress of Huygens in 1936 and their contributions to the Popular 
Front's commission on the colonies demonstrated a genuine, albeit paternalistic 
concern for the socio-economic situation of all Tunisians, whether European or 
Arab.33
What the socialists and communists had failed to register, however, was that 
by the mid-thirties it was the political demand for national independence which 
preoccupied most Tunisians. The Tunisian Left had managed to mobilise the urban 
working-class after 1936 but had less success with the agricultural workers, the 
commercial petty bourgeoisie and the large under-proletariat. As we saw above, it was 
left to Bourguiba's Neo-Destour to build politically on these sectors. Thus, at the peak 
of their influence, the Tunisian Left faced the strongest opposition it had yet 
encountered in the form of a mass nationalist movement demanding independence. 
How was the Left's internationalism affected by this challenge?
The three basic positions on the ‘colonial question’ within the SFIO had 
remained fundamentally intact through the twenties and into the Popular Front. The 
revolutionary left sector of the SFIO continued its campaign for the liberation of 
colonial peoples but found little echo in government where Leon Blum, representing 
the majority centrist position, advocated a policy of "assimilation” which would bring 
the colonies closer to France and allow them to benefit from the social reforms and 
political rights of the metropole. The communists on the other hand, had maintained 
a relatively consistent anti-colonialism until 1935, supporting the cause of national 
liberation. Yet by the time of the Popular Front, both parties had come to share a 
common perspective on the Maghrebi nationalist movements, switching their attention 
from the colonial question to the question of ‘national security’. The reasons for this 
sudden convergence in the Left's position on the colonies is to be found in the very 
same international conjuncture which gave rise to the Popular Front, namely the rise 
of fascism in Europe. Thus, internationalism becomes relevant to Tunisia under the
33 See Nouschi,”La politique coloniale du Front Populaire” and Lopez Garcia, Politica y 
moviminetos sociales.
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Popular Front not only as a principle of political action, but also as a concept which 
describes the Regency's insertion into the European civil war of the 1930s.
The relations between the Tunisian nationalists and the European working- 
class organisations had always been fraught. Socialists in the Regency generally 
looked upon the Destourians with disdain, branding them everything from elitist to 
fanatical. In France, however, the nationalist leadership often received moral and 
material support from working-class circles. We have seen how in Tunisia, 
nationalists and socialists suffered equally under the Peyrouton regime and how 
Bourguiba initially welcomed the Popular Front with a ‘favourable disposition’ 
(prejuge favorable). The communists in particular were interested in a rapprochement 
with the Neo-Destour which might radicalise the nationalists into a revolutionary 
position. In the wake of the outburst of popular discontent in 1934, Andre Ferrat, 
head of the PCF's colonial section wrote from Tunisia :
L'organisation communiste fit des tentatives pour que le mot d'ordre de la 
greve generate soit lance a la fois par le parti socialiste, le neo-Destour, le 
parti communiste et les organisations syndicales. Mais les dirigeants socialistes 
estimerent que cette initiative devait revenir au neo-Destour.34
International events, however, were to overtake the PCF's support for colonial 
insurrection. The rise of fascism in Europe and in east Asia was menacing to both 
communist activity across the old continent, and to the security of the Soviet Union. 
In August 1935, the seventh congress of the Comintern adopted a strategy which it 
thought could dispel both these threats: communist parties were to establish a ‘united 
front’ with anti-fascist forces in their own country. The PCF had no difficulty in 
embracing the strategy as it had in many ways originated within the French anti-fascist 
experience. Moreover, three months earlier the French and Soviet Foreign Ministers,
34 Cited in J. Moneta, La politique du Parti communiste frangais dans la question coloniale, 1920- 
1963 (Paris: Maspero, 1971), p. 97.
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Laval and Litvinov had signed a long-awaited Franco-Soviet Treaty of Mutual 
Assistance, thus committing the PCF to the defence of the existing French regime, 
Empire included.35 By the time the Rassemblement Populaire was formally constituted 
in January 1936, therefore, the PCF had clearly endorsed the idea of putting the 
interests of the Franco-Soviet Alliance above any ideological commitment to colonial 
emancipation. Despite paying lip-service to the idea of "the liberation of colonial 
peoples", Thorez emphasised in December 1937 that, "Since the decisive issue of the 
moment is the victory over the struggle against fascism, the interests of the colonial 
peoples lies in their union with the people of France, and not in an attitude which 
might further the aims of fascism and place in Algeria, Tunisia or Morocco ... under 
Hitler or Mussolini's yoke."36
Much historical and political debate surrounds Thorez's injunction. In terms 
the fascist threat in North Africa, there is little doubt that Thorez was right. The 
outbreak of the Spanish civil war in July 1936 had put Spain's protectorate over 
northern Morocco in the hands of Franco. Further East, Mussolini used the Italian 
presence in Libya and the large Italian population in Tunisia to extend fascist 
influence in North Africa. Juliette Bessis has examined in great detail the methods 
employed by Mussolini in the pursuit of this objective, including the Italian consulate 
and school in Tunis, the local Italian newspapers and most important, the Arabic 
language service of Radio Bari.37 As regards the pro-fascist tendency within the 
nationalist movement, however, Thorez's concerns were misplaced; the available 
evidence suggests that few Tunisians succumbed to the Italian propaganda. Bourguiba 
himself had stated as much in response to an insinuation by the communist Duran-
35 For an excellent account of this process and the international context of its genesis see J. Hislam, 
The Soviet Union and the Struggle for Collective Security in Europe, J935-39(London and Basingstoke: 
Macmillan Press, 1984), chapters 3 and 4; and J. Nere, The Foreign Policy o f France from 1914 to 
1945 (London and Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975), chapter 11.
36 Cited in M. Rodinson, Marxism and the Muslim World (London: Macmillan, 1978), p. 98.
37 Bessis La Mediterrannee Fasciste.
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Angliviel that Mussolini might curry the nationalist favour: "Personne au Neo-Destour 
ni dans notre pays ne veut que la France cede la place a Mussolini."38
Nonetheless, it is clear that his initial enthusiasm for the Popular Front began 
to wane as the Blum government fell without delivering the substantial reforms 
Bourguiba had anticipated. At the second congress of the Neo-Destour held on 7 
November 1937, Bourguiba declared that “le Gouvernement actuel a montre par ses 
actes precis sa volonte de reverter Congress tenir .... a la vielle erreur de la politique 
de force et de contrainte condamme par son predecesseur [...] le parti s'estime fonde 
a retirer des maintenant au Gouvernement actuel le prejuge favorable . . .”39 A week 
later, a general strike was called by the Neo-Destour in solidarity with the nationalist 
movements elsewhere in the Maghreb suffering from the a fresh wave of repressive 
measures. In the face of worsening relations with the French authorities -both in Tunis 
and Paris- and fuelled by the need to distance himself from the old Destour after the 
arrival in Tunisia of it charismatic leader Abdelaziz Thaalbi, the Neo-Destour 
radicalised its opposition toward the French Administration. The first months of 193 8 
witnessed a number of serious riots and bloody demonstrations which culminated in 
the massacre of April 9, where 112 demonstrators were killed and 62 injured. The 
following day, Bourguiba and 29 other Destourian leaders were arrested and the 
nationalist organisations outlawed. The Popular Front era in Tunisia had thus come 
a full circle.
5.3 Conclusions: The Contradictions of International Civil Society
By the end of the 1930s, Tunisia had been fully immersed into the process we have 
described as the expansion of international civil society. The basic features of civil 
society, as defined in chapter two, had taken root within the Protectorate and
38 Ibid., p. 217
39 H. Bourguiba, La Tunisie et la France (Paris: Rene Julliard, 1964), p. 154.
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Tunisia's vibrant political life had been integrated into the broader international 
political developments. This process of expansion certainly had a homogenising effect 
in so far as the social movements which operated within Tunisian civil society adopted 
the internationally prevalent modes of political agency, epitomised by the mass-based 
party with a universalist message. Yet, the expansion of international civil society also 
opened up new possibilities for political resistance -most notably in the shape of anti­
colonial nationalism- thus multiplying the different expressions of political protest 
internationally, and further accentuating the competition between contending political 
projects. As was noted in chapter two, one way of presenting this contradiction is to 
posit the expansion of international civil society as a process which extended 
particularly modern, and therefore relatively homogenous forms of political agency 
but which simultaneously facilitated a pluralism in the content of these forms. The 
classic expression of this contradiction in our context are the nationalist parties and 
organisations which adopted the prevalent forms of political agency but imbued them 
with a content which contributed to the diversification of political projects available 
internationally. One of the central contradictions of the expansion of international civil 
society, therefore, is that it can be the source of both a greater international 
cooperation among social movements and a sharpening of political antagonism 
between different movements at the domestic level.
The inter-war period in Tunisia exemplified this tension most dramatically as 
the Protectorate's civil society became increasingly polarised between socialist and 
nationalist political options. At one level, the movements comprising these two 
tendencies shared common organisational and ideological traits. As we have seen, one 
of the Neo-Destour's central aspirations was to build a political machine in the image 
of the large European parties. Similarly, in terms of both leadership and ideology the 
Neo-Destour relied very heavily on Enlightenment notions of citizenship, progress, 
secularism and reform. In these two respects, Tunisian nationalism was an expression 
of international civil society in that it employed modes of political engagement similar 
to other modern social and political movements across the world. As a party almost
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exclusively concerned with the achievement of Tunisian independence, the Neo- 
Destour was bound to privilege the ‘national question’ over the ‘social question’. The 
socialist organisations, on the other hand inverted this priority, consistently refusing 
to give the political claims for Tunisian national self-determination the relevance they 
deserved. Indeed, the principle of working-class internationalism was invoked by the 
socialists only as a means of sidelining nationalist demands with the argument that 
class solidarities had to come before national or ethnic affiliations. Yet, as the 
Tunisian communists had argued since 1921, national liberation and socialist 
emancipation could also be conceived as two sides of a single internationalist coin. By 
1937, however, the PCF and its affiliated party in Tunisia gave way to the argument 
that the imminent war against fascism meant putting off the struggle for national 
liberation in the colonies. The Tunisian Left's approving silence during the Regency's 
crackdown of the Neo-Destour in 1938 reflected the final divorce within Tunisian civil 
society between a European-dominated working-class movement hostile to the idea o f 
Tunisian self-determination and a mass-based nationalist movement with an 
irreversible commitment to the attainment of Tunisian independence.
The following chapter will deal with the eventual resolution of this tension 
between assimilation and independence during the post-war years. What is important 
at this stage is to recognise that the expansion of international civil society to Tunisia 
did not necessarily involve the harmonisation of political interests among its different 
representatives in the Regency. On the contrary, the extension of modern forms of 
political agency to the Maghreb fostered the emergence of mass nationalist parties 
which eventually proved to be the strongest rivals of European-based social 
movements. At the same time, however, as the Popular Front experience in Tunisia 
indicates, the fact that Tunisian social movements shared common political structures, 
practices and procedures allowed for some experiments in internationalist 
collaboration. The contradictions of international civil society lie precisely in this 
differentiation between its form and content. Whether or not the expansion of 
international civil society necessarily increased the chances for political collaboration
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between the different Tunisian social movements and their international counterparts 
therefore remained an open question.
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Chapter Six
Civil Society and International Society in the Struggle for Tunisian
Independence 1943-1956
A year or so after the evacuation of Dunkirk in May 1940, a tract of the Tunisian 
Neo-Destour party proclaimed: "Le Protectorat est mort, noye dans les eaux de 
Dunkerque.nI The benefit of hindsight allows us to view this statement as a premature 
celebration of an event which only formally took place a decade and a half later, in 
1956. Yet the expectations attached to the Neo-Destour's claim were not entirely 
misplaced. The social, economic, and especially the political upheavals which 
accompanied World War II had a momentous impact on the anti-colonial struggles, 
and were therefore rightly identified by the nationalist forces in Tunisia and elsewhere 
as a turning-point in the history of the French Empire.
In terms of colonial politics, the most obvious consequence of World War II 
was the weakening of the metropole's administrative and ideological hold over the 
colonial peoples. Although, as previous chapters have sought to indicate, anti-colonial 
parties had gained considerable support during the inter-war period, the reality of a 
defeated and divided France reinforced the case for the severing of links with the 
metropole by dealing a death-blow to the imperialist imagery of civilisational 
superiority. Arguments of the sort used in the past to justify France's protectorate 
over Tunisia -that the country was not yet 'ready' for independence, that it was too 
'weak' to bear the burden of sovereign statehood- now rang hollow in the face of the 
French war-time experience. Moreover, as in World War I, the colonial peoples' 
contribution to the allied war-effort not only had far-reaching sociological effects for 
those veterans returning to their homeland or those remaining in the metropole, but 
more importantly, emphasised the European powers' political debt to their colonies. 
In the case of France, this latter point was clearly recognised by de Gaulle during the
1 Juliette Bessis, "L’opposition France-Etats Unis au Maghreb de la deuxieme guerre mondiale jusqu’ 
a l’independance des Protectorats 1941-1956" in Ch.-R. Ageron, Les chemins de la decolonisation de 
Vempire colonial frangais (Paris: Editions du CNRS, 1986), pp. 341-375.
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Brazzaville Conference of 1944 and, as we shall see below, heavily informed the new 
concept of Union Frangaise which guided Paris' relations with the colonies under the 
Fourth Republic.
As if the profound war-time transformations within France were not enough 
to alter the social and political situation of the colonies, key international 
developments during this period further encouraged the dismemberment of the old 
imperial order. The first glimpse of this newly emerging international order came 
with the signing of the Atlantic Charter by Roosevelt and Churchill in 1941. As is 
well known, this document set out the basic parameters of the world an Allied victory 
would seek to create, including a commitment to "[r]espect the right of all peoples to 
choose the form of government under which they will live." With the end of World 
War II, these aspirations were partly formalised in a chapter of the United Nations 
(UN) Charter which promised to uphold the colonial peoples' right to self- 
determination.
The renewed force of the anti-colonial agenda at the international level should 
further be understood in the context of the nascent US hegemony and the first crises 
of the Cold War. Like other imperial powers, most notably Britain, France found it 
hard to adjust to this new international conjuncture. The post-war popularity of the 
French Communist Party (PCF), the ambiguous role played by the USA in Vietnam 
before, during and after the battle of Dien Bien Phu (1954), and most relevant to our 
discussion, the strategic importance of the western Mediterranean, all contributed to 
the development of a political and military rivalry between Washington and Paris in 
the post-1945 period.
These were the broad outlines of the world which Tunisian social movements 
encountered at the end of the war. The aim of this chapter is to explore the way in 
which these movements came to terms with the post-war order. Specifically, it seeks 
to examine the relationship between the agents of Tunisian civil society and the 
institutions of post-war international society. The full implications of using the loaded
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term 'international society' in this context were explored in chapter three of the thesis. 
For the purposes of the present discussion, the focus of our attention shall be on the 
way in which Tunisian social movements, and in particular, the Neo-Destour, 
exploited the juridical, political and logistical resources provided by international 
society.
The discussion will proceed by looking at three broad areas of interaction 
between civil society and international society in the struggle for Tunisian 
independence. The first concentrates upon the legal and institutional sources of this 
struggle. While the Neo-Destour, the UGTT and even the Communist Party had in 
the past turned to different international institutions in order to further their political 
cause, the post-war period witnessed a heightened awareness of the role of 
organisations like the UN or the Arab League could play in guaranteeing Tunisian 
independence. Thus, for the first time, the institutions of international society adopted 
a central function within Tunisian politics. A second important intersection between 
civil society and international society concerns the political contacts and collaboration 
between the Tunisian social and political movements, and their foreign counterparts. 
This is a dimension of international civil society which we have already examined in 
some detail under the rubric of 'internationalism'. The post-war years saw the same 
political tension arising between the French Left and the Tunisian nationalists as had 
characterised their inter-war relations. There were, nonetheless, some significant 
instances of internationalist cooperation which need to be taken into account. The 
main source of internationalist support after 1945 now came from neighbouring Arab 
countries and from newly independent Third World states. The Egyptian Free 
Officers coup in 1952 and the launch of the Algerian revolutionary war in November 
1954 gave Bourguiba's cause a considerable moral and tactical boost. This was 
further complemented by the campaigns in favour of Tunisian independence launched 
the newly-found League of Arab States and the lobbying work of the Affo-Asian 
group at the UN. Last, as in previous chapters, the Tunisian struggle for
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independence has to be understood within the context of the existing world-historical 
conjuncture - in this case, the Cold War. Tunisian social movements were fully aware 
of the strategic value of their political allegiance to either one of the contending blocs. 
The revolutionary wars in Vietnam and Algeria had highlighted the possibilities of 
using the bipolar confrontation as a means of advancing the case for national 
liberation. Thus, in some important respects, the Tunisian route to national 
independence has to be explained with reference to Cold War politics.
Taken in combination, these three domains of domestic and international 
interaction tell the story of how Tunisian civil society exploited the tools made 
available by international society in order to achieve national independence. On this 
reading, the struggle for independence was not an exclusively domestic or Franco- 
Tunisian experience, but rather, was played out at the interface between the domestic 
and the international. At the same time, however, this very interaction with 
international society buttressed the nationalist aspiration to sovereign statehood. 
Paradoxically, the international and transnational activities of the Tunisian nationalists 
reinforced the process of Tunisian state-building. It is in this sense that the expansion 
of international civil society becomes a dual process where the social movements that 
operate within civil society simultaneously undermine and reinforce the territorial and 
political boundaries of the international system. Tunisian post-war history is in many 
respects an exemplary instance of how this tension between the particular struggle for 
national self-determination and the broader international forces such as wars, 
revolutions or global capitalism, combined to produce a novel international 
conjuncture in the region. The following sections aim to illustrate how this process 
played itself out historically.
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6.1 The International Setting of the Tunisian Struggle for Independence
That Tunisian independence, like that of other colonies, was the product of a novel 
set of international circumstances ushered in by the end of World War II is an 
uncontroversial enough statement to border on the banal. As most histories of de­
colonisation point out, the post-war demise of European Empires was a direct 
consequence of US ascendancy during and after World War II, and the attendant 
spread of liberal internationalist institutions such as the UN.2 Whether or not these 
new players in the international scene were motivated by lofty sentiments of anti­
colonialism, or rather sought de-colonisation for reasons of political and economic 
expediency, are both moot points. What is important for our purposes, is simply to 
identify the relevant historical transformations that accompanied World War II, and 
their subsequent impact upon political developments in North Africa.
Perhaps the most notable influence of World War II upon the Maghreb was 
the geo-strategic value the region acquired during the course of the war. The German 
defeat of France in June 1940 and the subsequent entry of Italy into the conflict 
brought their respective North African colonies into the Mediterranean war-theatre 
almost overnight. Furthermore, Britain's rejection of Germany's peace overtures in 
July of that year, turned Hitler's attention toward British military outpost in the 
Mediterranean.3 Under the terms of the Franco-German Armistice, the newly-created 
Etat Frangais retained nominal sovereignty over the French Empire, thus making 
North Africa a likely site for a second war ffont in Europe, and a haven for both 
Resistance members working toward the liberation of France and Petainist 'patriots'
2 Representative texts include J. Darwin, Britain and Decolonisation: the Retreat from Empire in the 
Post-war World (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988); R. F. Holland, European Decolonization 1918-1981 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1985); and W. R. Louis, Imperialism at Bay, 1941-45: The United States and the 
Decolonization of the British Empire (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977).
3 For a detailed discussion on Hitler's strategy in the Mediterranean see G. Schreiber, B. Stegemann 
and D. Vogel, Germany and the Second World War, Vol. Ill (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).
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seeking to redress the ignominious defeat of 1940. From the very beginning, 
therefore, the Maghreb became the focus of a political and military contest involving 
four interconnected parties: the Allies, the Axis, the Vichy regime and the Free 
French. Although muted by both an exiled or imprisoned leadership and the war-time 
constraints on political activity, the Maghrebi nationalist movements must be counted 
in as the fifth element in this complex puzzle. As Peter Calvocoressi has suggested
The military campaigns of 1940-43 were superimposed upon a further conflict 
between rulers and ruled, between imperial power and nationalist aspirations. 
The war provided nationalists with new opportunities in an old cause. The 
Americans, whom the war brought into the western end of this increasingly 
crowded scene in 1942, sympathized with the nationalists’ hope of turning the 
evils of war into some good by accelerating the liberation of their homelands 
from foreign domination.4
While Calvocoressi's emphasis on the links between the military and political 
dimensions of the war in North Africa is to be welcomed, his assessment of US anti­
colonialism is somewhat skewed. Franklin D. Roosevelt's avowed anti-colonialism 
certainly lead to a series of seemingly pro-nationalist stances in the Maghreb on the 
part of the US. The most celebrated of these was the dinner Roosevelt gave for the 
Moroccan Sultan Mohammed V at Anfa, in the outskirts of Casablanca, on 22 January 
1943. Nationalist lore has insisted that Roosevelt promised the Sultan eventual 
independence for Morocco at this meeting, but there is only anecdotal evidence to 
support this claim.5 Better documented were the activities of US representatives in the
4 P. Calvocoressi, Total War: the Causes and Courses of the Second World War, Vol. 1 2nd ed. 
(London: Penguin, 1989), p. 372.
5 E. Roosevelt, As He Saw It (New York: Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1945); R. Murphy, Diplomat 
Among Warriors (London: Collins, 1964) pp. 216-217.
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Maghreb during these years.6 Under the aegis of Roosevelt's special envoy to North 
Africa, Robert Murphy, a number of American businessmen were appointed as vice- 
consuls to each of the three French North African colonies. The Tunisian vice-consul, 
Hooker A. Doolittle, developed close contacts among Neo-Destourian circles and 
eventually befriended Habib Bourguiba. This proximity to the nationalist cause earned 
him Murphy's censure and a subsequent transfer from Tunisia. According to Leon 
Borden Blair, "Murphy reported to State that Doolittle 'had become and active 
partisan' of better treatment for the Arab population, even to the point of insisting that 
'the four freedoms and the Atlantic Charter include the Arabs, and it is our duty to 
compel the French to act accordingly."7
Doolittle's fate is unsurprising when one considers the actual reasons for his 
presence and that of other vice-consuls in North Africa, namely to safe-guard the 
recent agreements between Murphy and the French High Commissioner for North 
Africa, General Maxime Weygand, permitting Vichy France to import American 
consumer goods with funds frozen in the USA. Far from unsettling Petain's control 
over the North African colonies, the Americans sought to bolster the Vichy regime 
as a barrier to further German expansion and to foster the necessary stability in the 
Maghreb for the imminent Allied landing. In the words of one distinguished 
commentator:
If the presence of an American ambassador in Vichy was useful to protect
6 See, L. Borden Blair, Western Window in the Arab World (Austin, TX: Texas University Press, 
1970) and Mohamed Khenouf and Michael Brett, "Algerian Nationalism and the Allied Military 
Strategy and Propaganda during the Second World War: the Backgound to Setif", pp. 258-274 in D. 
Killingray and R. Rathbone (eds.) Africa and the Second World War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 
1978).
7 Leon Borden Blair, "Amateurs in Diplomacy: The American Vice Consuls in North Africa 1941- 
1943" The Historian No.35 (August, 1973), pp. 607-620, p. 617.
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North Africa from the Germans ... that presence would have to be continued 
as long as possible. If Admiral Darlan, the Vichy Prime Minister who was in 
Algiers at the time of the invasion on November 8 1942, prevented the French 
forces from engaging the Allied troops, it was necessary to negotiate with him 
and remind Churchill of the old Balkan proverb: "My children, in times of 
great danger, you may go with the devil until you have crossed the bridge"8
In so far as North African nationalists turned to the Americans for support, therefore, 
it was because they saw the US undermining French colonial authority. This image 
was reinforced as the supply of American goods under the Murphy-Weygand 
Agreement and later, the Lend-Lease Act, helped to improve the dire socio-economic 
conditions experienced in the North African colonies during the war.9 With the Allied 
landing, and the subsequent Anglo-American manoeuvres to bring the different 
French factions under a single military and political command, the vision of a 
crumbling French Empire being replaced by an ostensibly anti-colonial superpower 
became even more appealing to the nationalists.10 Ferhat Abbas, a leading Algerian 
anti-colonial activist, for example, held several interviews with Robert Murphy on the 
eve of the Allied landing with the prospect of obtaining US support for Algerian 
independence. Some commentators have gone as far as suggesting that Abbas
8 A. Grosser (trans. M. Shaw), The Western Alliance: European-American Relations since 1945 (New 
York: Seabury Press, 1980) p. 23
9 See, J. J. Dougherty, The Politics of Wartime Aid: American Economic Assistance to France and 
French Northwest Africa, 1940-1946(London and Wesport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1978), especially 
chapter 7. See also A. Lacroix-Riz, Les Protectorats d ’Afiique du Nord entre la France et WasHngton 
(Paris: L’Harmattan, 1988) especially Chapter 1.
10 See, "Les Etats-Unis et le Maghreb" Maghreb (No.7, jan-fev., 1965 and No. 8 mars-avril 1965), pp 
39-47 and 34-49.
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subsequent Manifeste dupeuple algerien was Robert Murphy's brainchild11, but the 
American representative's own recollections offer a somewhat different reading:
[Abbas] had approached me before once or twice to discuss Algerian 
independence, and now ... wanted to inquire what was the American 
Government's latest attitude towards an autonomous Algeria? I repeated what 
I had told him before, that Americans were generally sympathetic to all 
desires for independence but that our present purposes in Africa... were 
concentrated on defeating the Nazis.12
In Tunisia, too, most nationalists rallied to the Allied cause. In August 1941, 
Bourguiba "il reccomande a ses partisans de ne pas preter l ’oreille aux propagandes 
allemandes" reaching Tunisia via Radio Bari and Radio Berlin.13 He had also 
instructed his second-in-command, Dr. Thameur to "Tacher si possible, et par 
1'intermediate des Fran^ais Gaullistes, d'entrer en contact avec les agents anglais ou 
americains ... On pourra les sonder sur les intentions de leur pays a notre egard apre s 
la victoire".14 When German troops arrived at the outskirts of Tunis in early 
November 1942, the vast majority of Tunisians remained loyal to the neutralist policy
11 See for example D. B. Marshall, The French Colonial Myth and Constitution-Making in the Fourth 
Republic (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1973), p. 117.
12 R. Murphy, Diplomat Among Warriors (London: Collins, 1964), p. 157-158.
13 Annie Rey Goldzeiguer, "L'occupation Germano-italienne de la Tunisie: un toumant dans la vie 
politique tunisienne", Ch.-R. Ageron, Les chemins de la decolonisation de Vempire colonial franqais, 
(Paris: Editions du CNRS 1986), pp. 325-340, p.328.
14 "Les Etats-Unis et le Maghreb", p. 45.
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adopted by the newly-appointed Moncef Bey. This stance was maintained throughout 
the six-month German occupation and after the arrival of the Allies. Yet Bourguiba's 
and indeed, the Bey's hopes of an Allied occupation raising the prospect of 
independence were soon to be betrayed. As Murphy had promised, the Allied 
invasion of North Africa would be accompanied by a preservation of the French 
administration over its colonial territories. On their arrival in Tunis, the Allies 
acquiesced to the return of the autocratic Marshal Peyrouton as Governor of Tunisia. 
This led to the deposition of the ‘Destourian Bey’, Moncef Bey and the forcible exile 
of the nationalist leaders. The exigencies of geo-politics had clearly won over any 
plans for independence the Americans may have reserved for the Maghreb.
One measure of the nationalist failure in turning the social and political turmoil 
of the war to their advantage was the relative ease with which the French empire was 
reinstated as an administrative entity after the Allied victory. The presence of foreign 
troops in the colonies, coupled with the existence of two rival French authorities had 
cast considerable doubt over the viability of a French empire in the post-war 
international order. The reappearance of the question of self-determination on the 
agenda of the major war-time conferences, and most notably during the drafting of 
the UN Charter at San Francisco, further compromised the future of the French 
colonial empire. Yet by 1946, the latter had been politically reconstituted in the form 
of the French Union (Union Frangaise). It was General de Gaulle, the man who only 
a few years earlier had been kept on the margins of French political life because of 
his personal and political antagonism with US President Roosevelt, who managed to 
engineer the continuity of empire after the war. It is therefore useful to pause briefly 
on de Gaulle’s immediate post-war policy toward empire, in order to explain and 
understand the nature of this remarkable restitution.
A key moment in the post-war re-invention of the French empire was the 
French Africa Conference held in the Congolese town of Brazzaville during January 
and February 1944. It was at this summit of French African governors that the basic
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parameters of the French Union were first layed out, and the post-war policies toward 
the colonies were first officially discussed. Indeed, it is worth recalling that the 
meeting took place only weeks after de Gaulle had become the President of the 
Committee of National Liberation at Algiers (Comite Frangais de la Liberation 
Nationale - CFLN), the body which officially became provisional government of the 
French Republic on 2 June 1944. Aware of the profound effects of the world war 
upon the colonial populations, and the need for the newly-created CFLN to swiftly 
establish its authority over the French empire, de Gaulle sized the Brazzaville 
Conference as an opportunity to both confirm imperial unity and forge the necessary 
policies for the empires survival after liberation. As one historian of the period has 
put it:
L ’essentiel, pour de Gaulle comme pour tous ceux qui etaient a ses cdtes a 
Alger comme a Londres, etait que la France garde sa responsabilite de son 
domaine colonial, qu’elle decide par elle-meme de sa transformation et de son 
avenir...15
Essentially, the proceedings of the Brazzaville Conference focused on two areas. The 
first, and perhaps most significant for our purposes, was the constitutional framework 
which was to define France’s relations with its colonies. This had already been the 
subject of considerable discussion among the French political community in Algiers, 
but it was the CFLN’s Director of Political Affairs for the Colonies, Henri Laurentie, 
who was made responsible for the Conference’s agenda.16 For Laurentie, the future
15 P.-M. de la Gorce, L'Empire Ecartee: 1936-1946 (Paris: Editions Denoel, 1988), p. 413.
16 Further details of the background and development of the Conference can be found in Institut 
Charles-de-Gaulle (ed.) Brazzaville, janvierfevrier 1944: aux sources de ladecolonisation (Paris: Plon, 
1988) and part 1 of M. Shipway, The Road to War: France and Vietnam, 1944-1947 (Providence and 
Oxford: Berhahn Books, 1996).
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of the French colonies lay in the construction of an imperial Federation which might 
maintain the unity of empire, while allowing its distinct parts to develop their own 
‘political personality’ {la personnalite politique). At the Conference, this aim was 
expressed in the following way:
On veut que le pouvoir politique de la France s'exerce avec precision et rigeur 
sur toutes les terres de son Empire. On veut aussi que les colonies jouissent 
d'une grance liberte adminstrative et economique. On veut egalement que les 
peuples coloniaux eprouvant par eux-mLmes cette liberte, et que leur 
responsabilite soit peu formee et elevee, afin qu'ils se trouvent associes a la 
gestion de la chose publique dans leur pays.17
To this end, the governors recommended the radical overhaul of the pre-war 
administrative system and the declaration of a French Federation {Federation 
Frangaise) which would grant the colonies extensive representation in the Constituent 
Assembly. This was to be complemented by the abolition of the existing consultative 
bodies within the colonies, and their replacement with Councils of Indigenous 
Notables and local Assemblies elected on the basis of universal suffrage for both 
Europeans and non-Europeans. The combination of these reforms, it was hoped, 
might square the circle of maintaining the empire without excluding the eventual 
development of what, in the absence of an appropriate term in their own language, 
the French authorities called ‘self-government’.
The second general arena of action the Conference dealt with was that of 
socio-economic reforms. Here, the leading intellectual light was de Gaulle’s 
Governor-General for Africa, Felix Eboue, who in the early 1940s had set down the 
basis of the Free French ‘New Native Policy’. The general thrust of these proposals
17 "Recommendations adoptees: premiere partie" in de la Gorce, L'Empire Ecartee, p. 470.
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were, according to Martin Ship way, centred around the
Moral renewal of the colonial regimes [which] was to stem from respect for 
African civilisation, recognition of traditional structures and a more equitable 
relationship between Africans and Europeans ... The circular placed new 
stress on issues such as family and social customs, the role of an educated 
African elite, whom Eboue termed ‘evolues’ ... and the status of mixed race, 
so-called ‘metis’.18
In this spirit, the final recommendations of the Brazzaville Conference sought to 
promote the gradual reform of ‘traditional’ legal and social customs related to 
marriage, education and political institutions in the direction of "[t]he principles 
which constitute the common basis of French civilisation [szc].”19 Thus, the 
Conference called on the abolition of polygamy, an administrative control of dowries, 
the extension of citizenship rights to ‘evolved natives’ and the incorporation of all 
children into the French educational system. Perhaps of greatest significance was the 
Conference’s recommendation in favour of the abolition of forced labour and the 
establishment of a ‘free labour market’ subject to regulatory norms dealing with 
wages and working conditions.
It is difficult to evaluate the exact impact of the Brazzaville Conference upon 
subsequent political developments within the French empire. The Conference 
proceedings were expressly circumscribed to France's sub-Saharan colonies, and, 
despite the presence of North African observers, references to the Maghreb were 
omitted from the final transcripts.20 Laurentie convened an Expert Commission and
18 Shipway, The Road to War, p. 24.
19 "Recommendations adoptees", de la Gorce, L ’Empire Ecartee, p. 484.
20 Ship way, The Road to War, p. 30.
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Working Party in 1944 and 1945 respectively, with the aim of bringing the 
Brazzaville recommendations into the discussions of the upcoming Constituent 
Assembly. By most accounts, Laurentie's cherished project of a Federation Frangaise 
was given short shrift as the reformist ideals thought up in the politically convivial 
atmosphere of Brazzaville were put to the test of a much more volatile and hostile 
post-war Paris. All this suggests that the Brazzaville policy remained more of a 
rhetorical reference point, particularly for those left-leaning Gaullists wanting to 
uphold the General as a defender of French colonial peoples' interests, rather than a 
concrete blueprint for a post-war metropolitan-colonial relationship. Yet by 1946, one 
of the main political aims of Brazzaville -maintaining the colonial empire intact- was 
achieved in the shape of the French Union. Though watered-down, the basic federal 
principle of maintaining imperial unity while granting the colonial peoples some 
measure of self-government was upheld. Local Assemblies elected on universal 
suffrage were established, citizenship rights were extended to all colonial peoples and 
the latter were to be represented by some 204 deputies at the Union's Assembly.21
But this was certainly not the what nationalists, particularly in North Africa, 
had expected from the post-war conjuncture. Despite the immediate setbacks after the 
Allied landings (repression of nationalists, the rejection of Ferhat Abbas’ 1943 and 
the Moroccan Istiqlal’s 1944 Manifestos, and the deposition of the Tunisian bey), 
Maghrebi nationalists could look toward some conciliatory gestures on the part of de 
Gaulle’s administration. The General’s new government had issued a decree 
promising the extension of citizenship rights to Algerians; it had initiated the French 
withdrawal from their Levantine mandates in 1946; and most spectacularly, it had
21 Details of the status of "overseas France" in the 1946 Constitution can be found in Ageron,Les 
chemins de la decolonisation, in Marshall, The French Colonial Myth and G. Wright, The Reshaping 
of French Democracy (New York: Howard Fertig, 1970).
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accepted the proclamation of an independent Vietnam in September 1945. All this 
could conceivably be interpreted as signalling the weakening of France's imperial 
resolve. In the event, however, North African nationalists were faced with a 
reconstituted imperial entity, seemingly unperturbed by the anti-colonial consensus 
being forged at the international level. For all the expectations attached to American 
anti-imperialism and de Gaulle's repeated expressions of gratitude toward the colonial 
role in France's liberation, the immediate post-war years witnessed the virtual return 
to a status quo ante in North Africa.
This relative lull in anti-colonial activity in North Africa was short-lived. As 
we shall see below, Maghrebi nationalists, and Tunisians in particular, soon launched 
an international campaign for their cause which within the space of a decade bore the 
fruits of independence. World War II had brought wider international forces to bear 
upon metropolitan-colonial relations, and soon the advent of the Cold War was to 
reinforce the internationalisation of the Tunisian struggle for independence.
As we have seen, the military-strategic value of the Maghreb had become 
especially apparent in the course of World War II. Like in most other parts of the 
world occupied by Allied troops, the US lost little time in promoting its military and 
economic interests in North Africa after the war. The US was most successful in 
Morocco where by 1953 it had secured the use of the aero-naval base at Kenitra 
(formerly Port Lyautey) together with the construction of five military bases in other 
parts of the protectorate. Although no such extensive military presence was achieved 
in Tunisia and Algeria, both these countries came under the scope of NATO by virtue 
of France's signature of the Atlantic Treaty in 1949. American economic interests 
were also strongly represented in the region during the post-war years as many of the 
businessmen who had arrived with the Allied landing continued their activities in the 
import-export sector, or as representatives of major US corporations (IBM,
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International Harvester, Standard Oil).22
Soviet interests in North Africa for their part, were more limited. The 
Maghreb had never been of significant political or strategic value to either the Soviet 
Union or the international communist movement. The prestige associated to the Soviet 
war-time feats and the USSR’s nominal endorsement self-determination, however, 
temporarily increased the popularity of North African communist organisations in the 
immediate post-war years. As the Cold War divisions became entrenched after 1947, 
the communist influence in the region was inflated beyond all proportion, and the 
familiar simplification of political conflict along bipolar lines became the norm. By 
the early 1950s, the President of the French Republic, Vincent Auriol, would insist 
to Foster Dulles that, "Derriere Bourguiba il y a des communistes, derriere l’lstiqlal 
il y a des communistes".23 At one level, the Soviet Union was naturally interested in 
fomenting the imagery of a communist-nationalist front. But pressures from a strongly 
nationalist PCF, coupled with the USSR’s own focus upon legitimising the post-war 
division of Europe, forced Moscow to adopt an ambiguous position vis-a-vis North 
African anti-colonialism.
The Americans found themselves in a similar situation as fears of 
radicalised nationalist movements and the need to keep France firmly aligned with the 
US clashed with the persistent anti-colonial rhetoric. Like the Soviets, they 
deliberately exaggerated the efficacy of communist activity in the Maghreb. The 
combined ambivalence of the superpowers did not diminish the influence of the Cold 
War on North African politics; on the contrary, fearing that a radical alteration in the
22 Egya N. Sangmuah, “Interest groups and Decolonization: American Businessmen and Organized 
Labour in French North Africa, 1948-56", The Maghreb Review (Vol. 13, No. 3-4, 1988), pp. 161- 
174.
23 Quoted in Juliette Bessis, "L’opposition France-Etats-Unis au Maghreb de la deuxieme guerre 
mondiale jusqu’ a l’independance des protectorats, 1941-1956",pp. 341-356, p. 351 in AgeronJLes 
chemins de la decolonisation.
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status of French North Africa might benefit the rival, the two superpowers put a hold 
on any support for national liberation. As Yahia Zoubir has suggested:
[b]oth superpowers pursued similar interests aimed at reconciling 
contradictory objectives to safeguard their own strategic, political and 
economic interests. Owing to the importance they accorded to their respective 
relationships with France, they sought to appease the colonial power while 
simultaneously trying to gain the friendship of the nationalist movements 
opposed to it. In this context, the primary consideration of the two 
superpowers was not to hasten the independence of Maghrebi countries b u t.... 
to delay it because of the uncertainty and power vacuum it would create ...24
It is important to bear in mind at this stage that part of the reason for the 
superpowers' "contradictory objectives" in the Maghreb lay in the political make-up 
of post-war France. The PCF had emerged from Liberation as the largest and 
arguably the most powerful political party in France - ‘le premier parti de France’ as 
its sympathisers called it. Its influence had been felt both within the Provisional 
Government at Algiers and at the two Constituent Assemblies which paved the way 
for the Fourth Republic. In fact, the PCF's success at legislative elections of 1945 and 
1946 allowed them to obtain important cabinet positions for the first time.25 If we add 
to this the Gaullist suspicions of ‘Anglo-Saxon’ hegemony, it becomes clear that the 
political climate of post-war France displayed a marked hostility toward the USA. Far 
from strengthening a pro-Soviet strand in French politics, however, this coalition of 
Gaullists and communists engendered a sui generis French nationalism, which, 
although seemingly antagonistic toward the US, was still firmly aligned with the
24 Yahia Zoubir, "US and Soviet Policies towards France's Struggle with Anticolonial Nationalism in 
North Africa," Canadian Journal o f History, Vol. XXX, December 1995, pp. 439-466, p. 439.
25 For further details see M. Adereth, The French Communist Party, a Critical History: From 
Comintern to ‘the colours of France’ (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984).
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American-led western bloc.
The Cold war therefore impacted upon the Tunisian struggle for independence 
in an ambivalent fashion. On the one hand, as the two superpowers vied for the 
allegiance of a nationalist movement which had patently emerged from the world war 
morally and politically fortified, the issue of self-determination came to the forefront 
of Cold War politics. On the other hand, the fight for independence was stalled as the 
Maghreb, although a marginal region within the wider dynamic of superpower 
confrontation, became enmeshed in a logic of bipolarity that often blunted the sharp 
antagonisms between colonies and metropole.
This section will have hopefully provided a snapshot of the historical context 
which preceded Tunisian independence. Like all historical processes, there is no iron 
law of necessity which dictated the eventual decolonisation of French North Africa. 
The bloody war of liberation in Algeria (1954-62) testifies to the way in which 
historical developments often brush against the grain of the times. Nonetheless, I have 
tried to identify a number of secular developments which affected the evolution of 
Tunisian history during World War II and its aftermath. Foremost among these was 
the Allied presence in North Africa and the possibilities it offered for the 
internationalisation of the nationalist cause. Second, the remarkable reconstitution of 
the French empire in the form the French Union, and the cross-party consensus which 
underpinned it, further conditioned the nature of the struggle for independence during 
the following years. Last and by no means least important, the Cold War brought the 
politics of superpower confrontation to bear upon the specific metropolitan-colonial 
conflict.
Having laid down the broad parameters of the period, the following sections 
will examine in greater detail how the various Tunisian social movements interacted 
with the agents of international society. The first and, in the context of this thesis 
most significant aspect to explore is the place of internationalism in the unfolding of 
Tunisian independence.
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6.2 Nationalism and Internationalism in the Struggle for Tunisian Independence
The preceding chapters have identified internationalism as a major component of the 
process I have termed the expansion of international civil society. It has been 
suggested that internationalism should be seen as a principle and a practice which has 
often guided the activities of modern political movements. In the specific case of 
North Africa, internationalism contributed to the extension of modern forms of 
political agency to the region during the 1920s and 1930s, thereby facilitating the 
political cooperation across national, ethnic and religious boundaries both within 
Maghrebi social and political movements, and between the latter and their 
Mediterranean counterparts. At that time, the main sources of internationalist 
solidarity arrived from three broad areas: Europe, the Mashreq and the wider Muslim 
world (especially the Ottoman Empire and later, Turkey). By the late 1940s and early 
1950s, the focus of internationalist support expanded both eastward and westward 
toward Asia and America. The nationalist cause in North Africa became an anathema 
to the French left during the post-war years as it donned the mantle of French 
grandeur in an attempt to defend the autonomy of Paris vis-a-vis Washington and 
Moscow. The PCF in particular jettisoned virtually all its internationalist principles 
during this period, as it plainly misunderstood, and until very much later, actively 
opposed the surging movement for national independence in the Maghreb. It was 
therefore left to the Arab nationalists of the Mashreq on the one hand, and a host of 
other anti-colonial or Third World nationalist movements on the other, to furnish 
Bourguiba’s campaign for independence with the necessary international credibility 
for its eventual success.
In March 1945, Habib Bourguiba slipped out of Tunisia and headed toward
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Cairo via Libya. Bourguiba’s decision to move eastwards had been heavily 
conditioned by the presence in Alexandria of his old accomplice, Hooker Doolittle, 
and more importantly, by the news that negotiations for the establishment of a League 
of Arab states were being held at the Egyptian capital. In fact, Bourguiba initiated his 
trek to Cairo barely a week after the League was officially founded. That this was no 
mere coincidence became evident during the succeeding years as Bourguiba, now 
joined by fellow North African nationalists, established an Arab Maghrebi Bureau in 
Cairo with a view to extending their cooperation with the Arab League and other 
African or Asian organisations sympathetic to their cause. A year into his Egyptian 
exile, Bourguiba was already intimating the exact purpose of his presence in the 
Mashreq. In a famous letter to his Algerian counterpart, Ferhat Abbas, Bourguiba 
clearly spelt out the expectations he attached to the post-war order:
[i]l y a un autre evenement formidable qui a vu le jour a la fin de la guerre et 
qui aura une influence decisive sur l’orientation des Arabes au Maghreb: c’est 
l ’unification du monde arabe ... Ma presence au Caire et Faction inlassable 
que j ’y mene en vue de Her le probleme de FAfrique du Nord a ceux du 
Moyen-Orient arabe ont acceleree singulierement Fevolution des esprits.26
Interestingly, the Neo-Destourian president was also sharply aware of the favourable 
international climate:
La conjoncture intemationale nous offfe une chance unique d ’en finir avec la 
vie ... que nous imposera tojours le colonialisme fran^ais. Des competitions 
internationales particulierement severes nous ouvrent des perspectives
26 Quoted in S. El-Mechat, Tunisie: les chemins vers Vindependance (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1992), p. 
260-61.
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insoupfonees.27
Although the ensuing events did not entirely match up to Bourguiba’s optimistic 
calculations, the Maghrebi presence in Egypt did pay its specific dividends to the 
nationalist cause. For one, it afforded the Neo-Destourians a first opportunity to 
establish contact with the newly-created Arab League.28 Tthe Secretary-General of the 
League, Azzam Pasha, was instrumental in securing the necessary logistical support 
(passports, funding, transport facilities, contacts) for the Maghrebi operation in Cairo 
to succeed. Furthermore, as we shall see below, the Arab League played a significant 
role in putting the issue of Tunisian independence before the United Nations via the 
Afro-Asian group in the General Assembly. This assistance to the North African 
cause was, however, tempered by the constraints of realist diplomacy. Azzam Pasha’s 
original commitment to League membership for Maghrebi nationalist groups turned 
into a cautious postponement, contingent upon the outcome of the League’s 
discussions with France over Syrian and Lebanese independence. In the event, de 
Gaulle’s predictable objection to a North African representation in the League was 
accepted without protest by the Secretary-General, thus frustrating one of the main 
Neo-Destourian aspirations.
These initial failures at the intergovernmental level were somewhat 
compensated by the Neo-Destour’s successful interaction with other Arab social 
movements present in Cairo. The principal vehicle for this international political 
cooperation was the Arab Maghrebi Bureau.29 In February 1947 the major North
27 Ibid., p. 263
28 For further details of Bourguiba’s experiences in Cairo see S. Belhassan and S. Bessis, Bourguiba: 
La conquete d ’un destin (1901-1957) (Paris: Jeune Afrique Livres, 1988) and N. Salem Habib 
Bourguiba, Islam and the Creation o f Tunisia (London: Croom Helm, 1984).
29 See T. Khatib, Culture et politique dans le mouvement nationalistemarocain au Machreq (Tetouan: 
Association Tetouan-Asmir, 1996)
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African nationalist groups celebrated the founding congress of the new body with an 
agenda aimed at coordinating an international campaign in favour of North African 
independence. This was to be achieved by presenting a united front of Maghrebi 
nationalists in different international fora like the UN or the Arab League, and by 
increasing intra-Maghrebi cooperation in the battle for independence. For the first 
time, North African nationalist movements were envisaging a joint political initiative 
which had as its explicit purpose the extension of the domestic struggle to the 
international arena. In the pursuit of these aims, the Arab Maghrebi Bureau in Cairo 
became, for a few years, the centre of an international political network linking not 
only Arab nationalists east and west, but more importantly, projecting a semblance 
of Maghrebi unity to the rest of the world. The bureau’s press office scored some 
successes in drawing the attention of several Egyptian dailies, while a reduced staff, 
led by Bourguiba’s confidante Dr.Habib Thameur, organised contacts with various 
Arab governments and political movements such as Sayyid Qutb’s Society of Muslim 
Brethren. The Arab Maghrebi Bureau never attained the objectives it had set for 
itself, one historian of the period concluding that,
Le Bureau du Maghreb arabe avait fonctionne comme une structure de 
regroupement mais sans reele coordination entre les differents mouvements 
. . .L’attitude incertain de la Ligue arabe, l’absence de moyens a la hauteur des 
pretensions, avaient abouti a l’eclatement de ce noyau, berceau de l’unite.30
Yet judged from the comparative perspective of other such experiments in 
transnational political cooperation, the Arab Maghrebi Bureau can be seen as a 
notable example of post-war internationalism. Bourguiba and his supporters had, in 
a small space of time and with limited resources, managed to significantly raise the 
profile of their campaign both among the statesmen and the social movements of the
30 El-Mechat, Tunisie, p. 43.
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Middle East and beyond.
While Bourguiba and the Neo-Destourian leadership lobbied their Mashreqi 
brothers in the east, an entirely different campaign was being waged by the nationalis t 
trade union movement in the west. The Tunisian experiment in autonomous trade 
unionism which, as we saw above, had been aborted in 1938, resurfaced with the 
founding of the Union Generate des Travailleurs Tunisiens (UGTT) in January 1946. 
There is considerable debate surrounding the origins and exact orientation of the 
UGTT. In essence, the new union sought to revive the idea of ‘autonomous’ (ie. non- 
French) trade unionism first expounded by M ’hamed Ali’s CGTT. The central 
premise of this approach was that trade unionists should not confuse their own 
distinctive activities and interests with those of existing political parties. In an early 
statement of policy, the new union’s Secretary-General, Ferhat Hached called on the 
membership to, “[ejxpliquer a vos nombreux camarades notre pensee et les buts a 
atteindre: donner a l’ouvrier le moyen de defendre son travail et sa vie de travailleur, 
par ses propres moyens at sans faire le jeu de politiciens qui se servent de lui en 
pretendent les servir . . .”31 Behind this syndicalist denunciation of ‘politics’ and 
‘politicians’ lay, however an fundamentally corporatist project which, like 
Bourguiba’s Neo-Destour, sought to bring Tunisian capital and labour together in the 
struggle for national liberation. Although, in fairness, it should be noted that the two 
organisations only established formal contacts at a much later date, Hached had from 
the outset made no secret of his nationalist standpoint:
Wir betrachten Kapital und Arbeit als zwei fureinander unersetzliche Elemente
und fur die beiden Lebensnotwendigkeiten des Landes. Man mufi deshalb
einen Weg suchen, auf dem sich die beiden Elemente erganzen konen ...Die
31 Cited in Abdesselam Ben Hamida, “Le syndicalisme Tunisien et la question de l’autonomie syndicat 
de 1944 a 1956" in , N. Sraieb Le Mouvement Ouvrier Maghrebin (Paris: Editions CNRS, 1985), p. 
16, pp. 15-25.
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Verbindung von Kapital und Arbeit garantiert darum das Aufbliihen eines
Unternehmens, das zum grofiten Wohl der Gesamtheit dient. 32
The founding of the UGTT no doubt corresponded to the long-standing wish among 
sectors of the indigenous working-class of setting up their own representative trade 
union. As we have seen, the tensions between European and Arab workers had been 
a common feature of Tunisian trade unionism, and these resurfaced after 1945 in the 
context of the renewed campaign for national liberation. However, it is also important 
to emphasise the Cold War setting of this new development in Tunisia’s social and 
political life. For the UGTT was also a virulently anti-communist organisation keen 
on highlighting this characteristic when extending the network of support for Tunisian 
independence via the international trade union movement.
In the immediate aftermath of the Allied occupation of Tunisia during January 
1944, communist influence over working-class movements in the protectorate was all- 
pervasive. The high profile of the communists in the resistance movement and the 
provisional organs which emerged out of liberation, coupled with an economic climate 
favourable to left-wing organisations, led to the considerable rise in communist 
support within the reconstituted Tunisian trade union movement. The clearest 
manifestation of this communist advance took place at the first post-war congress of 
the CGT’s Departmental Union in March 1944, where seventeen of the twenty-one 
elected executive committee members were communists. If we accept the figure of 
close to 40,000 members offered by the deputy Secretary-General of the Departmental 
Union, Hassen Sadaoui, the extent of communist influence over Tunisian working- 
class politics appears as being substantial.
It was in reaction to this radical development within Tunisian trade unionism 
that Ferhat Hached and his followers began considering the creation of a third
32 Quoted in W. Plum Gewerkschaften im Maghreb: UGTT-UMT-UGTA (Hannover: 
Verlag fur Literatur und Zeitgeschehen, 1962) , p. 22.
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‘autonomous’ Tunisian union. As Mustapha Kraiem has suggested,
Dans un pays qui connait depuis la fm de la premiere guerre mondiale une 
vigoureuse agitation populaire, et une represion severe contre les nationalistes, 
les militants autochtones etaient marques par 1’impact du probleme national. 
Le slogan d’independence syndicale etait en realite une fa?on de denoncer la 
politique du parti communiste.33
Prior to the Departmental Union’s congress, Hached had built up his power-base in 
the Sahelian port of Sfax, establishing a host of new unions with a view to influencing 
the results of the congress. With the communist victory over their own candidate, 
however, the pro-Hached unions decided to dissolve, thus leaving the CGT without 
substantial representation in the Sahel and the south. In their place, an Union des 
Syndicates Autonomes des Travailleurs du Sud Tunisien was founded in November 
1944 thus laying the ground for the emergence of the UGTT a year later. The 
communist response to this, in turn, was the creation of their own ‘autonomous’ 
movement in October 1946 as the remnants of the CGT’s Departmental Union became 
the Union syndicale des travailleurs de Tunisie (USTT).34
At the inception of the Cold War, therefore, the Tunisian trade union 
movement was split in two. As in 1924 and 1937-38, the organised Tunisian working- 
class was divided along ideological and ethnic lines: one union, with an essentially 
nationalist character was supported by the bulk of Arab workers; the other, of a 
fundamentally communist persuasion, represented a mainly European membership. 
These deep rifts, the historical origins of which we have touched on in previous 
chapters, were soon to be felt at the international level as the two organisations vied
33 Mustapha Kraiem, “CGT et syndicalisme Tunisien apres la prise de Tunis par les allies 1943- 
1944" Revue Tunisienne des Sciences Sociales (Vol. 12, Nos. 40-43, 1975), pp. 279-308,p. 301.
34 B. Lopez Garcia, Potitica y Movimientos Sociales en el Magreb (Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones 
Sociologicas, 1991), pp. 80-82.
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for the legitimate representation of Tunisian labour before the international trade 
union movement.
The immediate aftermath of World War II witnessed the unification of the 
international labour movement under the single banner of the World Federation of 
Trade Unions (WFTU). In a spirit reminiscent of the short-lived Popular Front 
period, and in the context of a continued post-war Allied collaboration, the largest 
trade unions in the west and the Soviet Union were joined by labour unions from 
Africa, Asia and Latin America in the founding congress of the new international 
federation in October 1945. This unprecedented unity in the international labour 
movement proved to be short-lived as only four years later, anti-communist unions, 
led this time by the American Federation of Labor (AFL) established the International 
Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) thereby leaving the WFTU under 
Soviet dominance. The details of this schism, and the reasons for its unraveling need 
not detain us here.35 What is of interest for our purposes is the relationship between 
the Tunisian unions and these two institutions of international civil society.
In a clear expression of its desire to internationalise its cause, the UGTT 
agreed to issue an application for membership of the WFTU at its inaugural congress 
in 1946. This in no way compromised the UGTT’s anti-communism, for as we have 
seen, the WFTU was at this time a non-sectarian organisation. Despite this, it took 
four years for the World Federation to accept the UGTT into its ranks, chiefly due 
to the French CGT’s attempt at turning its Tunisian sister-organisation, the USTT, 
into the sole representative of Tunisian labour. The WFTU responded to the UGTT’s 
membership requests by criticising its nationalist and Islamist bias and sending 
successive delegations to Tunisia with the aim of unifying the two competing unions. 
With the failure of these maneuvers and most importantly, as a result of the
35 For two opposing but equally infoimative accounts see, D. McShane, International Labour and the 
Origins of the Cold War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992) and Peter Weiler “The United States, 
International Labor and the Cold War: The Breakup of the World Federation of Trade Unions” 
Diplomatic History ( Vol. 5, No. 1, Winter 1981), pp. 1-22.
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disaffiliation of the anti-communist unions from the WFTU, the UGTT finally became 
a member of the World Federation in early 1949.36 By this time, however, it was 
clear that Ferhad Hached’s union was entirely in the wrong camp. After a 
troublesome eighteen-month membership the WFTU, the UGTT made a long-awaited 
decision in July 1951 to switch its allegiance to the rival ICFTU, where Hached was 
given an executive post. Although, as we have seen, this accorded with the UGTT’s 
ideological inclinations, it also chimed with the union’s strategy of securing 
international support for the nationalist cause.
Egya Sangmuah has mustered considerable evidence to suggest that the 
UGTT’s decision to leave the WFTU and join the ICFTU was heavily weighed by 
pressures and incentives from the both the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the 
US Department of State. According to Sangmuah,
State Department officials associated with North African policy favoured 
maintaining ‘active relations’ with American trade unions, foreign unions, and 
the ICFTU, and assisting or welcoming assistance from these organizations 
where their objectives coincided with those of the US ... In Tunis, Consul 
General John D. Jemegan was instrumental in influencing the UGTT National 
Council to break away from the WFTU in July 1950 .. .When he sensed some 
hesitation on the part of UGTT leaders, Jernegan ‘implied strongly’ that the 
United States supported Tunisian nationalism. Jernegan then used diplomatic 
channels to get the CIO to speed up negotiations with UGTT.37
Regardless of the accuracy of these assertions, there can be little doubt that by 1951
36 Wilard A.Beiling, "WFTU and Decolonization: A Tunisian Case Study" Journal of Modem African 
History, (Vol. 2 No.4, 1964), pp. 551-64.
37 Sangmuah, “Interest Groups and Decolonization", p. 169.
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the Tunisian nationalist movement had accomplished the goal of generating support 
for its cause in the west. That same year, Ferhat Hached and Habib Bourguiba 
traveled to the United States invited by the AFL representative in Europe, Irving 
Brown. At the AFL Congress held in San Francisco, Hached made a speech that left 
no room for equivocation:
Unsere tunesische Arbeiterklasse und unser tunesisches Volk, mit zahllosen 
Schwierigkeiten belastet, denen wir in dem ununterbrochenen Kampf um 
soziale und nationale Freiheiten begegnen, haben sich vom Kommunismus 
abgewandt, der in seiner Demagogie die Unruhen vergroBert, um das Elend 
der Arbeiter und die berechtigte Unzufriedenheit der Bevolkerung fur Ziele 
auszunutzen, die Sie [the AFL] nur zu gut kennen. Unsere 
Gewerkschaftsbewegung hat darum dem kominformistischen 
Weltgewerkschaftsbund den Riicken gekehrt und ist der groBen 
Gewerkschaftsorganisation der freien Arbeiterwelt im DBFG beigetreten. Aber 
wir begehen groBe Irrtiimer, wenn wir die kommunistische Gefahr fur 
endgiiltig gebannt halten. Wir waren nicht aufrichtig, wenn wir behaupten 
wollten, die tunesische Volksmasse sei hinter dem einzigen Bollwerk der 
muselmanischen Religion geschiitzt und vor jedem Eindringen des 
Kommunismus gefeit38
Now that the Tunisian nationalist movement had curried the favour of one of the 
superpowers, the ground was left open for an appeal to the wider international 
community. With the support of their American allies in the labour movement and in 
the Administration on the one hand, and the backing of the newly independent African 
and Asian states on the other, the nationalists launched their campaign in the United 
Nations. It is to this aspect of the relationship between Tunisian civil society and
38 Plum Gewerkschaften im Maghreb p. 23.
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international society which we now turn.
6.3 The United Nations and Tunisian Independence
The institutions of international society have played a central role in the history of 
modern social movements in Tunisia, and indeed in the rest of the Maghreb from their 
very inception. Both the League of Nations, and more significantly, the United 
Nations were the site of North African nationalist agitation over the years. Moreover, 
as previous chapters have indicated, key documents of international society like US 
President Wilson’s Fourteen Points or the Atlantic Charter became reference points 
for the international legitimation of the anti-colonial struggle. To be sure, this was 
partly a consequence of organisations like the League of Nations or the UN having 
a direct remit over colonial affairs through the mandates system and the Trusteeship 
Council, respectively. Yet it also reflected a genuine endorsement of the norms and 
values of international society on the part of these social movements, the full 
theoretical implications of which were considered in chapter three. For the purposes 
of the present discussion it may be sufficient to identify the milestones in the Tunisian 
campaign for independence at the UN, thereby exploring the interface between North 
African civil society and one of the most important institutions of post-war 
international society.
The Tunisian campaign for independence at the UN experienced a long period 
of gestation conditioned by two basic factors. First and foremost was the fact that the 
colonial question was placed at the center of the UN’s agenda. While it is likely that 
North African social movements would have, as in the past, turned to an international 
organisation like the UN to further their own cause, this possibility was greatly 
encouraged by the new organisation’s explicit support for the self-determination of 
colonial peoples. This was further enhanced by the establishment of an Affo-Asian 
group of states at the General Assembly which made the Maghrebi nationalist cause
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their own. Second, the decision to extend the campaign for independence to the UN 
was a direct consequence of the rejection by Paris of a bilateral solution to the 
Franco-Tunisian dispute. Although all the Tunisian nationalist factions appreciated the 
need for an internationalisation of the conflict, the Neo-Destour had held up the hope 
in the immediate post-war period of engaging Paris in bilateral negotiations for 
independence along the lines of those held at Fontainbleau with the Vietminh. It was 
only when this option was entirely discarded that the nationalist movement focused 
its attention on the UN.
In April 1950, Habib Bourguiba visited Paris for the first time after his three- 
year exile in Cairo. At meetings with Tunisian residents and the diverse elements of 
French public opinion, Bourguiba outlined a seven-point plan for Tunisian autonomy 
including a National Assembly to be voted on universal suffrage and the creation of 
a Tunisian executive. Only two months later the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Robert Schuman, delivered a speech on occasion of the appointment of the new 
Resident General, Louis Perillier, which for the first time employed the term 
‘independence’:
M. Perillier, dans ses nouvelles fonctions, aura pour mission de comprendre 
et de conduire la Tunisie vers le plein epanouissement de ses richesses et de 
l ’amener vers l’independence qui est l’objectif final pour tous les territoires 
au sein de 1’Union franfaise.39
That this was no mere slip of the tongue or a hollow promise became evident as the 
new Resident General re-confirmed his plans to open the protectorate’s administration 
to Tunisians thereby extending Franco-Tunisian ‘co-sovereignty’. By virtue of a 
Franco-Tunisian protocol of August 1950, a new cabinet under the premiership of 
Sidi M’Hamed Chenik appointed four Neo-Destourian ministers, including the party’s
39 Cited in R. LeToumeau Evolution politique de Vafrique du nord musulmane 1920-1961(Paris: 
Armand Colin, 1962), p. 118.
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Secretary-General Salah Ben Youssef as Justice Minister. In February 1951, Perillier 
instituted a series of reforms which enhanced the role of the Prime Minister and the 
legislative Grand Council -henceforth containing a balanced French and Tunisian 
membership- on domestic affairs. With their position now strengthened at the very 
helm of the Regency, the nationalists set out to push for further reforms in the 
direction of greater autonomy and eventual independence. A Tunisian delegation 
headed by Chenik arrived in Paris on 16 October 1951 and presented the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs with a plan geared toward extracting greater concession from the 
French authorities on Tunisian sovereignty. These echoed Bourguiba’s earlier 
requests: the creation of an exclusively Tunisian cabinet, the further ‘Tunisification’ 
of the civil service and the election of a National Assembly.40
The nationalist political offensive did not go uncontested by the reactionary 
members of the settler community, the so-called colonial preponderates. With 
pressure from both within the French administration and the metropolitan interests in 
Tunisia, the prospects of a negotiated move to independence faded rapidly. Paris 
rejected the Chenik demands in December 1951, and the new year brought the 
dismissal and imprisonment of the Tunisian Prime Minister, together with that of 
most of the nationalist leadership. The riots which ensued and the launch of an armed 
insurrection in the north of the country marked the end of a period when the prospects 
of Tunisian independence being negotiated on a bilateral level appeared as realistic, 
and the beginning of what, in hindsight, was the last Franco-Tunisian crisis under the 
colonial regime.
It is within this context that the Tunisian campaign at the UN must be 
understood. Aware that their aims could not be pursued exclusively at the domestic 
level, the various strands of Tunisian nationalism had crafted an extensive network 
of international relations since the end of the war. As we have seen, both the old and
40 LeToumeau Evolution politique and D. L Ling, Tunisia: From Protectorate to Republic 
(Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, 1967) , chapter 5.
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the Neo-Destour had used the Bureau du Maghreb Arab as a site for the development 
of contacts with other Middle Eastern political movements and organisations, most 
notably the Arab League. After his brief French sojourn in early 1950, Bourguiba set 
out on a tour of Asia, stopping at the World Islamic Congress in Karachi, New Delhi 
(where the Neo-Destour opened an information office) and Jakarta.41 During the 
following year, Bourguiba took his campaign to London, Stockholm, and finally to 
the US. Here, Bourguiba sought to complement the work of the Tunisian Information 
Office in New York set up by the Chenik cabinet with the aim of lobbying the UN. 
The end result of this fervent diplomatic groundwork was presentation of the Tunisian 
question before the world organisation during 1952 and 1953.
As with any constitution, the UN Charter is a complex document open to 
multiple interpretations. The principles and procedures enshrined within its various 
chapters were the consensual outcome of a prolonged clash of ideas and interests 
among the great powers emerging out of World war II. On the specific issue of 
colonial self-determination, these differences were ultimately resolved in the form of 
two chapters in the UN Charter specifying the nature of the trusteeship system and 
the highly ambiguous chapter XI, “The Declaration on Non-Self-Governing 
Territories” .42 The latter declaration made no reference to the term ‘independence’ 
as the Russian and Chinese delegations at San Francisco had initially demanded, but 
rather settled for the broader concept of ‘self-government’ which should “[t]ake 
account of the political aspirations of the [non-self-governing] peoples, and to assist 
them in the progressive development of their free political institutions...” . While 
chapter XI may have disappointed those anti-colonialists expecting the UN to lead an 
all-out campaign against colonialism, it did at least place the colonial question firmly 
on the international agenda. In the words of one commentator, “The controversies in 
the colonial sphere which heatedly occupied the UN’s attention in the early formative
41 For further details see El-Mechat, Tunisie: les chemins vers Vindependance , pp. 107-110.
42 For a detailed account of the disputes among the Ailed powers on this issue see Louis, Imperialism 
at Bay, especially chapter 35.
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years seem innocuous enough compared to with what was to come later, but 
comparatively they acted as a series of wedges to pry the door wider and wider 
open.
The first instance of this opening up of the colonial agenda at the UN came 
with the establishment in 1946 of an ad hoc Committee on Information relating 
specifically to Article 73(e) of the Charter.44 According to this article, the colonial 
powers were obliged to:
transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes ... 
statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, 
social and educational conditions in the territories for which they are 
respectively responsible...
The presence in the successive Committees on Information of members of the Afro- 
Asian bloc allowed the question of North African independence to brought before the 
different organs of the United Nations. During 1952 and 1953, the situation in Tunisia 
was discussed at the Security Council and the General Assembly at the request of 
members of the Afro-Asian group. In April 1952, letters from ten delegations 
(Afghanistan, Burma, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, the Philippines, 
Saudi Arabia and Yemen) requested the inclusion of the Tunisian question in the 
Security Council’s forthcoming agenda. Three Security Council meetings held during 
that same month considered the Afro-Asian demand and on 14 April Council members 
voted against the inclusion of the Tunisian question in the Council’s agenda with 5
43 Rupert Emerson, “Colonialism, Political Development and the UN”International Organization (Vol. 
19, No. 3, Summer 1965), pp. 484-503, p. 487.
44 Details of these Committees and the role of the Afro-Asian bloc in their formation and development 
can be found in Y. El-Ayouty, The United Nations and Decolonization: The Role ofAfro-Asia (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,1971) .
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votes in favour, 2 against and 4 abstentions.45 Two subsequent letters signed by the 
group of Afro-Asian states dated 20 June and 30 July 1952, requested a Special 
Session at the General Assembly and a Consideration of the Tunisian question at the 
Assembly’s Seventh Session, respectively. Only the second bid received a favourable 
response and after two meetings of its First Committee, the General Assembly 
adopted resolution 611(VII) expressing its confidence that the “Government of France 
will endeavor to further the effective development of the free institutions of the 
Tunisian people” and “that the parties will continue negotiations on an urgent basis 
with a view to bringing about self-government for Tunisians.”46 In March 1953, the 
political situation in Tunisian was brought to the attention of the President of the 
General Assembly for a third time. On this occasion, the Afro-Asian group, with the 
support of other representatives, put forth a draft resolution which had as the third of 
its recommendations the following statement:
That negotiations be undertaken without delay with the representatives of a 
Tunisian Government established through free elections held on the basis of 
universal suffrage ...with a view to enabling the Tunisian people to exercise 
all the powers arising from their legitimate rights to full sovereignty.47
The resolution suffered various important amendments and was put to the vote on 
December 17 1953 only to be rejected with 31 votes in favour, 18 against and 10 
abstentions.
This brief summary of the Tunisian campaign at the UN offers some sense of 
the contribution the world organisation made toward the internationalisation of the 
Franco-Tunisian dispute. While Paris had sought to keep the crisis within the confines
45 For more details see, G. Day, Les affaires de la Tunisie et du Maroc devant les Nations Unies(Paris: 
Editions A. Pedone, 1953); M-C Smouts,La France a I’ONU (Paris: Presses de la FNSP, 1979), pp. 
232-235 and Yearbook of the United Nations 1952 (New York :United Nations), pp. 266-270.
46 Yearbook of the United Nations 1952, p. 278.
47 Yearbook of the United Nations 1953 (New York :United Nations) p. 209.
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of the internal politics of the French Union, repeatedly invoking the concept of ‘co­
sovereignty’ allegedly enshrined in the Treaty of Bardo, the Tunisian nationalists 
turned to the supreme institution of post-war international society, arguing the case 
for independence with recourse to international law. Whether this strategy was 
ultimately responsible for Tunisian independence or not is an open question; the 
important point for the argument of this chapter is simply to register the political 
significance attached to the UN by the nationalist movements.
6.4 Conclusions: Civil Society and International Society in Post-War Tunisia
The preceding sections have sought to present a panoramic account of the way in 
which Tunisian social movements interacted with wider international society during 
and after World War II. The chief purpose of this exercise has been to illustrate how 
the nature of the struggle for national independence -the major dynamic behind 
Tunisian postwar history- was heavily conditioned by a host of international factors. 
As we have seen, the social and political transformations wrought by war on a global 
scale did not escape Tunisia. The defeat and division of France, the Allied occupation 
of North Africa and the nominal anti-colonialism of the two emerging superpowers 
all conspired to produce a post-war conjuncture highly favourable to nationalist 
aspirations. This in turn was buttressed by the consolidation of the first truly universal 
world organisation, the UN, and the growing defence within its various organs of the 
right to national self-determination. Finally, and perhaps most important for the 
argument of this thesis, Tunisian social movements, the Neo-Destour foremost 
amongst them, drew on a wide network of international support -formed by both state 
and non-state actors- in the pursuit of its political goals. It has been our contention 
that the sum of these interactions add up to the working of an international civil 
society. The reasons for this are two-fold.
In the first place, the course of post-war Tunisian history charted above
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indicates how far Tunisian social movements, and the nationalists in particular, were 
imbricated within the wider processes of international society. To be sure, as previous 
chapters have demonstrated, this was a feature which characterised modern social 
movements in North Africa from their origins at the beginning of this century. The 
post-war international order simply offered a wider array of international institutions 
which social movements could engage with, as regional organisations like the Arab 
League or international non-governmental organisations such as the WFTU or the 
ICFTU found greater prominence within world politics. In short, the international 
relations of Tunisian social movements during the post-war years exemplify the 
intense interaction between state and non-state actors which, I have argued, can be 
elucidated with reference to a concept like international civil society. By employing 
this category in the analysis of the Tunisian campaign for independence, a more 
comprehensive, and arguably a more accurate rendition of this process can be offered, 
as the complex international factors which conditioned its unfolding are fully 
accounted for.
The second important issue raised by the idea of international civil society in 
the context of post-war Tunisian history relates to the concepts of sovereignty and 
national self-determination. By the post-war years, these became keywords in the 
political idiom of Tunisian, and indeed North African social movements. It has been 
one of the aims of this chapter to show how these concepts were not just abstractions 
of international law, or rhetorical keywords invoked by liberal intellectuals and 
politicians. They certainly were this; but they were also concepts which were given 
concrete social and political content by the social movements we have been 
considering in this thesis. It is not necessary to buy into a ‘whiggish’ interpretation 
of the expansion international society, nor an overly positivist understanding of 
international law to appreciate the real political weight terms like ‘sovereignty’ and 
‘self-determination’ carried in the anti-colonial struggles. Echoing the theoretical 
points made in chapter three, this chapter will have hopefully offered some support
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for this contention, by tracing the nationalist campaigns at the UN and other 
international organisations, and indicating how Tunisian civil society appropriated the 
tools of international society for its own purposes.
In conjunction, the foregoing narrative chapters should have also substantiated 
the theoretical claims made earlier in the thesis. We saw in chapter four how the 
socio-economic and political transformations set in motion by French capitalist 
imperialism eventually generated a complex array of social movements in Tunisia. 
Though many of these drew their inspiration from Tunisia’s rich historical legacy in 
reformist experiments (both secular and religious), it was the new social processes 
and structures engendered by colonialism that were ultimately responsible for this 
explosion in social and political activity in the Regency. Chapter five sought to 
emphasise the importance of both the practice and the principles of internationalism 
in this development. By focusing specifically on the Popular Front years, an attempt 
was made to illustrate the relevance of internationalism in the expansion of 
international civil society to Tunisia, and in the unfolding of the country’s inter-war 
history. Lastly, the present chapter has aimed to underline the crucial interaction 
between the agents of Tunisian civil society and the emerging institutions of post-war 
international society. Here, the burden of the argument has rested upon the mutual 
dependence of inter-state and non-state actors in international relations, and in 
particular, the importance of the norms and values of international society for those 
social movements seeking to attain state sovereignty. The implications, both analytical 
and normative, of this complex historical interaction between Tunisian social 
movements and the wider world will now be briefly reexamined the concluding 
chapter of this study.
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The foregoing chapters have aimed to offer a novel interpretation of the concept 
‘international civil society’. By considering the expansion of international civil society 
to Tunisia, I have sought to illustrate historically the process whereby the forms, and 
to a certain degree the contents of modern political agency are transmitted 
internationally. The purpose of this exercise has been twofold. In the first instance, 
the objective has been to situate the historical and sociological study of non-state 
actors in international relations at the centre of the analytical concerns of our 
discipline. Though drawing generously from the successive waves of transnationalist 
literature in IR, I have sought to go beyond these approaches, highlighting their 
theoretical and historical shortcomings and arguing that a more rigorous investigation 
of the relations between states and civil societies under the rubric of ‘the expansion 
of international civil society’ can render the central arguments of transnationalism 
more forceful. More specifically, the claim has been that the term ‘international civil 
society’ should be associated not only with the agents that operate outside the 
immediate control of the state, but also to those social forces that have shaped the 
international society of states. It is for this reason that a special emphasis has been 
placed upon the interaction between the agents of civil society and those of the state, 
rather than on their mutual exclusiveness and opposition. From this perspective, the 
expansion of international civil society is seen as a process that reinforced the 
institutions and boundaries of the modern sovereign state as much as it helped to 
undermine them.
This first major concern of the thesis therefore speaks to those IR theorists 
interested in the origin and evolution of international society, and to the role of non­
state actors in this process. To this extent, the preceding chapters represent an 
engagement with the more orthodox preoccupations of our discipline - those dealing 
with international society, sovereignty, nationalism and international institutions. 
Throughout this study, however, a second important issue has been at stake, namely 
the normative or political implications of using the term international civil society. By
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investigating the systematic interaction between the agents of civil society in Tunisia 
and their counterparts in other parts of the world, I have sought to uncover the 
existence of an international relations ‘from below’. I have considered such activity 
as part of the experience of internationalism during this century; that is, the conscious 
attempt by collectivities and individuals to transcend national, ethnic and religious 
barriers in the pursuit of specific political goals. To be sure, such internationalist 
cooperation between social movements of the various shores of the Mediterranean and 
beyond was not always harmonious. One of the aims of the narrative section of the 
thesis has been precisely to underline those tensions and antagonisms between the 
avowedly universal political objectives of say, the Tunisian trade union movement, 
and their more parochial, nationalist practice. Moreover, this study has deliberately 
focused upon the more benign and progressive social movements that inhabit 
international civil society, without considering the numerous reactionary and anti­
democratic organisations that spring from this arena of our social and political life, 
and that often also employ an internationalist rhetoric.
Neither of these considerations, however, should compromise the relevance 
of internationalism as a political principle and practice, both for our understanding of 
the international system and for the construction of novel ways of engaging in world 
politics. The second underlying objective of this thesis, therefore, has been to explore 
the expansion of international civil society as a starting point for the imagination of 
new modes of political agency; to draw from the historical experience of social 
movements that have operated socially and politically across national, ethnic and 
religious boundaries in order to inform an internationalist politics for the coming 
century.
This concluding chapter is perhaps the best place to make more explicit the 
normative and political content of international civil society. I shall consider the 
significance of international civil society for contemporary world politics by arguing 
that international civil society represents a social and political space that progressive 
movements must appropriate and defend if the emancipatory aspirations of modernity
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are to be realised, however imperfectly. Looking at the specific case of the Maghreb, 
I offer some examples of how the forces of civil society are attempting to organise 
internationally across the different shores of the Mediterranean. With this brief 
incursion into the current application of the term’ international civil society’ to the 
western Mediterranean region, I hope to identify both the political promises and 
pitfalls inherent in the category.
Before doing so, however, it is necessary to offer a restatement of the basic 
features of international civil society as it has been defined in this study. Special 
emphasis is again placed upon the complex interface between the agents of civil 
society and the institutions of the state within an international context. Here, the 
paradoxical nature of the relationship between state and non-state actors will be 
explored with particular reference to the tensions between nationalism and 
internationalism in the expansion of international civil society.
7.1 The Meanings of International Civil Society
Throughout this study, the idea of international civil society has been defined with 
regard to three of its basic components. At the most elementary level, international 
civil society describes that arena of world politics where modern social movements 
pursue their political goals. It was argued in chapter two that specifically modern 
attributes can be identified in the modes of political engagement characteristic of civil 
society. Moreover, the claim was made that such modern forms of political agency 
have from their inception been international in nature. In other words, the modern 
social movements that have for the past three centuries been the mainspring of civil 
society should be viewed as international phenomena and not, as is traditionally done, 
within an exclusively national context.
A full explanation for the emergence and development of these modern 
movements, however, requires making reference to the socio-economic and political 
forces unleashed by the global reproduction of capitalism. Thus, international civil
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society has also been treated throughout this thesis as an arena permeated by capitalist 
social relations that generate antagonistic class interests. It is through the international 
articulation of these antagonisms, I have argued, that modern forms of social and 
political agency take shape.
Lastly, the preceding chapters have insisted that the term international civil 
society does not assume the existence of a world community of non-state actors 
seeking to undermine the international system of states. To be sure, the constituent 
agents of international civil society often represent a threat to state sovereignty insofar 
as they, by definition, operate across existing national, and more occasionally ethnic 
and religious boundaries. Yet such transgressions are neither constant nor 
unidirectional: as was argued in chapter three and illustrated in the narrative sections 
of the thesis, the social movements that inhabit international civil society are as likely 
to reinforce the existing boundaries of the sovereign state as they are to undermine 
them. Indeed, the experience Tunisian struggle for independence analysed above is 
paradigmatic in that nationalists clearly pursued the affirmation of existing Tunisian 
borders, yet simultaneously mobilised all the available international resources - 
transnational solidarity campaigns, international law, international institutions- in 
order to achieve this goal. In short, much of this thesis has endeavoured to show that 
the study of international civil society is closely tied to the examination of the origins 
and development of the international society of states. From this perspective, 
international civil society is not a category exclusively associated to the study of non­
state actors, but rather to the historical interaction between states and civil societies.
These, is sum, have been the basic features of my understanding of 
international civil society. There is one very specific aspect of the concept which 
merits closer attention in these closing paragraphs of the study, namely the 
relationship between international civil society and the state. Chapter three 
investigated this relationship with reference to the idea of international society. It was 
argued there that the norms, values and institutions of international society helped to 
reinforce the political goals of Tunisian civil society and that the latter in turn
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contributed toward the legitimisation of postwar international society. As in the rest 
of the thesis, the emphasis of that chapter was upon the mutual interdependence 
between these two spheres of social action, rather than upon their radical opposition. 
This overlap, however, raises some interesting contradictions in the definition of 
international civil society as it has been employed thus far. If social movements 
participating in international civil society choose to focus specifically upon a 
particular national struggle, do they thereby cease to be part of this domain of 
international politics? Once state sovereignty has been achieved, are the bonds with 
international civil society severed? What are the consequences for international civil 
society of social movements becoming the backbone of one-party states? These and 
other questions point to the seemingly irremovable tension between the universal 
pretensions of a concept like international civil society and its concrete manifestations 
in particularist movements like, for example, nationalist parties.
The way out of this false impasse lies in recognising that the universal can find 
expression in the concrete. In more specific terms, there is no necessary incongruity 
in positing an international civil society that encompasses nationalist as well as 
internationalist social movements. All of these, I have argued, were moulded by the 
international dimensions of civil society outlined in the second chapter of this thesis. 
Consider for instance the case of Tunisian nationalism. As previous chapters have 
indicated, the origins and development of Tunisian nationalism were inextricably tied 
to an ideological, institutional and historical interaction with the outside world. The 
Neo-Destour and its predecessors derived much of their programme from a 
combination of European liberalism, Mashreqi Islamic reformism and Arab and 
Turkish nationalism. They borrowed the organisational structure and the modes of 
political protest from their European counterparts, and put to good strategic use the 
impact of world-historical events such as the outbreak of the two World Wars or the 
creation of international organisations like the UN and the Arab League. To this 
extent, it is thoroughly misleading to interpret the rise of Tunisian nationalism as a 
purely autochthonous phenomenon (as much nationalist historiography would have
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us believe) or to see it as being at odds with the expansion of international civil 
society. On the contrary, explaining the nature of Tunisian nationalism (or any other 
form of nationalism for that matter) requires investigating the international 
reproduction of ideas and practices characteristic of modern civil society. In this 
respect, studying the expansion of international civil society provides fertile ground 
for the consideration of the international genesis of nationalism - one of the major 
forces shaping the contemporary international system.
From an historical perspective therefore, the concept of international civil 
society can readily incorporate agents of civil society with a narrower political agenda 
like that of nationalist movements. Far from undermining this arena of world politics, 
nationalist social movements have historically been the product of those international 
forces that I have identified with the expansion of international civil society. The 
more pressing question now becomes how such a historical experience can become 
integrated into a conceptual model that adequately accounts for the interaction of 
centrifugal and centripetal forces such as nationalist and internationalist social and 
political movements. In other words, how can the category of international civil 
society simultaneously accommodate social movements that seek to go beyond the 
sovereign state with those that aim to establish bounded national states?
One answer to this paradox offered in this study has been to distinguish 
between the form and the content of those social movements that operate within 
international civil society. On this account, the expansion of international civil society 
is premised not on the homogenisation of political programmes, but on the adoption 
of certain comparable modes of political engagement. What upholds the existence of 
international civil society is not an abstract universal harmony of interests but an 
identifiable commonality in the mechanisms of social and political protest -what I have 
referred to as modern social and political agency. Thus, international civil society 
aspires to become a category capable of recognising the dynamics of modern social 
and political agency in international relations, without thereby positing some 
necessary unity between the movements that are its protagonists. In fact, this study
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has sought to underline that international civil society is a domain of conflict and 
contradiction as much as it is an arena of cooperation and solidarity. While the 
normative impulse of this category plainly seeks to identify an international social and 
political space that may foster transnational alliances, there is -it should be stressed 
again- no requirement that such a communion of interests emerge out of the expansion 
of international civil society.
A second response to the question of how international civil society can co­
exist with state sovereignty focuses upon the contribution of modern social 
movements toward the construction of a modem states-system. Here the argument is 
that the origin and development of state sovereignty is intimately related to the 
expansion of international civil society. As chapter three sought to illustrate, the 
notion of popular sovereignty and the political struggles it inspired made the territorial 
state a privileged site of modern social and political activity. If it is accepted that all 
forms of political engagement require the delimitation of a particular community 
where conflicting interests are played out, then the national state should be seen as the 
dominant political community during the modem epoch. The social agents 
characteristic of civil society were instrumental in lending legitimacy to the legal and 
political institutions of the modern national state, both by contesting and affirming the 
validity of territorially-bounded political entities. It therefore follows that the 
reproduction of modern social and political agency throughout time and place is an 
international phenomenon simply by virtue of the fact that it reinforced the status of 
the modem territorial state as the highest source of political sovereignty.
In these two respects therefore, the meaning of international civil society is 
associated not only to those international social and political actors that lie outside the 
confines of the state, but also to those agents that interact, and in some cases, 
reinforce the institutions of the modern sovereign state. The full potential of the 
concept will only be realised once international civil society is used to explain both 
the universal but heterogenous reproduction of modem agency across the globe, and 
the simultaneous process of state-formation. Far from representing a logical
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contradiction in the definition of the category, this section will have hopefully 
demonstrated that international civil society need not be associated exclusively to the 
domain of non-state actors, but that it can also explain the historical and conceptual 
configuration of the present international society of states. Indeed, the argument 
throughout the thesis has been precisely that it is the nexus between these two 
domains -that of states and civil societies- as opposed to their separation, that bears 
most promises for our comprehension of international relations.
7.2 The Question of Internationalism
In all these discussions, one concept -that of internationalism- has loomed in the 
background as one of the key features of international civil society. It was argued in 
chapter two that the experience of feminist, working-class, liberal and even Islamic 
internationalism was both cause and effect of the expansion of international civil 
society and that internationalist organisations such as the International Congress of 
Women or the Comintern played a significant role in the international relations of the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The latter were certainly a product of the 
political and socio-economic transformations generated by international capitalism, 
and to that extent were a consequence of the expansion of international civil society. 
At the same time, however, such organisations also contributed to this process by 
actively promoting the establishment of kindred groups across the globe and by 
internationally disseminating political messages like those of class struggle or 
women’s emancipation. It would be therefore be very difficult to account for the 
expansion of international civil society without incorporating the activism of 
internationalist social movements as a major component of this process. Whilst 
guarding against an excessively voluntarist perspective on the role of internationalism, 
it is nonetheless crucial to recognise the importance of self-conscious collective 
agency in the expansion of international civil society. Modem social movements have 
historically propagated universal ideologies across existing political boundaries; they
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have produced demonstrative effects in other parts of the world; and perhaps most 
importantly, they have organised internationally in order to extend the limits of 
political action beyond the territorial state. In each of these three respects, the 
internationalist activism of nineteenth- and twentieth-century social and political 
movements should be considered as one of the basic motors behind the expansion of 
international civil society.
The historical moment chosen in this thesis to illustrate the relevance of 
internationalism in the expansion of international civil society was the brief period of 
the Popular Front. As we saw in chapter five, the economic depression, the 
sharpening class antagonisms and the accompanying rise of fascism in Europe all 
impacted heavily upon the politics of the Maghreb during the 1930s. The Popular 
Front victory in France in May 1936 swelled the ranks of the North African working- 
class organisations and generated similar coalitions across the region. The principles 
and the practice of working-class internationalism instigated much of this activity as 
ethnic and national differences were momentarily put aside, both among social 
movements within Tunisia, and in the relations between Paris and the Regency’s 
population. At the time, the chief political enemies of most Tunisian social 
movements were big business and fascism. Thus, insofar as this period displayed the 
basic features of an international relations ‘from below’ associated in this thesis to the 
idea of international civil society, it did so mainly as a result of the social and political 
cooperation inspired by the principles of internationalist solidarity.
The conjunctural nature of the short-lived Popular Front should not blind us 
to the fact that the internationalist ferment of this period sprung from a broader 
experience of international interaction dating back to at least the turn of the century. 
Chapter four sought to chart this gradual implantation in Tunisia (and the Maghreb 
at large) of the ideas and the modes of political engagement characteristic of modern 
civil society. While much of this was the product of complex historical processes - 
including most obviously the violent imposition of French political and cultural codes 
through imperial conquest- the internationalist activism of working-class and pan-
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Islamic organisations was also instrumental in securing the extension of political links 
to the Maghreb. For better or for worse, it is highly unlikely that trade unions, 
nationalist parties or Islamic reformist associations would have emerged in Tunisia 
(or anywhere else in the Maghreb) without the existence of an internationalist theory 
and practice that encouraged cross-ethnic and transnational solidarities. Even 
nationalism -a phenomenon seemingly at odds with the principles of internationalism - 
must be seen as a by-product of an attempt by European and Mashreqi social 
movements to extend their political ideas and organisational structures to the 
Maghreb. As we saw in the previous three chapters, the broad range of social 
movements that were protagonists of Tunisian colonial history emerged as a result of 
a systematic interaction with the outside world. Almost invariably, this interaction 
included an internationalist component so that, for example, Tunisian trade unionists 
and nationalists could openly acknowledge the influence and support of their 
European or Mashreqi counterparts in the pursuit of their own specific political goals. 
Whether considered at the leadership level or amongst the rank-and-file, much of the 
evidence presented in the historical chapters of this thesis suggests that the experience 
of internationalism was instrumental in furthering the expansion of international civil 
society to the Maghreb.
An investigation into the expansion of international civil society, therefore, 
must not only consider the process of capitalist accumulation on a global scale and the 
accompanying interaction with the forces of international society; it must also 
encompass the history and evolution of internationalism as a political principle and 
as an organisational practice in international relations. Modern forms of political 
agency have been reproduced internationally as a simultaneous reaction to three inter­
related processes: the variegated expansion of capitalist social relations; the 
constraints and opportunities thrown up by the expansion of international society; and 
the possibility of practical and ideological political cooperation across borders. It is 
the latter of these -what I have labelled internationalism- that has been most muted in 
this thesis. Yet it is precisely the experience of internationalist politics within the
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domain of international civil society that grants the latter concept a normative or 
political character. For without guaranteeing, as was said earlier, a necessary 
harmony of interests among progressive social movements, international civil society 
is a privileged arena for thinking through and realising projects of internationalists 
solidarity. The political promises (and limitations) inherent in the concept of 
international civil society can be illustrated by briefly considering the specific case of 
internationalism in the contemporary western Mediterranean.
7.3 The Contemporary Implications of International Civil Society: the Western 
Mediterranean Today
A cursory survey of the current socio-economic and political situation in the western 
Mediterranean reveals a complex and differentiated landscape. While the northern 
Mediterranean states (Spain, Portugal1, Italy, France) are preoccupied with the 
controversial process of European economic and monetary union, the so-called third 
Mediterranean countries of the Maghreb (Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria) have set their 
hopes externally on a misnamed Euro-Mediterranean Partnership while facing 
different degrees of domestic turmoil. In the mid-1970s, two of the northern 
Mediterranean states -Spain and Portugal- were just emerging out of protracted 
dictatorships, while Italy was experiencing its own ‘anni di piombo’ or ‘lead years’ 
where class confrontation took a violent turn. Almost twenty-five years later, liberal- 
democratic regimes have been established in Spain and Portugal, and Italy appears to 
have undertaken a radical overhaul of the political institutions that dominated its post­
war history, chiefly resulting from the demise of the Christian Democrats and the 
break-up of the Communist Party.
The Maghreb too, has witnessed significant changes in its political structures. 
Perhaps the starkest and cruellest transformation has been that of Algeria. The
1 Portugal has no Mediterranean coastline, but for political and historic reasons it has been included 
among the so-called ‘Club Med’ members of the European Union.
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economic and political reforms introduced by the then president Chedli Benjedid in 
the 1980s had the opposite effect from that originally intended as the country 
descended into a bloody confrontation between the state and its Islamist opponents 
(further complicated by factional disputes within the two camps) since the cancellation 
of the second round of legislative elections in January 1992. In the other two north 
African countries, the post-colonial order secured through a combination of coercion 
and consent also experienced some important transformations during the 1980s. In 
Morocco, the absolutist monarchy of Hassan II survived successive attempts from the 
military and left-wing opposition at overthrowing the regime, and the country is 
presently witnessing a gradual move toward greater democratic accountability and 
transparency under a socialist-led government. Tunisia, has unfortunately shifted in 
the opposite direction. The overthrow of Habib Bourguiba in November 1987 by his 
prime minister and former Minister of Interior, Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali, initially 
raised hopes of a greater openness in the country’s political system. Ten years down 
the line, however, Tunisia is a one-party police state where only the relative success 
of the country’s economy is capable of sustaining Ben Ali’s autocratic regime.
All these political fluctuations have been accompanied by the persistence of 
mass unemployment and underemployment, particularly amongst the youth; by gross 
inequalities in the distribution of wealth; and by the concomitant threat of violent 
uprising in the face of these conditions. Furthermore, the signing of Association 
Agreements with the EU under the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership initiative 
launched at Barcelona in 1995 has only further accentuated the asymmetric 
relationship between Morocco and Tunisia and its northern Mediterranean neighbours. 
Most of the Maghrebi ex-colonies continue to be dependent politically and 
economically on Europe while the sizeable North African population in the continent 
still suffers from socio-economic and political discrimination.
For all its complexity therefore, the social relations among the peoples and 
states of the western Mediterranean continue to be defined by structural inequalities 
both within and between the Mediterranean states. Given this sombre socio-economic
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and political outlook, what are the prospects of the progressive agents of international 
civil society overturning these entrenched disparities in the western Mediterranean? 
More broadly, how can the concept of international civil society be of use in 
interpreting and changing the existing international order in this region?
The second of these questions is perhaps the easier one to answer. From the 
perspective adopted in this study, international civil society is the domain of class 
conflict mediated through the international capitalist system and the international 
society of states. To this extent, the category ‘international civil society’ claims to be 
part of a wider gamut of Marxist concepts deployed in the analysis and transformation 
of our social and political reality. The extension of capitalist social relations to the 
Maghreb through imperialist penetration marked the beginning of the economic and 
political subjection of this region to European capital and its institutional 
representation via the colonial state. The attainment of sovereignty after World War 
II led to the adoption of economic development policies which aimed to sever an 
excessive dependency on the ex-metropole. Yet for a number of historical and 
political reasons, such ambitions proved to be illusory and today the North African 
working population is subject to the same ruthless forces of the capitalist market as 
any other part of the world. While the term ‘international civil society’ is unable to 
explain the dynamics of global capitalism, it is nonetheless capable of telling us how 
the market became international in the first place. Thus, it has been suggested 
throughout this study that the expansion of international civil society is synonymous 
with the international reproduction of capitalism. So long as civil society is identified 
with the capitalist market, the notion of an international civil society should be 
unproblematic: the long-standing and ever-increasing economic exchanges between 
the north and the south of the Mediterranean are a testimony to its existence.
But this is not the main strength of the category. One can, after all, both 
describe and explain the process of international capitalist production and exchange 
by referring to the much simpler term ‘international capitalist economy or the ‘global 
economy’. The major benefit of using international civil society in this context is that
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it allows us to understand the dynamic character of these exchanges by registering the 
resistance to and contestation of the extension of capitalist social relations. For while 
French colonial capital may have attempted to create a world after its own image in 
Tunisia, it was unable to do so due to the resistance (political and otherwise ) that it 
encountered. The expansion of international civil society introduced the law of the 
capitalist market to the Maghreb, but it also introduced class consciousness and class 
antagonisms which conditioned the nature of capitalist exploitation in this part of the 
world. It also eventually generated a nationalist movement strong enough to contest 
the political and economic domination of French capital. It is in this sense that the 
expansion of international civil society comes to represent more than simply the 
implantation of the capitalist market in the Maghreb; it also accommodates the social 
and political struggles against this market, which in turn affected the very nature of 
the socio-economic and political relations between the colonies and the metropole.
International civil society, then, is a historical-sociological category which can 
offer an explanation to the present socio-economic and political conjuncture in the 
Mediterranean by identifying the international structures and processes that 
engendered phenomena such as colonialism, nationalism, working-class organisations, 
independent sovereign states or unequal economic exchanges between the northern 
and southern shores of this sea. Though far from comprehensive, this list is arguably 
representative of the most significant forces behind contemporary politics in the 
western Mediterranean. Some of these phenomena are, to be sure, accounted for 
individually by other approaches to the politics of the region (historical, political- 
scientific, economic). The novel contribution of the term international civil society 
lies in the comprehensive character of its scope and its emphasis upon the 
international facets of the region’s politics. By encompassing the dialectical interaction 
between states, classes, social movements and dominant and subaltern political 
authorities within a single concept, the idea of civil society enables the difficult but 
necessary task of focusing upon the nexus between these different spheres of the 
region’s social and political life rather than seeing them in isolation. Moreover, with
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the incorporation of an international dimension, the category allows us to eschew 
essentialist and territorially-bounded analyses of western Mediterranean states and 
societies. In combining these diverse elements, the term international civil society 
aims to present a richer account of how sovereign states, classes and social 
movements were created in the first place, from there to argue that these are the key 
forces shaping the contemporary regional order. Thus, on this rendition, for example, 
the ideological disputes underpinning the current Algerian crisis would be explained 
with reference to a broader international context, and not simply within a domestic 
framework as is commonly done. Similarly, the signature by Morocco and Tunisia 
of Association Agreements with the EU are seen as resulting not only from shifts in 
the bilateral and multilateral relations among western Mediterranean states, but also 
(and primarily) as a product of the reconfiguration of class forces within these 
respective states. One of the key benefits of a concept like international civil society 
is that it can uncover the linkage between the domestic and international factors that 
give rise to such social and political processes.
These considerations lead us to the earlier question posed above, namely: what 
are the political implications derived from this analysis? A central argument in this 
thesis has been that analysing the workings of international civil society necessarily 
involves illuminating the possibilities of transnational social and political solidarity. 
The narrative section of the study considered the record of such solidarity during the 
colonial period, but recent initiatives suggest that similar experiments have resurfaced 
in the western Mediterranean over the past decade. The 1995 Barcelona Conference 
in particular, occasioned a flurry of transnational activity among non-state actors from 
the different shores of the Mediterranean which according to some signalled the 
beginnings of a ‘Mediterranean civil society’. Three meetings held in Barcelona in 
parallel to the official conference reflected this renewed international activity among 
social movements from the region: the Alternative Mediterranean Conference (AMC), 
organised by a collective of Catalan social and political organisations ranging from 
anti-racist movements to solidarity campaign groups, and from trade unions to
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INGOs; the EuroMed Civic Forum, convened by the Catalan autonomous government 
(la Generalitat de Catalunya), together with the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and the EU 's Social and Economic Council; and finally the ‘Euro-Mediterranean 
Meeting of Left and Progressive Forces’, a meeting arranged by Iniciativa per 
Catalunya , the Catalan federation of the Spanish political movement Izquierda Unida 
(United Left).
All three conferences were, to different degrees, critical of the official inter­
governmental conference and the declaration that emerged out of the proceedings. 
Aside from advocating a broader remit for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
(incorporating, for example, women’s rights, environmental issues and questions of 
migration flows), the main purpose of these gatherings was to demonstrate the 
existence of a Mediterranean civil society parallel to that of a Mediterranean society 
of states. Thus, for example, the EuroMed Civic forum’s stated aims were to bring 
together " [t]he new actors emerging in the international domain (chambers of 
commerce, corporations, trade unions, universities, media, NGOs, women's 
associations, and also the regions and cities) [in order] to channel the initiatives 
geared toward reinforcing the links between the two shores of the Mediterranean.”2 
Furthermore, it was emphasised that "despite cultural, economic, demographic and 
political differences, the important role played by civil society within the European 
and Mediterranean sphere makes it a key tool in the pursuit of greater mutual 
understanding. "3
These three examples of transnational social and political activity in the 
western Mediterranean demonstrate the potential of building links across national, 
religious and ethnic boundaries. Yet they also reveal some of the limitations inherent 
in a view of social and political change that overemphasises the role of non-state 
actors in international relations. For one, the agents of ‘Mediterranean civil society’
2 Forum Civil EuroMed "Documento de Trabajo" (working paper), Institut Catala d'Estudis
Mediterranis, Barcelona , Spain, 26 June 1995, p. 2.
3 Ibid., p. 2.
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have had little visible impact upon the region’s most pressing socio-economic and 
political problems, like for example, the crisis in Algeria or the escalating 
unemployment among the region’s young population. Furthermore, there has been 
little continuity in the organisational and programmatic frameworks established at 
Barcelona in 1995.
Any discussion of international civil society fostering internationalist activity 
in the western Mediterranean must therefore be tempered by a recognition of the 
limits to such activity . In particular, one of the central themes of this thesis, namely 
that states and civil societies are strongly intertwined, should be borne in mind. As 
we saw in the introduction, most theorists of international or global civil society 
operate on the assumption that the state and civil society occupy separate spheres of 
social and political life. Thus, civil society is presented as a social domain with its 
own structures and dynamics, which can somehow be detached from the logic that 
permeates the international society of states. The fact, however, is that states and civil 
societies are two inter-related parts of a greater whole, namely capitalist society: there 
is no such thing as an International Non-Governmental Organisation (INGO) or a 
social movement that stands outside wider social relations, including those involving 
the different branches of the state. The point, therefore, is that any emancipatory 
politics emerging from within the ranks of international civil society in the western 
Mediterranean must also account for the role of the state in the struggles for 
progressive change in the region.
The implications of this become readily apparent when we investigate the role 
of Mediterranean civil society in extending human and civil rights across the region. 
Some social movements pin their hopes on the creation of trans-Mediterranean human 
rights networks in the image of the Helsinki Citizen’s Assembly, that may be able to 
pressure for an improvement in the condition of civil and political liberties in the 
area. There is some evidence to suggest that such initiatives are already underway, 
spurred on by the Barcelona Conference. But the problems arise once the 
representatives of such organisations return home from their participation in
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international conferences. If we take the case of the Maghreb as an example, the 
different human rights groups working in the region can certainly be associated to 
a burgeoning 'Mediterranean civil society', and their participation in Barcelona- 
related meetings will in all probability have strengthened their domestic standing. Yet, 
as Susan Waltz has recently argued, these movements cannot be seen in isolation from 
the wider socioeconomic and political processes in North Africa: they are political 
actors with close links to different party-political projects and often, to different 
sectors and factions of the state.4 In so far as they are representatives of civil society, 
therefore, they are also significant players in the political and socioeconomic life of 
their respective states. An analysis of Mediterranean civil society which neglects this 
constant interaction between states and civil societies risks painting an overly 
optimistic picture of the possibilities for democratic change based solely upon 
transnational links among civil societies.. More importantly, the political strategies 
emerging from the different gatherings of Mediterranean civil society seem to suggest 
that change in the existing regional sociopolitical structures will come about through 
the extension of a transnational civil society which somehow contests the state-led 
forms of integration. Yet civil society will become a source of radical transformation 
in the Mediterranean only if it comes to terms with the interaction of states and civil 
societies within the wider political and socioeconomic context of the region. If the 
forces of Mediterranean civil society are to challenge the status quo, one of the first 
steps in this direction should involve critically evaluating their position vis-a-vis the 
international society of states. A second, and perhaps harder step, will be to revise 
their expectations about the power and effectiveness of a supposedly autonomous 
transnational network of civil societies within the western Mediterranean region.
7.4 The Uses of International Civil Society
4 Susan R. Waltz, Human Rights and Reform: Changing the Face o f North African Politics (Berkeley 
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1995).
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The ultimate test of the validity of any concept in the social sciences lies in its 
capacity to explain and to transform our collective social and political lives. The term 
‘civil society’ has in recent years been subject to uses and abuses that have, on these 
terms, rendered this classical concept of western political thought invalid for 
contemporary purposes. Civil society has been burdened with so many meanings and 
has had such high political expectations attached to it, that it has paradoxically 
become an increasingly shallow concept capable of explaining very little and 
transforming even less. This tendency to underestimate the very specific and often 
politically radical nature of civil society both in theory and in practice has been a 
feature of IR theory as we saw in the introductory chapter. The present study has 
evidently participated in this retrieval of civil society and its application within the 
domain of IR. Yet it has also aimed to restore some of the historical and sociological 
complexity of the category, often in critical dialogue with those IR theorists that 
employ the term. What will have hopefully emerged out of this process is a 
conception of international relations that gives collective social and political agency 
a central explanatory role in IR. I have argued that modern social movements have 
been international phenomena from their inception and that they represent a key 
component of the past and the present structure of the international society. 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that a proper historical and sociological 
investigation of this experience can serve present and future struggles for the 
construction of political solidarities across national, ethnic and religious boundaries.
The thesis has focused on the very specific case-study of Tunisia. Though a 
small country without a central role in the unfolding of contemporary world events, 
Tunisia’s history during this century is in many important senses representative of the 
international forces that have shaped the modern world. To that extent, there is no 
obvious reason why the study of the expansion of international civil society to Tunisia 
could not inspire similar studies of other colonised areas of the world. Indeed, the 
choice of case study -a predominantly Arab-Islamic society, historically dominated 
by successive occupying powers- has deliberately sought to dispel any doubts as to
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whether the expansion of international civil society is an exclusively European or 
north-Atlantic phenomenon. So long as the concept of international civil society can 
be deployed in the analysis of international social movements and their role in the 
construction of international society, it will have proved its explanatory utility for IR. 
If it manages to inspire further studies into the processes that instigated the rise of 
modern social and political agency in other parts of the globe, it will have also made 
a broader contribution to the social sciences.
The tallest order for international civil society, however, rests upon its 
capacity to inform the future internationalist politics. This study will have hopefully 
illustrated the historical and conceptual reality of an international social and political 
space where progressive agents can operate. As we have seen, this arena of 
international civil society is open to contestation by divergent and often distinctly 
unpalatable political projects. But the fact that the concept of international civil 
society can be appropriated by oppressive political movements should not blind us to 
its historical and sociological reality.
The expansion of capitalism has generated variegated social formations -albeit 
articulated by the overarching logic of capitalist production and exchange- which in 
turn yield myriad social forces. Political identities forged around notions of 
nationalism, ethnicity, race or religious affiliation have often found expression within 
the ambit of international civil society. Nonetheless, rather than writing such 
movements off as remnants of the past, it is crucial to explain -and criticise- these 
phenomena precisely with reference to the complex reproduction of global capitalism. 
At the same time, however, socialists and other progressive movements must counter 
these social forces in world politics by retracing and revising their own powerful 
tradition of internationalist thought and action that has sought to organise politically 
around universalist principles that transcend nationality, ethnicity or creed. I have 
argued that the idea of international civil society can serve to accomplish these two 
inter-related objectives. Conceptualising the complex and contradictory nature of the 
expansion of international civil society could represent the first step in the
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identification of the social and political sources of this new socialist internationalism.
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